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on Experimental Economics |
| By: | Jan-Erik Lönnqvist; Markku Verkasalo; Gari Walkowitz; Philipp C. Wichardt |
| Abstract: | This paper compares two prominent empirical measures of individual risk attitudes — the Holt and Laury (2002) lottery-choice task and the multi-item questionnaire advocated by Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, Schupp, Sunde and Wagner (2011) — with respect to (a) their within-subject stability over time (one year) and (b) their correlation with actual risk-taking behaviour in the lab — here the amount sent in a trust game (Berg, Dickaut, McCabe, 1995). As it turns out, the measures themselves are uncorrelated (both times) and, most importantly, only the questionnaire measure exhibits test-retest stability (? = .78), while virtually no such stability is found in the lottery-choice task. In addition, only the questionnaire measure shows the expected correlations with a Big Five personality measure and is correlated with actual risk-taking behaviour. The results suggest that the questionnaire is the more adequate measure of individual risk attitudes for the analysis of behaviour in economic (lab)experiments. Moreover, with respect to behaviour in the trust game, we find a high re-test stability of transfers (? = .70). This further supports the conjecture that trusting behaviour indeed has a component which itself is a stable individual characteristic (Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman and Soutter, 2000) |
| Keywords: | Risk Attitudes, Trust, Personality, Lab Experiments |
| JEL: | D81 C91 Z10 |
| Date: | 2014–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kie:kieliw:1905&r=exp |
| By: | Katharina M. Eckartz (Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, International Max Planck Research School on Adapting Behavior in a Fundamentally Uncertain World) |
| Abstract: | This study is directly motivated by the results of Eckartz et al (2012). Subjects exerted suprisingly high efforts irrespectively of how they were compensated. This paper discusses a number of potential explanations and then it will focus on two of them: first, subjects might exert effort simply because they enjoy working on the tasks. Second, subjects might exert effort because they feel obliged to do so or because they do not have opportunity costs of working. These questions are crucial to better understand the robustness of experimental results and also to be eventually able to transfer the results to the world outside the laboratory. We replicate our earlier results: in the baseline treatment we do not find effects of incentive schemes on the output. Decreasing the attractiveness of the tasks, we also do not observe differences between the incentive schemes. When we introduce, however, a paid outside option, the efforts are higher in the performance-dependent pay treatments than under flat payment. The size of the effect differs between the tasks, the direction is, however, the same. |
| Keywords: | Creativity, Incentives, Real effort task, Experimental methods |
| JEL: | C90 C91 J33 |
| Date: | 2014–02–19 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2014-005&r=exp |
| By: | Anya Savikhin Samek (School of Human Ecology, University of Wisconsin-Madison); Roman M. Sheremeta (Weatherhead School of Management, Case Western Reserve University and the Economic Science Institute, Chapman University,) |
| Abstract: | Studies show that identifying contributors significantly increases contributions to public goods. In practice, however, viewing identifiable information is costly, which may discourage people from accessing such information. To address this question, we design a public goods experiment in which participants can pay a fee to view information about identities and corresponding contributions of their group members. We then compare this to a treatment in which there is no identifiable information, and a treatment in which all contributors are freely identified. Our main findings are that: (1) contributions in the treatment with costly information are as high as those in the treatment with free information, (2) participants choose to view the information about 10% of the time, and (3) being a high contributor is positively correlated with choosing to view identifiable information about others. Thus, it seems that having access to information is important even when such information is rarely viewed. Or findings have practical implications for non-profit organizations with a large pool of donors and for designers of recognition systems, especially in online communities with many participants. |
| Keywords: | public-goods, information, experiments |
| JEL: | C72 C91 H41 |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:chu:wpaper:14-04&r=exp |
