New Economics Papers
on Experimental Economics
Issue of 2014‒04‒11
28 papers chosen by

  1. What Mechanism Design Theorists Had to Say About Laboratory Experimentation in the Mid-1980s By Kyu Sang Lee
  2. Optimal prizes in dynamic elimination contests: Theory and experimental evidence By Rudi Stracke; Wolfgang Höchtl; Rudolf Kerschbamer; Uwe Sunde
  3. Effects of Stress on Economic Decision-Making: Evidence from Laboratory Experiments By Delaney, Liam; Fink, Günther; Harmon, Colm P.
  4. An experimental study of corporate social responsibility through charitable giving in Bertrand markets By Feicht, Robert; Grimm, Veronika; Seebauer, Michael
  5. Between-group conflict and other-regarding preferences in nested social dilemmas By Robert Böhm; Gary Bornstein; Hannes Koppel
  6. Savings in Transnational Households: A Field Experiment among Migrants from El Salvador By Nava Ashraf; Diego Aycinena; Claudia Martínez A.; Dean Yang
  7. Experience in Public Goods Experiments By Anna Conte; M. Vittoria Levati; Natalia Montinari
  8. Public Goods: Voluntary Contributions and Risk By Miguel Sánchez Villalba; Silvia Martínez-Gorricho
  9. Social Capital to Induce a Contribution to Environmental Collective Action in Indonesia: An Experimental Method By Alin Halimatussadiah; Budy P. Resosudarmo; Diah Widyawati
  10. "Channels of Peer Effects and Guilt Aversion in Crime: Experimental and Empirical Evidence from Bangladesh" By Masahiro Shoji
  11. The CCCTB option: An experimental study By Keser, Claudia; Kimpel, Gerrit; Oestreicher, Andreas
  12. Peer Effects and Students’ Self-Control By Berno Buechel; Lydia Mechtenberg; Julia Petersen;
  13. Investing Even in Uneven Contests: Effects of Asymmetry on Investment in Experimental All-Pay Contests By Einav Hart; Judith Avrahami; Yaakov Kareev; Peter M. Todd
  14. The Impact of Vocational Training for the Unemployed: Experimental Evidence from Turkey By Hirshleifer, Sarojini; McKenzie, David; Almeida, Rita K.; Ridao-Cano, Cristobal
  15. Why are economists so different? Nature, nurture, and gender effects in a simple trust game By Haucap, Justus; Müller, Andrea
  16. An Examination of Racial Discrimination in the Labor Market for Recent College Graduates: Estimates from the Field By John M. Nunley; Adam Pugh; Nicholas Romero; Richard Alan Seals, Jr.
  17. College Major, Internship Experience, and Employment Opportunities: Estimates from a Résumé Audit By John M. Nunley; Adam Pugh; Nicholas Romero; Richard Alan Seals, Jr.
  18. Knowing that You Matter, Matters! The Interplay of Meaning, Monetary Incentives, and Worker Recognition By Kosfeld, Michael; Neckermann, Susanne; Yang, Xiaolan
  19. Attention Discrimination: Theory and Field Experiments with Monitoring Information Acquisition By Bartos, Vojtech; Bauer, Michal; Chytilová, Julie; Matejka, Filip
  20. School Resources, Behavioral Responses and School Quality: Short-Term Experimental Evidence from Niger By Elizabeth Beasley; Elise Huillery
  21. Misperception of Consumption: Evidence from a Choice Experiment By Seeun Jung; Yasuhiro Nakamoto; Masayuki Sato; Katsunori Yamada
  22. What can experiments tell us about how to improve governance? By Gisselquist, Rachel M.; Nino-Zarazua, Miguel
  23. Shirking, Monitoring, and Risk Aversion By Seeun Jung; Kenneth Houngbedji
  24. Monkey see, monkey do: Truth-telling in matching algorithms and the manipulation of others By Guillen, Pablo; Hakimov, Rustamdjan
  25. Attitudes to Income Inequality: Experimental and Survey Evidence By Andrew E. Clark; Conchita D'ambrosio
  26. Designing experiments to measure spillover effects By Baird, Sarah; Bohren, Aislinn; McIntosh, Craig; Ozler, Berk
  27. Brainstorming versus creative design reasoning By Akin Osman Kazakci; Thomas Gillier; Gerald Piat; Armand Hatchuel
  28. The heterogeneous effects of HIV testing By Baird, Sarah; Gong, Erick; McIntosh, Craig; Ozler, Berk

  1. By: Kyu Sang Lee
    Abstract: Thanks to the recent studies of the history and philosophy of experimental economics, it is well known that around the early 1980s, experimental economists made a case for the legitimacy of their laboratory work by emphasizing that it was a nice and indispensable complement to mechanism design theorists’ mathematical study of institutions. The present paper examines what mechanism design theorists thought of laboratory experimentation, or whether they were willing to form a coalition with experimental economists circa the mid-1980s. By exploring several dimensions of the relationship between mechanism design theory and experimental economics, the present paper shows that a close rapport had been established by the early 1980s between the representative members of the two camps, and also that mechanism design theorists were among the strongest supporters of laboratory experimentation in the economics profession in the mid-1980s.
