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on Experimental Economics |
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Issue of 2014‒02‒02
57 papers chosen by |
| By: | Winter, Joachim; Lührmann, Melanie; Serra Garcia, Marta |
| Abstract: | We report the results of a field experiment evaluating the impact of financial literacy training on teenagers between 14 and 16 years in German high schools. After the training, treated teenagers exhibit a significant increase in both interest in financial matters and self-assessed knowledge relative to the control group. We also find a strong decrease in the prevalence of impulse purchases after the training, suggesting that teenagers become more sovereign consumers. Our data reveals strong gender differences in financial matters already before adulthood: Girls show less interest in and self-assessed knowledge about financial matters, and are less likely to save. -- |
| JEL: | D14 D91 C93 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:vfsc13:79744&r=exp |
| By: | Schumacher, Heiner; Kesternich, Iris; Kosfeld, Michael; Winter, Joachim |
| Abstract: | We analyze distributional preferences in games in which a decider chooses the provision of a good that benefits a receiver and creates costs for a group of payers. The average decider takes into account the welfare of all parties and has concerns for efficiency. However, she attaches similar weights to small and large groups so that she neglects large provision costs that are dispersed among many payers. This holds regardless of whether the decider benefits from the provision or not. A CES utility function which rationalizes average behavior implies altruism in bilateral situations and welfare-damaging actions when costs are dispersed. |
| Keywords: | Social Preferences; Distribution Games; Concentrated Benefits and Dispersed Costs |
| JEL: | C91 D63 H00 |
| Date: | 2014–01–17 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:trf:wpaper:453&r=exp |
| By: | Riedl A.M.; Dariel A. (GSBE) |
| Abstract: | We elicit reciprocal preferences in a firm-worker gift-exchange setting and relate them to actual behavior in a repeated gift-exchange game. We find that only a small minority of 10 percent of workers is materially selfish whereas 90 percent exhibit reciprocal preferences. However, the intensity of reciprocal preferences is weak in the sense that firms maximize profits by not relying on gift-exchange but by offering the lowest possible wage. Workers behavior in the repeated gift-exchange game is predicted by their elicited preferences, but the correlation between preferences and behavior is imperfect. Together with profit maximizing behavior of firms these observations can explain the observed unraveling of gift-exchange over time in our experiment and some recent field experiments. |
| Keywords: | Noncooperative Games; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior; Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining: Other; |
| JEL: | C72 C92 J59 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:unm:umagsb:2013034&r=exp |
| By: | Riedl A.M.; Cettolin E. (GSBE) |
| Abstract: | An important element for the public support of policies is their perceived justice. At the same time most policy choices have uncertain outcomes. We report the results of a first experiment investigating just allocations of resources when some recipients are exposed to uncertainty. Although, under certainty almost all uninvolved participants distribute resources equally, they exhibit remarkable heterogeneity in just allocations under uncertainty. Moreover, uninvolved participants allocate on average less to recipients exposed to higher degrees of uncertainty and allocations are correlated with their own risk preferences. The observed allocations are consistent with four different views of justice under uncertainty. |
| Keywords: | Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual; Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement; |
| JEL: | C91 D63 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:unm:umagsb:2013036&r=exp |
| By: | Riedl A.M.; Smeets P.M.A. (GSBE) |
| Abstract: | This paper explores whether social preferences influence portfolio choices of retail investors. We use administrative investor trading records which we link to decisions of the same investors in experiments with real money at stake. We show that social preferences rather than return expectations or risk perceptions are the main driver of investments in socially responsible SRI mutual funds. Social preferences are only associated with investments in SRI funds without tax benefits, but are unrelated to investments in SRI funds with tax incentives. This illustrates that tax incentives change the clientele of mutual funds and that tax incentives crowd out the intrinsic motivations of investors with strong social preferences. Our results also show that prosocial behavior in one domain experiment is correlated with prosocial behavior in another domain investments, which adds to the discussion on the usefulness of experiments in finance. |