| By: | Hoogveld, Nicky (affiliation not available); Zubanov, Nikolay (Goethe University Frankfurt) |
| Abstract: | We study the effect of recognition on performance with a field experiment involving first-year undergraduate students at a Dutch university. Our treatment, given unannounced in randomly selected student groups, was to publicly recognize students who scored within the top 30% of their group on the first of the two midterm exams. The overall treatment effect on the second midterm grade is 0.03s (s = the grade's standard deviation) for the recipients of recognition, and 0.15s for the non-recipients, both statistically insignificant. The effect for the non-recipients increases with class attendance (itself unaffected), and decreases with the distance to the cutoff grade for recognition, reaching a significant 0.44s for those exceeding the minimum attendance requirement and staying within the first quartile of the distance to cutoff. We argue that conformance to performance norm is the most likely behavioral mechanism behind our findings. |
| Keywords: | recognition, performance, experiment |
| JEL: | C93 M52 |
| Date: | 2014–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp7953&r=exp |
| By: | Holden, Stein (Centre for Land Tenure Studies, Norwegian University of Life Sciences); Bezu, Sosina (Centre for Land Tenure Studies, Norwegian University of Life Sciences) |
| Abstract: | Lab-in-the-field Hawk-Dove game experiments were played by spouses in a rural sample of households in Southern Ethiopia where women/wives traditionally have a weak position. Randomized treatments included a 3x3 design with simultaneous, one-way signaling and sequential games as the first dimension and Pareto-efficient, Pareto-inferior and Pareto-superior (Dove;Dove) payout treatments as the second dimension, with a sequence of six game rounds per household. The experiments allow for the assessment of the presence of alternative player types, such as players that prioritize household income maximization, players that prioritize personal income, players that are Hawkish and punish their spouse at their own expense, and cooperative reciprocators (Doves) who cooperate even at the expense of household and personal income. The experiments revealed that all player types were present in the sample. Husbands played significantly less Hawkish than their wives and played gradually less Hawkish over the six game rounds, whereas wives remained Hawkish. |
| Keywords: | Intra-household cooperation; Hawk-Dove game; Pareto-efficiency; simultaneous games; one-way signaling games; sequential games |
| JEL: | C71 C72 C93 H31 J16 Q15 |
| Date: | 2014–02–25 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:nlsclt:2014_003&r=exp |
| By: | Patricio S. Dalton; Sayantan Ghosal |
| Abstract: | This paper examines whether the degree of confidence and overconfidence in one’s ability is determined biologically. In particular, we study whether foetal testosterone exposure correlates with an incentive-compatible measure of confidence within an experimental setting. We find that men (rather than women) who were exposed to high testosterone levels in their mother’s womb are less likely to overestimate their actual performance, which in turn helps them to gain higher monetary rewards. Men exposed to low prenatal testosterone levels, instead, set unrealistically high expectations which results in self-defeating behavior. These results from the lab are able to recon- cile hitherto disconnected evidence from the field, by providing a link between traders’ overconfidence bias, long-term financial returns and prenatal testosterone exposure. |
| Keywords: | 2D:4D, testosterone, neuroeconomics, expectations, overconfidence, self- confidence, goals. |
| JEL: | C91 D03 D87 |
| Date: | 2014–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gla:glaewp:2014_02&r=exp |
| By: | Sandro Casal; Luigi Mittone |
| Abstract: | When the phenomenon of tax evasion is discussed, both scholars and authorities agree on the fact that, although essential, classical enforcements are not enough to ensure tax compliance: some other forms of incentives must be adopted. The paper’s aim is to experimentally test the role of different non- monetary incentives for tax compliance: participants have been treated with different experimental conditions, which differ in the role played by anonymity. Indeed, subjects have been informed on the possibility of revealing their identity and their choices through the publication of their pictures, as a consequence of the result of the auditing process. As expected, anonymity plays an important role in the decision to pay taxes; in addition, we find that negative non-monetary incentive increases tax compliance more effectively than positive non-monetary incentive. We find also that the effect of these non-monetary incentives is mitigated, when too many information are made available. Finally, results show that, when evasion is made public, tax-dodgers are willing to pay in order to keep secret their cheating behavior and avoid public shame. |