    Keywords: mechanism design theory, experimental economics, institutional design, Stanley Reiter, Vernon Smith, Charles Plott
    Date: 2013
  2. By: Rudi Stracke; Wolfgang Höchtl; Rudolf Kerschbamer; Uwe Sunde
    Abstract: This paper investigates the implications of different prize structures on effort provision in dynamic (two-stage) elimination contests. Theoretical results show that, for risk-neutral participants, a structure with a single prize for the winner of the contest maximizes total effort, while a structure with two appropriately chosen prizes (a runner-up prize and a final prize) ensures incentive maintenance across stages. In contrast, a structure with two prizes may dominate a winner-takes-all contest in both dimensions if participants are risk-averse. Evidence from laboratory experiments is largely consistent with these predictions, suggesting that contest design should account for risk attitudes of participants.
    Keywords: Dynamic Contests, Multiple Prizes, Risk Aversion, Experiment, Over-provision
    JEL: C72 D72 J33
    Date: 2014–03
  3. By: Delaney, Liam (University of Stirling); Fink, Günther (Harvard School of Public Health); Harmon, Colm P. (University of Sydney)
    Abstract: The ways in which preferences respond to the varying stress of economic environments is a key question for behavioral economics and public policy. We conducted a laboratory experiment to investigate the effects of stress on financial decision making among individuals aged 50 and older. Using the cold pressor task as a physiological stressor, and a series of intelligence tests as cognitive stressors, we find that stress increases subjective discounting rates, has no effect on the degree of risk-aversion, and substantially lowers the effort individuals make to learn about financial decisions.
    Keywords: stress, financial decisions, discounting, risk aversion, learning
    JEL: D91 I31
    Date: 2014–03
  4. By: Feicht, Robert; Grimm, Veronika; Seebauer, Michael
    Abstract: We experimentally investigate a Bertrand market with homogenous goods where sellers may behave socially responsible by donating a share of their profits to an existing non-profit organization. In our experiment, we find that this Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) component is used independent of its credibility. However, market outcomes in terms of prices and profits do neither significantly differ with respect to the credibility of the CSR component nor in comparison to a market without the availability of CSR components. Moreover, prices have the main impact on purchase decisions while higher donations only affect purchase decisions when they are credible and price differences are negligible. We conclude that competition severely limits the possibility to attract customers with CSR components. Actual donations are small and the burden induced by the CSR components is shifted partly to the buyers resulting in equal profits in all treatments. --
    Keywords: Corporate Social Responsibility,Competition,Charitable Giving,Experiment
    JEL: C92 D22 M31
    Date: 2014
  5. By: Robert Böhm (RWTH Aachen University, Germany); Gary Bornstein (Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel); Hannes Koppel (Heidelberg University, Germany)
    Abstract: We investigate experimentally the underlying motivations and individual dierences with regard to the participation in between-group conflict in nested social dilemmas. In our nested social dilemmas, the collective is divided into two groups, and individuals allocate tokens between a private, a group-specific, and a collective good. We vary the marginal per capita return of the group-specific and collective good in order to manipulate the motivational within- and between group conflicts. A first experiment shows that a between-group conflict leads to within-group cooperation and particularly individuals with positive other-regarding preferences (prosocials) react to a between-group conflict by contributing to the group-specific good. Hence, paradoxically, individuals with positive other-regarding preferences may foster between-group conflicts. A second experiment reveals that prosocials' contributions to the group-specific or collective good vary as a function of the personal costs of within-group versus collective cooperation, supporting the weighted average social preference theory by Charness and Rabin (2002).
