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on Experimental Economics |
| By: | Bart J. Wilson (Chapman University, Economic Science Institute) |
| Keywords: | experimental economics, deception, professional ethics of economists |
| JEL: | C90 |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:chu:wpaper:14-05&r=exp |
| By: | Brañas-Garza, Pablo; Rodriguez-Lara, Ismael |
| Abstract: | We report experimental data on expectations about generosity in a dictator game in which dictators first divide the pie and then make a guess about the donation of other dictators. In our experiment, recipients have to guess the donation that they are going to receive from their own dictator as well as the donation of other dictator, whose choice does not affect their own payoffs. Our findings indicate that property rights are important to explain guesses, as dictators predict a smaller donation from other dictators than recipients do. We also observe that the involvement in the game is crucial as recipients expect other dictators to be more generous than their own dictator. When we compare guesses with actual donations, we see that dictators' guesses are positively correlated with their own transfer and that recipients overestimate the kindness of other dictators, as they expect them to be more kind than what they actually are. |
| Keywords: | generosity, expectations, dictator game, fairness, property rights, involvement. |
| JEL: | C9 D63 D64 |
| Date: | 2014–02–26 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:53760&r=exp |
| By: | Neyse, Levent; Brañas-Garza, Pablo |
| Abstract: | Literature on Digit Ratio is rapidly growing in Economics. Quite surprisingly we observe that there is no consensus about how to make an accurate measurement in such a delicate task. Along this brief document we offer some concise guidance of how to scan the hands using digital scanners and provide a comprehensive guideline to make a reliable measurement of the 2D:4D. Furthermore, we point out the most common imaging and measurement errors. We also provide a number of hints aimed to avoid these errors that in some cases may cause systematic inaccuracies. |
| Keywords: | 2D:4D; Digit ratio; Measurement; Guide |
| JEL: | C42 C8 C90 |
| Date: | 2014–03–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:54134&r=exp |
| By: | Kamei, Kenju |
| Abstract: | We elicit human conditional punishment types by conducting experiments. We find that their punishment decisions to an individual are on average significantly positively proportional to other members’ punishment decisions to that individual. |
| Keywords: | cooperation, punishment, experiments |
| JEL: | C91 C92 D70 H41 |
| Date: | 2014–02–28 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:54031&r=exp |
| By: | Bao, T. (University of Amsterdam); Hommes, C.H. (University of Amsterdam); Makarewicz, T.A. (University of Amsterdam) |
| Abstract: | This experiment compares the price dynamics and bubble formation in an asset market with a price adjustment rule in three treatments where subjects (1) submit a price forecast only, (2) choose quantity to buy/sell and (3) perform both tasks. We find that bubbles emerge in all these treatments, but to a larger degree in treatment (2) and (3). Our result confirms that bubble formation is a robust finding in markets with positive expectation feedback. We also find some repeated ``super bubbles'' where the price is 3 times larger than the fundamental value, which were not seen in former experiments. |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ams:ndfwpp:14-01&r=exp |
| By: | Matsdotter, Elina (Department of Economics, Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences); Elofsson, Katarina (Department of Economics, Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences); Arntyr, Johan (Ramböll Sverige AB) |
| Abstract: | A majority of consumers claim to prefer climate-labelled food over non-labelled alternatives. However, there is limited empirical evidence that such labels actually influence consumer behaviour when shopping. The purpose of this study is to investigate whether qualitative information about a voluntary climate labelling scheme affects the demand for milk in the short run. In a randomized field experiment conducted in 17 retail stores in Sweden, the effects of a climate label on milk demand was measured. Results suggest that climate labelling increased demand for medium-fat climate labelled milk by approximately 7%. The response is significantly smaller than suggested by consumer surveys but larger than that observed in earlier studies of actual purchasing behaviour where quantitative information on climate impact was provided. |
| Keywords: | Climate labelling; milk; demand; voluntary policy instruments; randomized controlled trial |
| JEL: | D12 D83 Q18 Q54 |
| Date: | 2014–02–13 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:slueko:2014_002&r=exp |
| By: | Adriana Breaban (Department of Economics and LEE, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón, Spain); Charles N. Noussair (Department of Economics, Tilburg University, Tilburg, The Netherlands) |