| Keywords: | Tax Evasion, Non-monetary incentives, Anonymity, Experimental Economics |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:trn:utwpce:1401&r=exp |
| By: | Pablo Branas-Garza (Business School, Middlesex University London); Antonio M. Espin (GLOBE,Universidad de Granada; Departamento de Teoría e Historia Económica, Universidad de Granada); Benedikt Herrmann (Behavioural Economics Team, Institute for Health and Consumer Protection, Joint Research Centre, European Commission) |
| Abstract: | Fairness norms are crucial in understanding the emergence and enforcement of large-scale cooperation in human societies. The most widely applied framework in the study of human fairness is the Ultimatum Game (UG). In the UG, a proposer suggests how to split a sum of money with a responder. If the responder rejects the proposer’s offer, both players get nothing. Rejection of unfair offers is considered to be a form of punishment implemented by fair-minded individuals, who are willing to sacrifice their own resources in order to impose the fairness norm. However, an alternative interpretation is equally plausible: punishers might actually be using rejections in a competitive, spiteful fashion as a means to increase their relative standing. This hypothesis is in line with recent evidence demonstrating that “prosocial” and “antisocial” punishers coexist in other experimental games. Using two large-scale experiments, we explore the nature of UG punishers by analyzing their behavior in a Dictator Game. In both studies, we confirm the coexistence of two entirely different sub-populations: prosocial punishers, who behave fairly as dictators, and spiteful (antisocial) punishers, who are totally unfair. Such a result is fundamental for research on the foundations of punishment behavior employing the UG. We discuss how focusing only on the fairness-oriented part of human behavior might give rise to misleading conclusions regarding the evolution of cooperation and the behavioral underpinnings of stable social systems. |
| Date: | 2014–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:beb:wpaper:201402&r=exp |
| By: | Flip Klijn; Joana Pais; Marc Vorsatz |
| Abstract: | Minority reserves are an affirmative action policy proposed by Hafalir (2013) in the context of school choice. We study in the laboratory the effect of minority reserves on the outcomes of two prominent matching mechanisms, the Gale-Shapley and the Top Trading Cycles mechanisms. Our first experimental result is that the introduction of minority reserves enhances truth-telling of some minority students under the Gale-Shapley but not under the Top Trading Cycles mechanism. Secondly, for the Gale-Shapley mechanism we also find that the stable matchings that are more beneficial to students are obtained more often relative to the other stable matchings when minority reserves are introduced. Finally, the overall expected payoff increases under the Gale-Shapley but decreases under the Top Trading Cycles mechanism if minority reserves are introduced. However, the minority group benefits and the majority group is harmed under both mechanisms. |
| Keywords: | sequencing situations, outsourcing, first best solution, game theory, price of anarchy, coordinating mechanism |
| JEL: | C78 C91 C92 D78 I20 |
| Date: | 2014–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bge:wpaper:752&r=exp |
| By: | Erlend Berg; Maitreesh Ghatak; R Manjula; D Rajasekhar; Sanchari Roy |
| Abstract: | This paper studies the interaction of incentive pay and social distance in the dissemination of information. We analyse theoretically as well as empirically the effect of incentive pay when agents have pro-social objectives, but also preferences over dealing with one social group relative to another. In a randomised field experiment undertaken across 151 villages in South India, local agents were hired to spread information about a public health insurance programme. Relative to at pay, incentive pay improves knowledge transmission to households that are socially distant from the agent, but not to households similar to the agent. |
| Keywords: | public services, information constraints, incentive pay, social proximity, knowledge transmission |
| Date: | 2014–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bri:cmpowp:13/316&r=exp |
| By: | Ketel, Nadine (VU University Amsterdam); Linde, Jona (VU University Amsterdam); Oosterbeek, Hessel (University of Amsterdam); van der Klaauw, Bas (VU University Amsterdam) |