    Keywords: between-group conflict, nested social dilemma, other-regarding preferences, local and global public goods
    JEL: C72 C92 H41
    Date: 2014–03–31
  6. By: Nava Ashraf; Diego Aycinena; Claudia Martínez A.; Dean Yang
    Abstract: We implemented a randomized field experiment that tested ways to stimulate savings by international migrants in their origin country. We find that migrants value and take advantage of opportunities to exert greater control over financial activities in their home countries. In partnership with a Salvadoran bank, we offered U.S.-based migrants bank accounts in El Salvador. We randomly varied migrant control over El Salvador-based savings by offering different types of accounts across treatment groups. Migrants offered the greatest degree of control accumulated the most savings at the partner bank, compared to others offered less or no control over savings. Impacts are likely to represent increases in total savings: there is no evidence that savings increases were simply reallocated from other savings mechanisms. Enhanced control over home-country savings does not affect remittances sent home by migrants.
    JEL: F22 O16
    Date: 2014–03
  7. By: Anna Conte (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena, and WBS, University of Westminster, EQM Department); M. Vittoria Levati (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena, and University of Verona, Department of Economics); Natalia Montinari (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena, and Lund University, Department of Economics)
    Abstract: We use information on students' past participation in economic experiments, as stored in our database, to analyze whether behavior in public goods games is affected by experience (i.e., previous participation in social dilemma-type experiments) and history (i.e., participation in experiments of a different class than the social dilemma). We have three main results. First, at the aggregate level, the amount subjects contribute and expect others to contribute decrease with experience. Second, a mixture model reveals that the proportion of unconditional cooperators decreases with experience, while that of selfish individuals increases. Finally, history also influences behavior, although to a lesser extent than experience. Our findings have important methodological implications for researchers, who are urged to control for subjects' experience and history in their experiments if they want to improve the external validity and replicability of their results.
    Keywords: Public goods experiments, Social preferences, Mixture models, Experience, History
    JEL: C35 C51 C72 H41
    Date: 2014–03–31
  8. By: Miguel Sánchez Villalba (Dpto. Fundamentos del Análisis Económico); Silvia Martínez-Gorricho (Dpto. Análisis Económico Aplicado)
    Abstract: We analyze two incentive mechanisms as a way of financing public goods. Our mechanism can be interpreted as a variation of a parimutuel lottery in which the total rebate (prize) is made endogenous by setting it equal to a non-increasing function of total bets. The mechanism changes the nature of the standard VCM from a Prisoner’s Dilemma to a Stag-Hunt game. We tested —and found support for— the theoretical predictions of the model by means of a computer-based experiment. The theoretical model and the supporting experimental evidence both suggest the mechanism is an efficient and equitable means to finance public goods through voluntary contributions. In policy terms, and beyond the efficiency and equity considerations, the mechanism would be easy to implement and run given its simplicity and self-sufficiency.
    Keywords: Public Goods, Voluntary Contribution Mechanism, Subsidy Schemes, Laboratory Experiments
    JEL: C72 C92 H41
    Date: 2014–03
  9. By: Alin Halimatussadiah; Budy P. Resosudarmo; Diah Widyawati
    Abstract: Social capital is considered to be an important factor in economic development. It is argued that it generates a flow of (economic) benefits through collective action, by reducing free riding and increasing individual contribution. This study examines whether social capital increases individual contribution in a collective action situation. Using a classroom experiment, two games are played in a sequential manner: a trust game to measure level of trust–as a proxy for social capital–and a public goods game to measure individual contribution to collective action. In the public goods game, we apply some treatments to look at the impact of partial disclosure of a group member’s behaviour in the trust game on contributions in the public goods game. In general, the result shows that the level of social capital positively impacts individual contribution to collective action. However, we found no significant evidence to support the impact of partial disclosure of a group member's behaviour in the trust game on contributions in the public goods game.