| Abstract: | We report results from an asset market experiment, in which we investigate how the time path of the fundamental value trajectory affects the level of adherence to fundamentals. In contrast to previous experiments with long-lived assets, there is a phase in which fundamental values are constant before the onset of a trend. The trend is either increasing or decreasing, depending on the treatment. We compare the level of mispricing between the decreasing and increasing fundamental value trajectories. Before the market begins, risk aversion, loss aversion, and cognitive reflection protocols are administered to traders. We find evidence for closer adherence to fundamental values when the trajectory follows a decreasing, than when it has an increasing, trend. Greater average risk aversion on the part of traders in the market predicts lower market prices. The greater the level of loss aversion of the trader cohort, the lower the quantity traded. The greater the average cognitive reflection test score, the smaller the differences between market prices and fundamental values. The variation between groups in risk aversion, loss aversion, and CRT score, explains 45% and 18% of the cohort-level variation in price level and mispricing, respectively. |
| Keywords: | Bubble, Fundamental Value, CRT, Crash |
| JEL: | C92 G02 |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jau:wpaper:2014/08&r=exp |
| By: | Dorsett, Richard (National Institute of Economic and Social Research); Oswald, Andrew J. (University of Warwick) |
| Abstract: | Many politicians believe they can intervene in the economy to improve people’s lives. But can they? In a social experiment carried out in the United Kingdom, extensive in-work support was randomly assigned among 16,000 disadvantaged people. We follow a sub-sample of 3,500 single parents for 5 ensuing years. The results reveal a remarkable, and troubling, finding. Long after eligibility had ceased, the treated individuals had substantially lower psychological well-being, worried more about money, and were increasingly prone to debt. Thus helping people apparently hurt them. We discuss a behavioral framework consistent with our findings and reflect on implications for policy. |
| Keywords: | Well-Being |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cge:warwcg:182&r=exp |
| By: | Andersson, Ola (Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)); Huysentruyt, Marieke (London School of Economics); Miettinen, Topi (Hanken School of Economics at HECER); Stephan, Ute (Aston Business School) |
| Abstract: | We investigate the effects of organizational culture and personal value orientations on performance under individual and team contest incentives. We develop a model of regard for others and in-group favoritism predicting interaction effects between organizational culture and personal values in the contest games. The predictions are tested in a computerized lab experiment with exogenous control of both organizational culture and incentives. In line with our theoretical model we find that prosocial (proself) orientated subjects exert more (less) effort in team contests in the primed prosocial organizational culture condition, relative to the neutrally primed baseline condition. Further, when the prosocial organizational culture is combined with individual contest incentives, prosocial subjects no longer outperform their proself counterparts. These findings provide a first, affirmative, causal test of person-organization fit theory. They also suggest the importance of a 'triple-fit' between personal preferences, organizational culture and incentive mechanisms for prosocially orientated individuals. |
| Keywords: | Tournaments; Organizational culture; Personal values; Person-organization fit; Teams; Economic incentives |
| JEL: | C91 D02 D23 J33 M52 |
| Date: | 2014–02–27 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:1010&r=exp |
| By: | Doerrenberg, Philipp; Duncan, Denvil; Zeppenfeld, Christopher |
| Abstract: | This paper examines whether risk-taking in a lottery depends on the opportunity to respond to the lottery outcome through additional labor effort and/or tax evasion. Previous empirical attempts to answer this question face identification issues due to self selection into jobs that facilitate tax evasion and labor effort exibility. We address these identification issues using a laboratory experiment (N = 180). Subjects have the opportunity to invest earned income in a lottery and, depending on randomly assigned treatment states, have the opportunity to respond to the lottery outcome through evasion and/or extra labor effort. We find strong evidence that ex-post access to labor opportunities reduces ex-ante risk willingness while access to tax evasion has no effect on risk behavior. We discuss possible explanations for this result based on the existing literature. -- |
| Keywords: | Tax Evasion,Labor Supply,Risk Behavior,Lab Experiment |
| JEL: | G11 H21 H24 H26 J22 |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:zewdip:14014&r=exp |
| By: | Christoph Starke (Faculty of Economics and Management, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg); Steffen Burchhardt (Faculty of Economics and Management, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg) |
| Abstract: | Financiers of social entrepreneurs are typically characterized as having some form of prosocial or CSR related objective. While in some studies such objectives have been formulated on an analytically inconvenient level, other contributions are limited only to charity finance. In this paper we identify Fehr and Schmidt’s inequality aversion as an analytically tractable and most basic motivation of social financiers in general. Specifically, we show that the financiers’ decision structures and their observable behavior coincide with the experimental findings of Fehr and Schmidt (1999). Moreover, we derive behavioral implications for social entrepreneurs. Paradoxically, given that financiers do not prefer a self-consumption of the social service, they contribute more if the entrepreneur provides them nevertheless. |
| Keywords: | inequality aversion, social entrepreneurship, financier, public good, social service |
| JEL: | D03 D31 L26 L31 |
| Date: | 2014–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mag:wpaper:140002&r=exp |
| By: | Burkhard Schipper (Department of Economics, University of California Davis) |