| Keywords: | Altruism; Philanthropy; Portfolio Choice; Investment Decisions; Public Goods; |
| JEL: | G11 D64 H41 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:unm:umagsb:2013051&r=exp |
| By: | Riedl A.M.; Wölbert E.M. (GSBE) |
| Abstract: | To accurately predict behavior economists need reliable measures of individual time preferences and attitudes toward risk and typically need to assume stability of these characteristics over time and across decision domains. We test the reliability of two choice tasks for eliciting discount rates, risk aversion, and probability weighting and assess the stability of these characteristics over timeand across situations. We find high reliability and that individual characteristics are remarkably stable over time. The estimated parameters correlate well with self-reported decisions in financial domains, but are largely uncorrelated with decisions in other important life domains involving intertemporal trade-offs and risk. |
| Keywords: | Methodological Issues: General; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual; Behavioral Economics: Underlying Principles; Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty: General; Intertemporal Choice and Growth: General; |
| JEL: | C18 C91 D03 D80 D90 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:unm:umagsb:2013041&r=exp |
| By: | Kimbrough, Erik; Sheremeta, Roman |
| Abstract: | We design an experiment to explore the impact of earned entitlements on the frequency and intensity of conflicts in a two-stage conflict game where players may attempt to use non-binding side-payments to avoid conflict. In this game, Proposers make offers and Responders decide simultaneously whether to accept the offers and whether to engage in a conflict. A simple theoretical analysis suggests that Proposers should never offer side-payments because Responders should always accept them and then still choose to enter conflict; however, our experiment reveals that some individuals use this non-binding mechanism to avoid conflict. Moreover, when subjects earn their roles (Proposer or Responder), conflicts are 44% more likely to be avoided than when roles are assigned randomly. Earned entitlements impact behavior in three important ways: (1) Proposers who have earned their position persistently make larger offers; (2) larger offers lead to a lower probability of conflict, but (3) Proposers whose offers do not lead to conflict resolution respond spitefully with greater conflict expenditure. Hence, with earned rights, the positive welfare effects of reduced conflict frequency are offset by higher conflict intensity. This result differs from previous experimental evidence from ultimatum games in which earned entitlements tend to encourage agreement and increase welfare; thus, our findings highlight the important consequences of endogenizing the costs of conflict. Our analysis suggests that earned entitlements alter behavior by influencing the beliefs of Proposers about the willingness of Responders to accept a peaceful resolution. As a result, these Proposers make persistent high offers, and when their beliefs are disappointed by a Responder’s decision to accept a side-payment and still enter conflict, they retaliate. |
| Keywords: | contests, conflict resolution, side-payments, entitlements, experiments |
| JEL: | C72 C91 D72 |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:53253&r=exp |
| By: | Stefano DellaVigna; John A. List; Ulrike Malmendier; Gautam Rao |
| Abstract: | Why do people vote? We argue that social image plays a significant role in explaining turnout: people vote because others will ask. The expectation of being asked motivates turnout if individuals derive pride from telling others that they voted, or feel shame from admitting that they did not vote, provided that lying is costly. We design a field experiment to estimate the effect of social image concerns on voting. In a door-to-door survey about election turnout, we experimentally vary (i) the informational content and use of a flyer pre-announcing the survey, (ii) the duration and payment for the survey, and (iii) the incentives to lie about past voting. Our estimates suggest significant social image concerns. For a plausible range of lying costs, we estimate the monetary value of voting `because others will ask' to be in the range of $5-$15 for the 2010 Congressional election. In a complementary get-out-the-vote experiment, we inform potential voters before the election that we will ask them later whether they voted. We find suggestive evidence that the treatment increases turnout. |
| JEL: | C93 P48 |
| Date: | 2014–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:19832&r=exp |
| By: | Bjšrn Bartling; Urs Fischbacher; Simeon Schudy |