    Keywords: Social Capital, Collective Action, Trust Game, Public Goods Game
    JEL: A14 C91 C92
    Date: 2014
  10. By: Masahiro Shoji (Faculty of Economics, Seijo University)
    Abstract:    This study empirically disentangles the channels of peer effects in crime through an experiment conducted in rural Bangladesh. The first part of this study assumes that individuals exhibit guilt aversion, which predicts the peer effects via guilt sensitivity and belief. By incorporating peer effects in a take-away game, the criminal player is informed about the victim player's belief only in the treatment group, so that the peer effects in the treatment group are driven only through guilt sensitivity. The experime ntal results suggest that peer effects affect and bring about changes in belief. The second part elicits guilt sensitivity to test guilt aversion. I find robust supporting evidence for my results, and reject the alternatives such as pure altruism and trustw orthiness. Finally, external validity is also confirmed: the criminal behaviour of subjects in the experiment is correlated with their attitude towards illegal activities in the real wo rld, and individuals are less likely to suffer from property crime in villages with a higher guilt sensitivity neighbourhood.
    Date: 2014–02
  11. By: Keser, Claudia; Kimpel, Gerrit; Oestreicher, Andreas
    Abstract: The objective of this paper is to look into the probability that, given the choice, corporate groups would opt for taxation on a consolidated basis. Consolidation would allow them to offset losses crossborder but remove the opportunity to exploit international tax-rate differentials between entities via transfer pricing. We present a laboratory experiment in which we investigate to what extent a corporation would be inclined to take up the consolidation option and how this would impact on the corporation´s location of investment and its transfer pricing activities involving locations outside the consolidated group. We use a 2-by-2 treatment design with two levels of tax-rate differential between two investment locations, and two different remuneration functions allowing the participants to act as owners or managers of a company. --
    Keywords: international company taxation,separate accounting,formula apportionment,transfer pricing,experimental economics
    JEL: C91 H25 M41
    Date: 2014
  12. By: Berno Buechel; Lydia Mechtenberg; Julia Petersen;
    Abstract: We conducted a multi-wave field experiment to study the interaction of peer effects and selfcontrol among undergraduate students. We use a behavioral measure of self-control based on whether students achieve study related goals they have set for themselves. We find that both self-control and the number of talented friends increase students’ performance. We then set out to test the theoretical prediction of Battaglini, Bénabou and Tirole (2005) that (only) sufficiently self-controlled individuals profit from interactions with peers. We find that peers with high self-control are more likely to connect to others, have a higher overall number of friends and have a higher number of talented friends. Moreover, positive news about self-controlled behavior of their peers increases students’ own perseverance. Hence, our findings are consistent with the model of Battaglini, Bénabou and Tirole. In addition, we find that female students are more likely to have high self-control, but do not outperform male students. One reason for this is that female students have a lower number of talented friends than their male counterparts, thereby profiting less from positive peer effects.
    Keywords: Self-control, Peer Influence, Social Networks, Goals, Time preferences, Procrastination, Willpower, School Performance, Experiment
    JEL: C93 D85 I21 J24
    Date: 2014–04
  13. By: Einav Hart; Judith Avrahami; Yaakov Kareev; Peter M. Todd
    Abstract: Many competitions require investment of nonrefundable resources, e.g., political campaigns, financial markets, sports or courting rituals. One contestant wins the prize for the invested amount, while all others forfeit their investments without receiving compensation. Frequently, contests are asymmetric, due to differing resources or prize valuations. This could lead weaker contestants to avoid investing, and stronger ones to lower their investment. Two experiments explored the effects of asymmetry between the contestants – arising from their endowments or prizes – on investments. Subjects played both symmetric and asymmetric contests, enabling direct within-subject comparisons. We observed an effect of asymmetry only when it concerned endowments: Subjects invested less when their endowments were asymmetric, whereas (a-)symmetry in the prizes did not influence investments. The changes between consecutive investments can be explained by reactions to the previous outcome (win or loss) in terms of regret over the previous investment being too much or too little.
    Date: 2014–02
  14. By: Hirshleifer, Sarojini (University of California, San Diego); McKenzie, David (World Bank); Almeida, Rita K. (World Bank); Ridao-Cano, Cristobal (World Bank)
    Abstract: We use a randomized experiment to evaluate a large-scale active labor market policy: Turkey's vocational training programs for the unemployed. A detailed follow-up survey of a large sample with low attrition enables precise estimation of treatment impacts and their heterogeneity. The average impact of training on employment is positive, but close to zero and statistically insignificant, which is much lower than either program officials or applicants expected. Over the first year after training we do find training to have had statistically significant effects on the quality of employment, and that the positive impacts are stronger when training is offered by private providers. However, longer-term administrative data shows that after three years these effects have also dissipated.
