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on Experimental Economics |
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Issue of 2014‒08‒16
thirteen papers chosen by |
| By: | Dickinson, David (Appalachian State University); Masclet, David (University of Rennes); Villeval, Marie Claire (CNRS, GATE) |
| Abstract: | Do individuals trained in law enforcement punish or reward differently from typical student subjects? We analyze norm enforcement behavior of newly appointed police commissioners in both a Voluntary Contribution Mechanism game and a Common Pool Resource game. Our experimental design includes treatments where a reward or sanction institution is exogenously imposed, as well as treatments with endogenous selection of the norm enforcement institution. Compared to a standard student-subject pool, police commissioners cooperate significantly more in both games. With exogenous institutions, police commissioners bear a higher burden of punishment costs than non-police subjects. When the norm enforcement institution is endogenous, all subjects vote more in favor of rewards over sanctions, but police subjects with some work experience are more likely to vote for sanctions. Police subjects also reward and sanction more than the others when the institution results from a majority vote. |
| Keywords: | norm enforcement, common pool resources, voluntary contribution mechanism, police officers, experiment |
| JEL: | C92 H41 D63 |
| Date: | 2014–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp8218&r=exp |
| By: | Haoran He (School of Economics and Business Administration, Beijing Normal University, 19, XinJieKouWai Street, HaiDian District, Beijing 100875, P. R. China); Marie Claire Villeval (Université de Lyon, Lyon, F-69007, France ; CNRS, GATE Lyon St Etienne,F-69130 Ecully, France) |
| Abstract: | We compare inequality aversion in individuals and teams by means of both within- and between-subject experimental designs, and we investigate how teams aggregate individual preferences. We find that team decisions reveal less inequality aversion than individual initial proposals in team decision-making. However, teams are no more selfish than individuals who decide in isolation. Individuals express strategically more inequality aversion in their initial proposals in team decision-making because they anticipate the selfishness of other members. Members with median social preferences drive team decisions. Finally, we show that social image has little influence because guilt and envy are almost similar in anonymous and non-anonymous interactions. |
| Keywords: | Team, inequity aversion, preference aggregation, social image, experiment |
| JEL: | C91 C92 D03 D63 D72 |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gat:wpaper:1417&r=exp |
| By: | Mantilla, Cesar |
| Keywords: | Common pool resource experiment, lie aversion, preferences for consistency |
| JEL: | A13 C93 D03 |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tse:iastwp:28316&r=exp |
| By: | Bartling Björn; Grieder Manuel; Zehnder Christian |
| Abstract: | Is competition perceived as a fair procedure? We report data from laboratory experiments where a powerful buyer can trade with one of several sellers. Sellers who feel shortchanged can engage in counterproductive behavior to punish the buyer. We find that the same unfavorable terms of trade trigger significantly less punishment if the buyer uses a competitive auction to determine the terms of trade than if she uses her authority to dictate the same terms directly. Our results inform the debate on the fairness of market outcomes by showing that the use of a competitive procedure can, by itself, affect how people judge unequal distributive outcomes. |
| Keywords: | Competition, authority, markets, fairness, responsibility, procedures |
| JEL: | C91 D03 D63 |
| Date: | 2014–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zur:econwp:158&r=exp |
| By: | Michael Caldara (Economic Science Institute, Chapman University); Michael McBride (Department of Economics, University of California-Irvine) |
| Abstract: | Many social and economic networks emerge among actors that only partially observe the network when forming network ties. We ask: what types of network architectures form when actors have limited observation, and does limited observation lead to less efficient structures? We report numerous results from a laboratory experiment that varies both network observation and the cost of forming links. Overall, we find that limited network observation does not inevitably lead to highly inefficient networks but instead might actually inhibit inefficient positional jockeying among actors. |
| Keywords: | Networks; Limited observation; Coordination |
| JEL: | C92 D83 D85 |
| Date: | 2014–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:irv:wpaper:141501&r=exp |
| By: | Paola Manzini (University of St Andrews and IZA); Marco Mariotti (University of St Andrews) |
| Abstract: | We compare three methods for the elicitation of time preferences in an experimental setting: the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak procedure (BDM); the second price auction; and the multiple price list format. The first two methods have been used rarely to elicit time preferences. All methods used are perfectly equivalent from a decision theoretic point of view, and they should induce the same `truthful' revelation i dominant strategies. In spite of this, we find that framing does matter: the money discount rates elicited with the multiple price list tend to be higher than those elicited with the other two methods. In addition, our results shed some light on attitudes towards time, and they permit a broad classification of subjects depending on how the size of the elicited values varies with the time horizon |
| Keywords: | time preferences, elicitation methods, BDM, Auctions, MPL |
| JEL: | C91 D9 |
| Date: | 2014–07–21 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:san:wpecon:1405&r=exp |
| By: | Nicolas Jacquemet (EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics - Ecole d'Économie de Paris, BETA - Bureau d'économie théorique et appliquée - CNRS : UMR7522 - Université de Strasbourg - Université Nancy II); Adam Zylbersztejn (EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics - Ecole d'Économie de Paris, CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS : UMR8174 - Université Paris I - Panthéon-Sorbonne) |
| Abstract: | Experiments based on the Beard and Beil (1994) two-player coordination game robustly show that coordination failures arise as a result of two puzzling behaviors: (i) subjects are not willing to rely on others' self-interested maximization, and (ii) self-interested maximization is not ubiquitous. Such behavior is often considered to challenge the relevance of subgame perfectness as an equilibrium selection criterion, since weakly dominated strategies are actually used. We report on new experiments investigating whether inequality in payoffs between players, maintained in most lab implementations of this game, drives such behavior. Our data clearly show that the failure to maximize personal payoffs, as well as the fear that others might act this way, do not stem from inequality aversion. This result is robust to varying the saliency of decisions, repetition-based learning and cultural differences between France and Poland. |