| Abstract: | This paper reports on a field experiment testing for sunk-cost effects in an education setting. Students signing up for extra-curricular tutorial sessions randomly received a discount on the tuition fee. The sunk-cost effect predicts that students who receive larger discounts will attend fewer tutorial sessions. For the full sample, we find little support for this hypothesis, but we find a significant effect of sunk costs on attendance for the 45% of students in our sample who are categorized as sunk-cost prone based on hypothetical survey questions. For them higher tuition fees can serve as a commitment device to attend classes. |
| Keywords: | sunk-cost effect, higher education, field experiment |
| JEL: | C93 D03 I22 |
| Date: | 2014–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp7951&r=exp |
| By: | Philip Brookins (Department of Economics, Florida State University); Adriana Lucas (Department of Economics, Florida State University); Dmitry Ryvkin (Department of Economics, Florida State University) |
| Abstract: | Overconfidence in one's relative performance within a group is a wide-spread phenomenon. Similar to individual (or within-group) overconfidence, it was also shown that individuals are, on average, overconfident about the performance of their group relative to other groups. We hypothesize that this between-group overconfidence should mitigate within-group individual overconfidence. Simply put, if the decision maker believes that her group's ranking is high it must be because her beliefs about the performance of other members of her group are inflated, which we expect will lead to a reduction in her individual within-group overconfidence. We test this hypothesis in a laboratory experiment. Using a 2x2 between-subject design, we manipulate the salience of between-group confidence judgments and group identity. We find, as hypothesized, that the salience of between-group confidence judgments significantly reduces within-group individual overconfidence. We also find an equally strong reduction in within-group overconfidence from the group identity manipulation. For managers whose goal is to improve calibration of their employees, our results imply that activities promoting comparisons between groups, e.g., between firms or between teams within a firm, and strengthening organizational identity should be helpful. |
| Keywords: | overconfidence, group identity, judgment about one's group, experiment |
| JEL: | C91 D03 D83 D84 |
| Date: | 2014–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fsu:wpaper:wp2014_02_01&r=exp |
| By: | Chong, Alberto (University of Ottawa); Machicado, Carlos Gustavo (INSEAD); Yanez-Pagans, Monica (World Bank) |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates the potential of information technologies to improve public service delivery and empower citizens in the context of two unusual randomized natural experiments occurring within one particular bureaucratic process: the renewal of a national identification card by the Bolivian Police. The first experiment arises from the random assignment of both police officers and applicants to a manual or digital renewal process, which is identical in all aspects except that the digital renewal process makes use of information technologies as part of the renewal process. The second experiment arises by the existence of technical failures within the digital renewal process, which allows police officers to change from the digital to the manual renewal process randomly across renewal day. The efficiency of public service delivery is measured in terms of both renewal success rates (which average to a strikingly low rate of 72 percent in our sample) and time-it-takes to renew an identification card. We find that information technologies significantly improve the quality of public service delivery. Also, we find that information technologies significantly lower barriers in access to national identification cards by promoting a more equitable provision across the population. We discuss several channels through which technologies might be improving efficiency and promoting equity within this particular bureaucratic process. Overall, our findings suggest that information technologies might be achieving these goals by introducing efficiencies (such as reducing administrative shortcomings and transaction costs), and limiting the exercise of discretion by police officers within the renewal process. |
| Keywords: | public service delivery, technologies, Bolivia, natural experiment |
| JEL: | C93 O38 J24 |
| Date: | 2014–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp7975&r=exp |
| By: | Holden, Stein (Centre for Land Tenure Studies, Norwegian University of Life Sciences) |