    Keywords: vocational training, active labor market programs, randomized experiment, private provision
    JEL: I28 J24 J68 O12 C93
    Date: 2014–03
  15. By: Haucap, Justus; Müller, Andrea
    Abstract: We analyze the behavior of 577 economics and law students in a simple binary trust experiment. While economists are both significantly less trusting and less trustworthy than law students, this difference is largely due to differences between female law and economics students. While female law students are already different in nature (during the first term of study) from female economists, the gap between them also widens more drastically over the course of their study compared to their male counterparts. This finding is rather critical as the detailed composition of students is typically neglected in most experiments. --
    Keywords: Gender Effects,Trust Game,Economists,Nature,Nurture
    JEL: A12 A22 C35 C91
    Date: 2014
  16. By: John M. Nunley; Adam Pugh; Nicholas Romero; Richard Alan Seals, Jr.
    Abstract: We present experimental evidence from a correspondence test of racial discrimination in the labor market for recent college graduates. Online job advertisements were answered with over 9,000 résumé s from fictitious, recently-graduated job seekers. We find strong evidence of differential treatment by race: black applicants receive approximately 14 percent fewer interview requests than their otherwise identical white counterparts. The racial gap in employment opportunities increases as perceived productivity characteristics are added, which is difficult to reconcile with models of statistical discrimination. We investigate different channels through which the observed racial differences might occur and conclude that taste-based discrimination at the race-skill level is the most likely explanation. The racial differences identified operate primarily through customer-level discrimination.
    Keywords: Racial Discrimination; Employment; Productivity; Field Experiments; Correspondence Studies
    JEL: J23 J24 J71
    Date: 2014–04
  17. By: John M. Nunley; Adam Pugh; Nicholas Romero; Richard Alan Seals, Jr.
    Abstract: We use experimental data from a résumé-audit study to estimate the impact of particular college majors and internship experience on employment opportunities. Our experimental design relies on the randomization of résumé characteristics to identify the causal effects of these attributes on job opportunities. Despite applying exclusively to business-related job openings, we find no evidence that business degrees improve employment prospects. Furthermore, we find no evidence linking particular degrees to interview-request rates. By contrast, internship experience increases the interview-request rate by about 14 percent. In addition, the “returns” to internship experience are larger for non-business majors than for business majors.
    Keywords: College Major; Internship; Employment; Field Experiments; Correspondence Studies; Résumé Audit
    JEL: J23 J24 J60
    Date: 2014–04
  18. By: Kosfeld, Michael (Goethe University Frankfurt); Neckermann, Susanne (Erasmus University Rotterdam); Yang, Xiaolan (Zhejiang University)
    Abstract: We manipulate workers' perceived meaning of a job in a field experiment. Half of the workers are informed that their job is important, the other half are told that their job is of no relevance. Results show that workers exert more effort when meaning is high, corroborating previous findings on the relationship between meaning and work effort. We then compare the effect of meaning to the effect of monetary incentives and of worker recognition via symbolic awards. We also look at interaction effects. While meaning outperforms monetary incentives, the latter have a robust positive effect on performance that is independent of meaning. In contrast, meaning and recognition have largely similar effects but interact negatively. Our results are in line with image-reward theory (Bénabou and Tirole 2006) and suggest that meaning and worker recognition operate via the same channel, namely image seeking.
    Keywords: meaning, monetary incentives, worker recognition, field experiment
    JEL: C93 J33 M12 M52
    Date: 2014–03
  19. By: Bartos, Vojtech (CERGE-EI); Bauer, Michal (Charles University, Prague); Chytilová, Julie (Charles University, Prague); Matejka, Filip (CERGE-EI)
    Abstract: We link two important ideas: attention is scarce and lack of information about an individual drives discrimination in selection decisions. Our model of allocation of costly attention implies that applicants from negatively stereotyped groups face "attention discrimination": less attention in highly selective cherry-picking markets, where more attention helps applicants, and more attention in lemon-dropping markets, where it harms them. To test the prediction, we integrate tools to monitor information acquisition into correspondence field experiments. In both countries we study we find that unfavorable signals, minority names, or unemployment, systematically reduce employers' efforts to inspect resumes. Also consistent with the model, in the rental housing market, which is much less selective than labor markets, we find landlords acquire more information about minority relative to majority applicants. We discuss implications of endogenous attention for magnitude and persistence of discrimination in selection decisions, returns to human capital and, potentially, for policy.