| Abstract: | Are people blamed for being pivotal if they implement an unpopular outcome in a sequential voting process? We conduct an experimental voting game and analyze how pivotality affects responsibility attribution by parties who can be negatively affected by the voting outcome. We measure responsibility attribution by assigned punishment points and find that pivotal decision makers are blamed significantly more than non-pivotal decision makers. Moreover, we find that some voters avoid being pivotal by voting strategically to delegate the pivotal vote to subsequent decision makers. |
| Keywords: | Pivotality, voting, responsibility attribution, blame, delegation, experiment |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:twi:respas:0090&r=exp |
| By: | Bartling, Björn; Schmidt, Klaus |
| Abstract: | Do contracts provide reference points that affect ex post behavior? We address this question in a canonical buyer-seller relationship with renegotiation. Our paper provides causal experimental evidence that an initial contract has a highly significant and economically important impact on renegotiation behavior that goes beyond the effect of contracts on bargaining threatpoints. We compare situations in which an initial contract is renegotiated to strategically equivalent bargaining situations in which no ex ante contract was written. The ex ante contract causes sellers to ask for markups that are 45 percent lower than in strategically equivalent bargaining situations without an initial contract. Moreover, buyers are more likely to reject given markups in renegotiations than in negotiations. We do not find that these effects are stronger when the initial contract is concluded under competitive rather than monopolistic conditions. -- |
| JEL: | C78 C91 D03 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:vfsc13:79809&r=exp |
| By: | Friedrichsen, Jana; Engelmann, Dirk |
| Abstract: | We consider the interaction of intrinsic motivation and concerns for social approval in a laboratory experiment. We elicit a proxy for Fairtrade preferences before the experiment. In the experiment, we elicit willingness to pay for conventional and Fairtrade chocolate. Treatments vary whether this can be signalled to other participants. Subjects concerned with social approval should state a higher Fairtrade premium when signalling is possible. We find that this is the case, but interestingly only for participants who are not intrinsically motivated to buy Fairtrade. This has important implications both for crowding out of intrinsic motivation through incentives and for producer choices. -- |
| JEL: | D03 C91 H41 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:vfsc13:79746&r=exp |
| By: | Michailova, Julija |
| Abstract: | We investigate the influence of overconfidence and risk aversion on individual financial decision making in the experimental asset markets of the Smith, Suchanek and Williams (1988) type, with no informational asymmetries. Subjects, based on their pre-experimental overconfidence scores, were assigned to the two types of markets: least overconfident subjects formed five “rational” markets and most overconfident subjects formed five “overconfident” markets. The asset market experiment was followed by post hoc risk aversion measurement. Our results revealed that in the suggested setting, performance and trading activity were overconfidence dependent only for female participants. Mistakes in price forecasting, that are negatively correlated with overconfidence, could partially account for the increase in trading activity and losses. In the decreased sample differences in individual outcomes were overconfidence and not risk aversion driven. |
| Keywords: | overconfidence; miscalibration; overprecision; risk aversion; financial decisions; economic experiments |
| JEL: | D81 G11 C90 C91 |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:53114&r=exp |
| By: | Cicognani, Simona; Mittone, Luigi |
| Abstract: | This paper extends choice theory by allowing for the interaction between cognitive costs and social norms. The authors experimentally investigate the role of imitation and temporal decisional patterns when participants face a task which is costly in cognitive terms. They identify two main reasons for imitative behavior. First, individuals belonging to a community might want to conform to others to obey to social norms. Second, individuals might be boundedly rational and consider imitation as a decisional device when comparing alternatives is cognitively demanding. In order to empirically disentangle the two effects, the authors present a laboratory experiment in which they model the choice of different alternatives through high or low cognitive costs and feedback information given to subjects. Their results do not provide strong evidence for imitative behavior. They find instead a temporal pattern in the distribution of choices, both in the high-cost and low-cost conditions. -- |
| Keywords: | social norms,cognitive costs,laboratory experiments |
| JEL: | C92 D81 Z13 |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:ifwedp:20142&r=exp |
| By: | Dariel A. (GSBE) |