| Abstract: | We correlate competitive bidding and profits in symmetric independent private value first-price auctions with salivary testosterone, estradiol, progesterone, and cortisol in more than 200 subjects. Bids are significantly positively correlated and profits are significantly negatively correlated with basal salivary progesterone but only for females who do not use hormonal contraceptives. Surprisingly, we have null findings for basal testosterone, estradiol, and cortisol for both males and females. We show that our finding for progesterone is not mediated by risk aversion or bidding mistakes. No hormone responds to total profits in the auctions except for a small positive response of the stress hormone cortisol in males. |
| Keywords: | Hormones, Steroids, Testosterone, Estradiol, Progesterone, Cortisol, Contraceptives, Auctions, Gender, Competition, Aggression, Risk-taking, Endocrinological economics |
| JEL: | C72 C91 C92 D44 D81 D87 |
| Date: | 2014–02–27 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cda:wpaper:14-4&r=exp |
| By: | Dhillon, Amrita (Kings College, London); Peeters, Ronald (Maastrict); Muge Yukse, Ayse (Maastrict) |
| Abstract: | The use of social networks in the workplace has been documented by many authors, although the reasons for their widespread prevalence are less well known. In this paper we present evidence based on a lab experiment that suggests quite strongly that social networks are used by employers to reduce worker moral hazard. We capture moral hazard with a dictator game between the referrer and worker. The worker chooses how much to return under dierent settings of social proximity. Social proximity is captured using Facebook friendship information gleaned anonymously from subjects once they have been recruited. Since employers themselves do not have access to social connections, they delegate the decision to referrers who can select among workers with dierent degrees of social proximity to themselves. We show that employers choose referrals over anonymous hiring relatively more when they know that the referrer has access to friends, and are willing to delegate more often when the social proximity between referrer and worker is potentially higher. In keeping with this expectation, referrers also choose workers with a greater social proximity to themselves and workers who are closer to referrers indeed pay back more to the referrer. The advantage of the lab setting is that we can isolate directed altruism as the only reason for these results. |
| Keywords: | Eciency wage contracts, Moral hazard, Dictator game, Referrals, Altruism, Reciprocity, Directed altruism, Social proximity, Facebook, Experiment, Social networks, Strength of ties, Spot market. |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cge:warwcg:183&r=exp |
| By: | Marina Agranov; Thomas R. Palfrey |
| Abstract: | This paper reports results from a laboratory experiment that investigates the Meltzer-Richard model of equilibrium tax rates, inequality, and income redistribution. We also extend that model to incorporate social preferences in the form of altruism and inequality aversion. The experiment varies the amount of inequality and the collective choice procedure to determine tax rates. We report four main findings. First, higher wage inequality leads to higher tax rates. The effect is significant and large in magnitude. Second, the average implemented tax rates are almost exactly equal to the theoretical ideal tax rate of the median wage worker. Third, we do not observe any significant differences in labor supply or average implemented tax rates between a direct democracy institution and a representative democracy system where tax rates are determined by candidate competition. Fourth, we observe negligible deviations from labor supply behavior or voting behavior in the directions implied by altruism or inequality aversion. |
| JEL: | C92 D63 D72 H23 |
| Date: | 2014–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:19918&r=exp |
| By: | Ulrik H. Nielsen (Department of Economics, Copenhagen University) |
| Abstract: | Does socioeconomic background when measured by parental educational attainment explain the heterogeneity in adults' other-regarding preferences? I test this by using data from two online experiments -- a Dictator Game and a Trust Game that were conducted with a broad sample of the Danish adult population. I match the experimental data with high-quality data from the Danish population registers about my subjects and their parents. Whereas previous studies have found socioeconomic status, including parental educational attainment, to be predictive for children's generosity, I find no such evidence among adults. This result is robust across age groups and genders. I provide two explanations for this. First, sociodemographic characteristics in general appear to be poor predictors of adults' other-regarding behavior. Second, by using Danish survey data, I find that Danish parents' educational attainment appears to be uncorrelated with how important they find it to teach their children to "think of others". More speculative explanations are also provided. |
| Keywords: | Dictator Game, Trust Game, Generosity, Other-Regarding Preferences, Parental Education, Socioeconomic Status. |
| JEL: | C91 D63 D64 |
| Date: | 2014–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kud:kuiedp:1403&r=exp |
| By: | Sebastian Galiani; Gustavo Torrens; Maria Lucia Yanguas |