    Keywords: discrimination, attention, field experiment, monitoring information acquisition
    JEL: C93 D83 J15 J71
    Date: 2014–03
  20. By: Elizabeth Beasley; Elise Huillery (Département d'économie)
    Abstract: Increasing school resources has often shown disappointing effects on school quality in developing countries, a lack of impact which may be due to student, parent or teacher behavioral responses. We test the short-term impact of an increase in school resources under parental control using an experimental school grant program in Niger.
    JEL: H52 O15 I21 I28
    Date: 2013–04
  21. By: Seeun Jung (PSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - CNRS : UMR8545 - École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) - École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC) - École normale supérieure [ENS] - Paris - Institut national de la recherche agronomique (INRA), EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics - Ecole d'Économie de Paris); Yasuhiro Nakamoto (Kyushu Sangyo University - Kyushu Sangyo University); Masayuki Sato (Graduate School of Human Development and Environment - Kobe University); Katsunori Yamada (ISER - Institute of Social and Economic Research - Osaka University)
    Abstract: We investigate people's different conceptions of the economic term "consumption" when comparing with others. An Internet-based hypothetical discrete choice experiment was conducted with Japanese participants. As in other relative income comparison studies, we found that own consumption and own saving had a positive impact on utility, whereas the consumption and saving of a reference person had a negative impact on utility. However, the results show that the magnitudes of consumption and saving differ in size; saving could affect utility much more than consumption for the Japanese subjects. By using scope tests, we found that the impact of own consumption is not monotonic and so does not necessarily increase utility. This calls into question the conventional assumption of the monotonicity of "the utility of consumption"; consumption could be perceived as a negative good. Our results, therefore, provide some evidence that, in reality, people understand and perceive the economic terms differently from what economists would expect. Furthermore, when considering the consumption of others as well as their own, the size of the discrepancy is even bigger.
    Keywords: Relative Utility ; Choice Experiment ; Misperception of Economic Terms
    Date: 2014–03
  22. By: Gisselquist, Rachel M.; Nino-Zarazua, Miguel
    Abstract: In recent years, randomized controlled trials have become increasingly popular in the social sciences. In development economics in particular, their use has attracted considerable debate in relation to the identification of .what works. in development pol
    Keywords: randomised control trials, governance, development
    Date: 2013
  23. By: Seeun Jung (PSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - CNRS : UMR8545 - École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) - École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC) - École normale supérieure [ENS] - Paris - Institut national de la recherche agronomique (INRA), EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics - Ecole d'Économie de Paris); Kenneth Houngbedji (PSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - CNRS : UMR8545 - École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) - École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC) - École normale supérieure [ENS] - Paris - Institut national de la recherche agronomique (INRA), EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics - Ecole d'Économie de Paris)
    Abstract: This paper studies the effect of risk aversion on effort under different monitoring schemes. It uses a theoretical model which relaxes the assumption of agents being risk neutral, and investigates changes of effort as monitoring varies. The predictions of the theoretical model are tested using an original experimental setting where the level of risk aversion is measured and monitoring rates vary exogenously. Our results show that shirking decreases with risk aversion and monitoring. Moreover, monitoring is more effective to curtail shirking behaviors for subjects who are less risk averse.