| Abstract: | This paper presents the results from an experiment investigating whether framing affects the elicitation and predictive power of preferences for cooperation, i.e., the willingness to cooperate with others. Cooperation preferences are elicited in three treatments using the method of Fischbacher, Gächter and Fehr (2001). The treatments vary two features of their method: the sequence and order in which the contributions of other group members are presented. The predictive power of the elicited preferences is evaluated in a one-shot and a finitely-repeated public-good game. I find that the order in which the contributions of others are presented, by and large, has no impact on the elicited preferences and their predictive power. In contrast, presenting the contributions of others in a sequence has a pronounced effect on the elicited preferences and reduces substantially their predictive power. Overall, elicited preferences are more accurate at predicting behavior when others contributions are presented simultaneously and in ascending order, like in Fischbacher, Gächter and Fehr (2001). |
| Keywords: | Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual; Public Goods; |
| JEL: | C91 H41 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:unm:umagsb:2013010&r=exp |
| By: | Meub, Lukas; Proeger, Till |
| Abstract: | The performance of groups has been thoroughly investigated in experimental economics, showing that groups are overall more rational deciders than individuals. However, superior group performance in economic experiments has primarily been shown for face-toface decision making, which has ceased to be the prevalent form of communication in many IT-based organizations. To test the robustness of higher group rationality under conditions of virtual communication, we conduct a social learning experiment. We find that virtual communication leads to a substantial deterioration of group rationality for a judgmental task, while there is no effect for a purely intellective task. Further, we show that higher cognitive abilities of group members have no impact for the judgmental task, yet increase rationality for the intellective task. Our results have potential implications for the design of communication structures within decentralized organizations relying on virtual communication. -- |
| Keywords: | cognitive abilities,communication,group composition,group performance,laboratory experiment,methodology,social learning |
| JEL: | C9 D8 |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:cegedp:185&r=exp |
| By: | Dur R.; Neckermann S.; Bradler C.; Non J.A. (GSBE) |
| Abstract: | This paper reports the results from a controlled field experiment designed to investigate the causal effect of public recognition on employee performance. We hired more than 300 employees to work on a three-hour data-entry task. In a random sample of work groups, workers unexpectedly received recognition after two hours of work. We find that recognition increases subsequent performance substantially, and particularly so when recognition is exclusively provided to the best performers. Remarkably, workers who did not receive recognition are mainly responsible for this performance increase. This result is consistent with workers having a preference for conformity. |
| Keywords: | Field Experiments; Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects; |
| JEL: | C93 M52 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:unm:umagsb:2013017&r=exp |
| By: | Hargreaves Heap, Shaun P. |
| Abstract: | This paper reviews some of the economic experimental evidence on conformism. There is nothing to match the early psychology experiments where subjects were often swayed by the behaviour of others to an extraordinary degree, but there is plenty of evidence of conformism. This seems built-in to our sociality either because we have preferences for conversation or status which are activated by the knowledge of what others do, or because other people face relevantly similar decisions to our own and so that their behaviour signals something useful to us about the uncertain world. These social influences can cause mischief. The more worrying cases, however, are those where individual preferences themselves change through interaction with others: the strongest experimental evidence for this is with respect to individual social preferences. -- |
| Keywords: | social conformism,information cascade,preference change |
| JEL: | C91 C92 D43 H41 |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:ifwedp:20144&r=exp |
| By: | Alberto Bisin; Kyle Hyndman |