| Abstract: | The Political Coase Theorem (PCT) states that, in the absence of transaction costs, agents should agree to implement efficient policies regardless of the distribution of bargaining power among them. This paper uses a laboratory experiment to explore how commitment problems undermine the validity of the PCT. Overall, the results support theoretical predictions. In particular, commitment issues matter, and the existence of more commitment possibilities leads to better social outcomes. Moreover, we find that the link is valid when commitment possibilities are asymmetrically distributed between players and even when a redistribution of political power is required to take advantage of those possibilities. However, we also find that at low levels of commitment there is more cooperation than strictly predicted by our parameterized model while the opposite is true at high levels of commitment, and only large improvements in commitment opportunities have a significant effect on the social surplus, while small changes do not. |
| JEL: | C92 D72 |
| Date: | 2014–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:19943&r=exp |
| By: | Penélope Hernández (ERI-CES); Guillem Martínez-Canovas (ERI-CES); Manuel Muñoz-Herrera (University of Groningen); Lea Ellwardt (University of Groningen) |
| Abstract: | We examine the interplay between a person's individual preference and the social influence others exert. We provide a model of network relationships with conflicting preferences, where individuals are better off coordinating with those around them, but not all prefer the same action. We test our model in an experiment, varying the level of conflicting preferences between individuals. Our findings suggest that preferences are more salient than social influence, under conflicting preferences: subjects relate mainly with others who prefer the same. This leads to two undesirable outcomes: network segregation and social inefficiency. The same force that helps people individually hurts society. |
| Keywords: | Heterogeneity, Social Networks, Formation, Equilibrium selection |
| JEL: | C62 C72 D82 D85 |
| Date: | 2014–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dbe:wpaper:0114&r=exp |
| By: | Peon, David; Calvo, Anxo; Antelo, Manel |
| Abstract: | Two relevant areas in the behaviorist literature are prospect theory and overconfidence. Many tests are available to elicit their different manifestations: utility curvature, probability weighting and loss aversion in PT; overestimation, overplacement and overprecision as measures of overconfidence. Those tests are suitable to deal with single manifestations but often unfeasible, in terms of time to be performed, to determine a complete psychological profile of a given respondent. This paper contributes to provide two short tests, based on classic works in the literature, to derive a complete profile on prospect theory and overconfidence. We conduct an experimental research with 126 students to validate the tests, revealing they are broadly efficient to replicate the regular results in the literature. The experimental analysis of all measures of overconfidence and prospect theory using the same sample of respondents allows us to provide new insights on the relationship between these two areas. Finally, enhancements for future research are suggested. |
| Keywords: | Experimental economics, overconfidence, prospect theory, behavioral finance, utility measurement, overestimation, overplacement, overprecision |
| JEL: | C91 D03 D81 |
| Date: | 2014–03–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:54135&r=exp |
| By: | Jürgen Huber; Michael Kirchler; Daniel Kleinlercher; Matthias Sutter |
| Abstract: | While politically attractive in order to generate tax revenues, the effects of a financial transaction tax (FTT) are scientifically disputed, not the least because seemingly small details of its implementation may matter a lot. In this paper, we provide experimental evidence on the different effects of a FTT, depending on whether it is implemented as a tax on markets, on residents, or a combination of both. We find that the effects of a tax on markets are different from a tax on residents, with negative effects of a market tax on volatility and trading volume. The residence principle shows none of these undesired effects. In addition to studying aggregate market outcomes, we investigate how individual traders react to different forms of a FTT and whether their risk attitude is related to these reactions. We find no such relationship, meaning that a FTT affects traders with different risk tolerances similarly. |
| Keywords: | Financial transaction tax, Experimental finance, Residence principle, Market principle |
| JEL: | C91 G10 E62 |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eui:euiwps:eco2014/03&r=exp |
| By: | Jordi Brandts; David J. Cooper; Roberto A. Weber |
| Abstract: | We study the effectiveness of leaders for inducing coordinated organizational change to a more efficient equilibrium, i.e., a turnaround. We compare communication from leaders to incentive increases and also compare the effectiveness of randomly selected and elected leaders. While all interventions yield shifts to more efficient equilibria, communication from leaders has a greater effect than incentives. Moreover, leaders who are elected by followers are significantly better at improving their group's outcome than randomly selected ones. The improved effectiveness of elected leaders results from sending more performance-relevant messages. Our results are evidence that the way in which leaders are selected affects their legitimacy and the degree to which they influence followers. Finally, we observed that a combination of factors- incentive increases and elected leaders-yield near universal turnarounds to full efficiency. |
| Keywords: | Leadership, Job Selection, Coordination Failure,Experiments, Communication |
| JEL: | C72 C92 D83 |
| Date: | 2014–03–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aub:autbar:947.14&r=exp |