    Keywords: Risk aversion
    Date: 2014–03
  24. By: Guillen, Pablo; Hakimov, Rustamdjan
    Abstract: We test the effect of the amount of information on the strategies played by others in the theoretically strategy-proof Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanism. We find that providing limited information on the strategies played by others has a negative and significant effect in truth-telling rates relative to full or no information about others' strategies. Subjects report truthfully more often when either full information or no information on the strategies played by others is available. Our results have potentially important implications for the design of markets based on strategy-proof matching algorithms. --
    Keywords: school choice,top trading cycles,strategy-proofness
    JEL: C78 D79 D80 I20
    Date: 2014
  25. By: Andrew E. Clark (EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics - Ecole d'Économie de Paris, PSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - CNRS : UMR8545 - École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) - École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC) - École normale supérieure [ENS] - Paris - Institut national de la recherche agronomique (INRA)); Conchita D'ambrosio (Université du Luxembourg - Université du Luxembourg)
    Abstract: We review the findings in surveys and experiments from the literature on attitudes to income inequality. We interpret the latter as any disparity in incomes between individuals. We classify these contributions into two broad groups of individual attitudes to income distribution in a society: the normative and the comparative view. The first can be thought of as the individual's disinterested evaluation of income inequality; on the contrary, the second view reflects self-interest, as individual's inequality attitudes depend not only on how much income they receive but also on how much they receive compared to others. We conclude with a number of extensions, outstanding issues and suggestions for future research.
    Keywords: Attitudes ; Distribution ; Experiments ; Income inequality ; Life satisfaction ; Reference groups
    Date: 2014–03–31
  26. By: Baird, Sarah; Bohren, Aislinn; McIntosh, Craig; Ozler, Berk
    Abstract: This paper formalizes the design of experiments intended specifically to study spillover effects. By first randomizing the intensity of treatment within clusters and then randomly assigning individual treatment conditional on this cluster-level intensity, a novel set of treatment effects can be identified. The paper develops a formal framework for consistent estimation of these effects, provides explicit expressions for power calculations, and shows that the power to detect average treatment effects declines precisely with the quantity that identifies the novel treatment effects. A demonstration of the technique is provided using a cash transfer program in Malawi.
    Keywords: Disease Control&Prevention,Science Education,Scientific Research&Science Parks,Technology Industry,Labor Policies
    Date: 2014–03–01
  27. By: Akin Osman Kazakci (CGS - Centre de Gestion Scientifique - MINES ParisTech - École nationale supérieure des mines de Paris); Thomas Gillier (ERPI - Equipe de Recherche sur les Processus Innovatifs - Institut National Polytechnique de Lorraine (INPL) - Ecole Nationale Supérieure en Génie des Systèmes Industriels); Gerald Piat (EDF R&D - EDF); Armand Hatchuel (CGS - Centre de Gestion Scientifique - MINES ParisTech - École nationale supérieure des mines de Paris)
    Abstract: In industrial settings, brainstorming is seen as an effective technique for creativity in innovation processes. However, bulk of research on brainstorming is based on an oversimplified view of the creativity process. Participants are seen as idea generators and the process aims at maximizing the quantity of ideas produced, and the evaluation occurs post-process based on some originality and feasibility criteria. Design theories can help enrich this simplistic process model. The present study reports an experimental investigation of creativity process within the context of real-life design ideation task. Results lead to the rejection of the classical 'quantity breeds quality' hypothesis. Rather, we observe that successful groups are the ones who produce a few original propositions that hold great value for users while looking for ways to make those propositions feasible.
    Date: 2014–04–02
  28. By: Baird, Sarah; Gong, Erick; McIntosh, Craig; Ozler, Berk
    Abstract: An extensive multi-disciplinary literature examines the effects of learning one's HIV status on subsequent risky sexual behaviors. However, many of these studies rely on non-experimental designs; use self-reported outcome measures, or both. This study investigates the effects of a randomly assigned home based HIV testing and counseling (HTC) intervention on risky sexual behaviors and schooling investments among school-age females in Malawi. The study finds no overall effects on HIV, Herpes Simplex Virus (HSV-2), or achievement test scores at follow-up. However, among the small group of individuals who tested positive for HIV, a large increase in the probability of contracting HSV-2 is found, with this effect stronger among those surprised by their test results. Similarly, those surprised by HIV-negative test results see a significant improvement in achievement test scores, consistent with increased returns to investments in human capital. The finding of increased HSV-2 prevalence among HIV-positive individuals suggests that the conventional wisdom that those who learn they are HIV-positive will adopt safer sexual practices should be treated with caution.
    Keywords: Disease Control&Prevention,Population Policies,HIV AIDS,Gender and Health,HIV AIDS and Business
    Date: 2014–03–01

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