| Abstract: | We study procrastination in the context of a field experiment involving students who must exert costly effort to complete certain tasks by a fixed deadline. Students display a strong demand for commitment in the form of self-imposed deadlines. However, deadlines appear not to increase task completion rates. Students who report themselves as being more disorganized delay task completion significantly more. We estimate that the fraction of students displaying present bias in our sample is over 40%. Furthermore, we structurally estimate present bias and other possible behavioral aspects of students' decision making by fitting the experimental data on both completion rates and failed attempts through a stylized stopping time choice model. The point estimate of present bias is 30% in our preferred specification. Present-bias appears, however, not to significantly affect behavior in the context of repeated similar tasks. This suggests various frame effects whereby repeated similar task activate internal self-control. Beyond present bias, our results indicate that other behavioral characteristics play an important role in inducing procrastination. |
| JEL: | D03 |
| Date: | 2014–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:19874&r=exp |
| By: | Agnès Festré (CRIISEA; University of Picardie - Jules Verne); Pierre Garrouste (GREDEG CNRS; University of Nice Sophia Antipolis) |
| Abstract: | In this paper we test the fulfillment of commitments in terms of effort made by students under an incentive contract but without strategic interactions. Accordingly it is an experimental contribution to decision theory. The experiments took place in classrooms during class time. Students have to announce a level and realize a level of effort virtually. The two levels of effort can differ and the game is made in such a way that students have interest not the stand by their commitments that to make their two levels of effort different. The results show however that an important percentage of students respect their commitment and that a freezing effect can be identified. |
| Keywords: | commitment, freezing effect, classroom experiments, level of effort |
| JEL: | C91 D90 |
| Date: | 2014–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gre:wpaper:2014-03&r=exp |
| By: | Astrid Gamba; Elena Manzoni |
| Abstract: | We study theoretically and experimentally decision making under uncertainty in a social environment. We introduce an interdependent preferences model that assumes that the decision maker evaluates monetary outcomes in relation both with his individual and his social reference point. In the experiment we reproduce a workplace environment whereby subjects interact in an effort task, earn (possibly) different wages from this task and then undertake a risky decision that may give them an extra bonus. Controlling for intrinsic risk attitudes, we find that both downward and upward social comparison strongly influence risk attitudes and that they both generate more risk loving behavior. Moreover, we find that a propension to envy counterposes such effect, by increasing risk aversion. |
| Keywords: | Social comparison, risk aversion, interdependent preferences, reference point |
| JEL: | C91 D03 D81 |
| Date: | 2014–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mib:wpaper:266&r=exp |
| By: | Luehrmann, Melanie; Chevalier, Arnaud; Dolton, Peter |
| Abstract: | This paper examines field experiment in which we encourage the use of computer-based tests (quizzes) through a set of non-financial incentives and test their effect on effort and performance of students. Our identification strategy exploits cross-cohort experimental variation in assessment rules and within course variation in incentives to determine their impact on the performance in exams. We find these incentives to result in an increase in grades of 2.4 marks or about 4%. The performance effects are concentrated in the lower quartile of the grade distribution and can be attributed to increase quiz participation. Our results suggest that use of computerised assessment methods is not only a relatively low cost method of fostering continuous learning but also an effective tool in increasing student effort and performance. -- |
| JEL: | I23 D20 A23 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:vfsc13:79795&r=exp |
| By: | Li X.; Peeters R.J.A.P. (GSBE) |
| Abstract: | We consider a cheap-talk setting that mimics the situation where an incumbent firm the sender is endowed with incentives to understate the true size of the market demand to two potential entrants the receivers. Although our experimental data reveals that senders messages convey truthful information and this is picked up by the receivers, this overcommunication relative to standard theoretical prediction does not enhance efficient entry levels and payoffs to beyond what can be achieved without any communication. The reason is that receivers fail to optimally translate the information received in their entry decision, possibly due to overcautiousness. |
| Keywords: | Noncooperative Games; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design; Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; |
| JEL: | C72 C92 D82 D83 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:unm:umagsb:2013035&r=exp |
| By: | Friehe, Tim (University of Bonn); Schildberg-Hörisch, Hannah (University of Bonn) |