| By: | Sarah Baird (George Washington University and University of Otago); J. Aislinn Bohren (Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania); Craig McIntosh (University of California, San Diego); Berk Ozler (World Bank and University of Otago) |
| Abstract: | This paper formalizes the design of experiments intended specifically to study spillover effects. By first randomizing the intensity of treatment within clusters and then randomly assigning individual treatment conditional on this cluster-level intensity, a novel set of treatment effects can be identified. We develop a formal framework for consistent estimation of these effects, and provide explicit expressions for power calculations. We show that the power to detect average treatment effects declines precisely with the quantity that identifies the novel treatment effects. A demonstration of the technique is provided using a cash transfer program in Malawi. |
| Keywords: | Experimental Design, Networks, Cash Transfers |
| JEL: | C93 O22 I25 |
| Date: | 2014–02–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pen:papers:14-006&r=exp |
| By: | Sumit Agarwal; Itzhak Ben-David |
| Abstract: | We study a controlled corporate experiment in which loan officers’ compensation structure was altered from fixed salary to volume-based pay. The incentives increased aggressiveness of origination: higher origination rates (+31%), larger loan sizes (+15%), and higher default rates (+28%). Under the incentive system, loan officers have greater influence on loan approval decisions; however, their recommendations do not convey more information. Poor loan performance is caused by lax approval and aggressive loan terms, and is more likely to occur among end-of-month originations, male loan officers, and tenured loan officers. About 10% of the loans under the incentive system are likely to have negative net present value. |
| JEL: | G01 G21 |
| Date: | 2014–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:19945&r=exp |
| By: | Weili Ding; Steven F. Lehrer |
| Abstract: | Unobserved ability heterogeneity has long been postulated to play a key role in human capital development. Traditional strategies to estimate education production functions do not allow for varying role or development of unobserved ability as a child ages. Such restrictions are highly inconsistent with a growing body of scientific evidence; moreover, in order to obtain unbiased parameter estimates of observed educational inputs, researchers must properly account for unobserved skills that may be correlated with other inputs to the production process. To illustrate our empirical strategy we use experimental data from Tennessee’s Student/Teacher Achievement Ratio experiment, known as Project STAR. We find that unobserved ability is endogenously developed over time and its impact on cognitive achievement varies significantly between grades in all subject areas. Moreover, we present evidence that accounting for time-varying unobserved ability across individuals and a more general depreciating pattern of observed inputs are both important when estimating education production functions. |
| JEL: | C23 I21 |
| Date: | 2014–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:19937&r=exp |
| By: | Sihem Dekhili; Mohamed Akli Achabou |
| Abstract: | This research explores the country of origin effect on the evaluation of ecolabelled products. Findings from experimentation indicate that the mention of a country of origin with favorable image in terms of sustainable development has a neutral effect on the evaluation of an ecolabelled product. However, the indication of a country with a negative image affects negatively the product’ evaluation. |
| Keywords: | consumer behaviour; country of origin; european ecolabel; sustainable development |
| Date: | 2014–02–25 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ipg:wpaper:2014-140&r=exp |
| By: | Halliday, Katherine E.; Okello, George; Turner, Elizabeth L.; Njagi, Kiambo; Mcharo, Carlos; Kengo, Juddy; Allen, Elizabeth; Dubeck, Margaret M.; Jukes, Matthew C.H.; Brooker, Simon J. |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates the effects of intermittent screening and treatment of malaria on the health and education of school children in an area of low-to-moderate malaria transmission. A cluster randomized trial was implemented with 5,233 children in 101 government primary schools on the south coast of Kenya in 2010-12. The intervention was delivered to children randomly selected from classes 1 and 5 who were followed up twice across 24 months. Once during each school term, public health workers used malaria rapid diagnostic tests to screen the children. Children who tested positive were treated with a six-dose regimen of artemether-lumefantrine. Given the nature of the intervention, the trial was not blinded. The primary outcomes were anemia and sustained attention and the secondary outcomes were malaria parasitaemia and educational achievement. The data were analyzed on an intention-to-treat basis. Anemia in this setting in Kenya, intermittent screening and treatment, as implemented in this study, is not effective in improving the health or education of school children. Possible reasons for the absence of an impact are the marked geographical heterogeneity in transmission, the rapid rate of reinfection following artemether-lumefantrine treatment, the variable reliability of malaria rapid diagnostic tests, and the relative contribution of malaria to the etiology of anemia in this setting. |
| Keywords: | Health Monitoring&Evaluation,Disease Control&Prevention,Primary Education,Adolescent Health,Educational Sciences |
| Date: | 2014–02–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:6791&r=exp |