| Keywords: | Coordination Failure ; Subgame perfectness ; Non-credible threats; Laboratory experiments; Social Preferences; Inequality Aversion |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-01026080&r=exp |
| By: | Michael D. Carr; Phil Mellizo |
| Abstract: | Data from lab experiments support the claim that individuals have social preferences. Most models of social preferences, however, consider only the distribution of outcomes, not the source of the endowment used in the game. Once the source is considered, outcomes in the ultimatum game are more difficult to interpret. We extend the ultimatum game to allow for responder-produced endowments. We find that offers increase when the responder produces the endowment, but rejection rates are lower. Further, offers remain below 100% of the endowment, suggesting that unproductive proposers feel entitled to a part of the endowment, and responders respect this right. |
| JEL: | C91 D30 D63 |
| Date: | 2013–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mab:wpaper:2013_01&r=exp |
| By: | Kocher, Martin G.; Tan, Fangfang; Yu, Jing |
| Abstract: | This paper experimentally examines the effect of electoral delegation on providing global public goods shared by several groups. Each group elects a delegate who can freely decide on each group member’s contribution (including the contribution of herself) to the global public good. Our results show that people mostly vote for delegates who assign equal contributions for every group member. However, in contrast to standard theoretical predictions, unequal contributions across groups drive cooperation down over time, and it decreases efficiency by almost 50% compared to the benchmark. This pattern is not driven by delegates trying to exploit their fellow group members, as indicated by the theory – quite to the opposite, other-regarding preferences and a re-election incentives guarantee that delegates assign equal contributions for all group members. Since the source of the resulting inefficiency is the polycentric nature of global public goods provision together with other-regarding preferences, we use the term Pinefficiency to describe our finding. |
| Keywords: | Global Public Goods; Delegation; Cooperation; Experiment |
| JEL: | C92 D72 H41 |
| Date: | 2014–07–24 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lmu:muenec:21163&r=exp |
| By: | Ulrich Schmidt |
| Abstract: | In an intensively discussed paper, Andreoni and Sprenger (2012) , henceforth A&S, present an experiment where subjects can allocate money between two different points of time under the condition of risk. A&S claim that their results refute discounted expected utility (DEU) as well as prospect theory and other models relying on probability weighting. In this note I will show that the theoretical analysis of A&S is inappropriate and, therefore, that their claims are not valid. It turns out that the experimental results of A&S are fully in line with DEU. The main problem of A&S ´s analysis is that is confounds income with consumption. There exist several other comments on A&S (Miao andZhong, 2012; Epper and Fehr-Duda, 2014 and Cheung, 2014) which discuss interesting aspects of the analysis of A&S but have not identified the theoretical implications of equalizing consumption and income |
| Keywords: | Time Preferences |
| JEL: | C91 D81 D91 |
| Date: | 2014–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kie:kieliw:1942&r=exp |
| By: | Wibral, Matthias (University of Bonn) |
| Abstract: | Reputation systems aim to induce honest behavior in online trade by providing information about past conduct of users. Online reputation, however, is not directly connected to a person, but only to the virtual identity of that person. Users can therefore shed a negative reputation by creating a new account. We study the effects of such identity changes on the efficiency of reputation systems. We compare two markets in which we exogenously vary whether sellers can erase their rating profile and start over as new sellers. Buyer trust and seller trustworthiness decrease significantly when sellers can erase their ratings. With identity changes, trust is particularly low towards new sellers since buyers cannot discriminate between truly new sellers and opportunistic sellers who changed their identity. Nevertheless, we observe positive returns on buyer investment under the reputation system with identity changes, and our evidence suggests that trustworthiness is higher than in the complete absence of a reputation system. |
| Keywords: | identity changes, reputation, trust |
| JEL: | C91 D02 L14 |
| Date: | 2014–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp8216&r=exp |
| By: | Chen, Xiu; Kaiser, Harry M.; Rickard, Bradley J. |
| Keywords: | Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety, Production Economics, |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:cudawp:180111&r=exp |
| By: | Das, Ashis; Friedman, Jed; Kandpal, Eeshani; Ramana, GNV; Das Gupta, R K; Pradhan, Madan M; Govindaraj, Ramesh |
| Abstract: | Malaria continues to be a prominent global public health challenge, in part because of the slow population adoption of recommended preventive and curative behaviors. This paper tests the effectiveness of two service delivery models designed to promote recommended behaviors, including prompt treatment seeking for febrile illness, in Odisha India. The tested modules include supportive supervision of community health workers and community mobilization promoting appropriate health seeking. Program effects were identified through a randomized cluster trial comprising 120 villages from two purposively chosen malaria-endemic districts. Significant improvements were measured in the reported utilization of bed nets in both intervention arms vis-à-vis the control. Although overall rates of treatment seeking were equal across the study arms, treatment seeking from community health workers was higher in both intervention arms and care seeking from trained providers also increased with a substitution away from untrained providers. Further, fever cases in both treatments were more likely to have received timely medical treatment (within 24 hours) from a skilled provider. The study arm with supportive supervision was particularly effective in shifting care seeking to community health workers and ensuring prompt diagnosis and treatment. A community-based intervention combining the supportive supervision of community health workers with intensive community mobilization can be effective in shifting care seeking and increasing preventive behavior, and thus may be used to strengthen the national malaria control program. |
| Keywords: | Health Monitoring&Evaluation,Housing&Human Habitats,Disease Control&Prevention,Population Policies,Adolescent Health |
| Date: | 2014–06–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:6901&r=exp |