| Abstract: | I present a theory that can explain hyperbolic discounting and magnitude effects in intertemporal choice. This approach builds on theories of narrow framing and reference dependence and expands these theories in a novel way by examining hidden mental zooming in base consumption adjustment in decisions regarding intertemporal prospects of varying magnitudes and time horizons. Data from a field experiment were used to assess the theory with an incentive-compatible multiple price list approach involving magnitude levels of 5x, 10x and 20x the basic magnitude level with time horizons of one, three, six and 12 months. Without zooming adjustments in base consumption, very strong hyperbolic and magnitude effects were found, and present bias could not explain the hyperbolic effects. The mental zooming model provides an effective rational explanation of what appear to be significant intertemporal anomalies in the data. |
| Keywords: | Intertemporal choice; hyperbolic discountin; magnitude effects; mental zooming theory; field experiment |
| JEL: | C93 D03 D91 |
| Date: | 2014–02–21 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:nlsclt:2014_002&r=exp |
| By: | Wanda Mimra (ETH Zurich, Switzerland); Alexander Rasch (Duesseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE) and University of Cologne); Christian Waibel (ETH Zurich, Switzerland) |
| Abstract: | We experimentally investigate the role of second opinions in markets where experts like doctors both diagnose and provide the services. Experts may exploit their informational advantage over customers and overtreat by providing a more costly and expensive treatment than necessary. We show that introducing costly second opinions significantly reduces the level of overtreatment. Market efficiency rises as the reduction in treatment costs—due to less overtreatment—exceeds the increase in incurred search costs. Lowering customers’ search costs leads to significantly more second opinions, however, the overtreatment level does not decrease. |
| Keywords: | Credence goods; Experts; Second opinion; Overtreatment; Search costs. |
| JEL: | D82 L15 |
| Date: | 2014–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eth:wpswif:14-192&r=exp |
| By: | Huber, Jürgen (University of Innsbruck); Kirchler, Michael (University of Innsbruck); Kleinlercher, Daniel (University of Innsbruck); Sutter, Matthias (European University Institute) |
| Abstract: | While politically attractive in order to generate tax revenues, the effects of a financial transaction tax (FTT) are scientifically disputed, not the least because seemingly small details of its implementation may matter a lot. In this paper, we provide experimental evidence on the different effects of a FTT, depending on whether it is implemented as a tax on markets, on residents, or a combination of both. We find that the effects of a tax on markets are different from a tax on residents, with negative effects of a market tax on volatility and trading volume. The residence principle shows none of these undesired effects. In addition to studying aggregate market outcomes, we investigate how individual traders react to different forms of a FTT and whether their risk attitude is related to these reactions. We find no such relationship, meaning that a FTT affects traders with different risk tolerances similarly. |
| Keywords: | Financial Transaction Tax, experimental finance, residence principle, market principle |
| JEL: | C91 G10 E62 |
| Date: | 2014–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp7978&r=exp |
| By: | Buetler, Monika; Lechner, Michael; Thiemann, Petra; Deuchert, Eva; Staubli, Stefan |
| Abstract: | Disability insurance (DI) beneficiaries lose some of their benefits if their earnings exceed certain thresholds (“cash-cliffs”). When this reduction is too high, this implicit taxation of earnings is considered to be one of the prime reasons for the low outflow from DI. This paper analyzes a conditional cash program that incentivizes work related reductions of disability benefits in Switzerland. A randomized group of DI beneficiaries receive the offer to claim a payment of up to CHF 72,000 (USD 71,000) if they take up or expand employment and reduce DI claims. This paper presents the results of the short-term evaluation by analyzing the first reactions to the announcement of seed capital. Overall, the interest in taking-up the financial incentive is low at only 3%. Individuals close to cash-cliffs react more on seed capital but the overall magnitude is small. Our results suggest that workdisincentives imposed by cash-cliffs are unlikely to be the main driver for low employment and outflow from the Swiss disability insurance system, despite the fact that the partial disability insurance system generates a non-linear budget set and bunching behavior at cashcliffs prior to the implementation of seed capital. |
| Keywords: | Disability insurance, field experiment, financial incentive |
| JEL: | H55 J14 C93 D04 |
| Date: | 2014–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:usg:econwp:2014:06&r=exp |
| By: | Lunn,Pete; Lunn, Mary |
| Abstract: | We hypothesise and confirm a novel empirical result concerning the willingness to accept (WTA)-willingness to pay (WTP) disparity. Employing data from what has become the classic experimental design, we reveal systematic variation in the relative magnitudes of three valuations: WTA, WTP and choice equivalent (CE). Individuals with low CE relative to others set a proportionally higher WTA, while those with high CE set a proportionally lower WTP. The effect size is substantial in relation to the WTA-WTP disparity itself. These results are predicted by a model in which subjects behave as if maximising surplus over a sequence of exchange encounters, as typifies real exchanges outside the laboratory. They are at odds with models based on loss aversion, which either predict constant relativities between the three valuations or the opposite of the pattern observed. |
| Keywords: | Endowment effect, willingness to pay, willingness to accept, loss aversion |
| Date: | 2014–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:esr:wpaper:wp479&r=exp |
| By: | Burks, Stephen V. (University of Minnesota, Morris); Lewis, Connor (University of Minnesota, Morris); Kivi, Paul (University of Minnesota, Morris); Wiener, Amanda (University of Minnesota, Morris); Anderson, Jon E. (University of Minnesota, Morris); Götte, Lorenz (University of Lausanne); DeYoung, Colin G. (University of Minnesota); Rustichini, Aldo (University of Minnesota) |
| Abstract: | We collected personality (Big Five) and demographic characteristics, and ran incentivized experiments measuring cognitive skills (non-verbal IQ, numeracy, backward induction/ planning), and economic (time, risk) preferences, with 100 students at a small public undergraduate liberal arts college in the Midwestern US as part of a larger study that collected the same measures from 1,065 trainee truckers. Using standardized (z-score) versions of our variables we analyze their relative power to predict (1) timely graduation (four years or less), (2) graduation in six years or less, and (3) final GPA. The proactive aspect of Conscientious (but not the inhibitive one) has a large and robust positive effect on all three outcomes, and Agreeableness has a robust negative effect on both graduation outcomes, but not on GPA. Economic time preferences predict graduation in four years, and GPA. Cognitive skill measures predict as expected if entered individually in a multivariate model, but when all variables compete it is only our backward induction measure ("Hit15") that weakly predicts graduation in four years, and strongly predicts graduation in six years. Trainee truckers work in a different vocational setting and their results are appropriately different, but there is a common element: Hit15 also predicts their job success (completing a one year employment contract that makes training free). We interpret Hit15 as capturing a specific part of the cognitive skills required for self-management in non-routine settings – thinking backward from future goals to make the best current choice – that is not well measured by existing instruments, and suggest this deserves further scientific and institutional scrutiny. |
| Keywords: | graduation, Big Five, cognitive skill, backward induction, economic preferences, GPA |
| JEL: | D03 I21 C99 |
| Date: | 2014–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp7952&r=exp |
| By: | Anna Conte (Strategic Interaction Group, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena, and Department of Economics and Quantitative methods, WBS, University of Westminster); John D. Hey (Department of Economics and Related Studies, University of York); Ivan Soraperra (Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, University of Verona,) |
| Abstract: | This paper estimates the determinants of decision time for different types of decision maker in the context of an experimental investigation of multiple prior models of behaviour under ambiguity. Four models are considered: Expected Utility, Smooth, Rank Dependent Expected Utility and Alpha model. The results of a mixture model which assigns subjects to types enable us to distinguish the factors influencing the decision time of each of these four types. We find that the different types are influenced by different factors. In general, the Rank Dependent type takes more time, followed by the Smooth, the Expected Utility and finally the Alpha type, whose decision time is always the lowest. Our results reflect the relative complexity of the preference functionals used by the different types. Consequently, the importance of looking at the process of pairwise choices rather than simply at the choice made is raised to the attention of theorists and analysts. |
| Keywords: | decision time, choice under uncertainty, censored regression |
| JEL: | C23 C24 C91 D81 |
| Date: | 2014–02–19 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2014-004&r=exp |