| Abstract: | We explore the individual and joint explanatory power of concepts from economics, psychology, and criminology for criminal behavior. More precisely, we consider risk and time preferences, personality traits from psychology (Big Five and locus of control), and a self-control scale from criminology. We find that economic preferences, personality traits, and self-control complement each other in predicting criminal behavior. The most significant predictors stem from all three disciplines: risk aversion, conscientiousness, and high self-control make criminal behavior less likely. Our results illustrate that integrating concepts from various disciplines enhances our understanding of individual behavior. |
| Keywords: | crime, risk preferences, time preferences, personality traits, self-control, experiment |
| JEL: | K42 D03 D81 D90 C21 C91 |
| Date: | 2014–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp7894&r=exp |
| By: | Reiss, J. Philipp; Levin, Dan |
| Abstract: | The Winner s Curse (WC) is a non-equilibrium behavior in common-value auctions involving systematic and persistent overbidding that often results in signi ficant losses. It is one of the most robust fi ndings in laboratory experiments. We developed an auction mechanism with a payment rule that internalizes the adverse selection by inducing a simple strategy, sincere bidding, as no-regret equilibrium. Other less efficient payment rules, that use more than the minimal information needed, may also induce sincere bidding as equilibrium. However, given concerns with the WC, we study whether such less minimal rules can help bidders find their way to equilibrium bidding. Our main experimental fi ndings are that the no-regret minimal payment rule results in more WC than the English auction. Yet, a less efficient but more intuitive payment rule addresses overbidding better than the minimal payment rule and, remarkably for a static, sealed-bid design, matches the performance of the English auction. -- |
| JEL: | C92 D44 C72 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:vfsc13:79926&r=exp |
| By: | Giacomo Degli Antoni (University of Parma, Department of Law; Econometica, Inter-University Center for Economic Ethics and Corporate Social Responsibility, Italy); Gianluca Grimalda (University of Duisburg-Essen, Centre for Global Cooperation Research and Kiel Institute for the World Economy, Germany; LEE-Universitat Jaume I of Castellón, Spain) |
| Abstract: | The social capital literature attributes association members a key role in propagating inter-personal trust in the society. It has been posited that participating in associations instils pro-social attitudes in their members, and that the decline in associational membership is the main cause of the faltering rates of inter-personal trust in the US. However, the extent to which association members are indeed inclined to extend their presumed higher pro-social attitudes from within associations to the society at large is still an open question. The survey evidence on the issue is scant, and recent laboratory evidence with minimal groups assigns no value to groups as such. We investigate these issues in the first field experiment measuring trust and trustworthiness of members of real-life associations and of a demographically comparable sample of non-members. The sample was stratified with respect to age, gender, educational level. Members have played an anonymous Trust Game either with fellow members (ingroup treatment), or with people from the general population (outgroup treatment). Our main findings are: (a) Association members are significantly more trusting and trustworthy than non-members when interacting with people from the general population. (b) Association members generally trust and reward fellow members in the same way as they behave with people from the general population. Ingroup favouritism is limited to two associations out of ten with respect to trust, and to one case with respect to trustworthiness. (c) However, people who are members of only “Olsonian” associations do not trust others significantly more than people from the general population, while members of “Putnamesque” and social welfare associations trust significantly more. This confirms the conjecture that associations may have different macroeconomic impacts depending on the nature of their goals. (d) We find no evidence that growing individual involvement with associational life, measured by length of membership, hours spent volunteering, and number of associations joined, has any effect in increasing pro-social attitudes. |
| Keywords: | Trust; Trustworthiness; Social Capital; Ingroup bias; Voluntary associations; Field experiment |
| JEL: | A13 C91 C93 D03 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jau:wpaper:2013/20&r=exp |
| By: | Doerrenberg, Philipp; Duncan, Denvil |
| Abstract: | Motivated by the observation that access to evasion opportunities is dis- tributed heterogeneously across the labor market, this paper examines the extent to which labor supply elasticities with respect to tax rates depend on such evasion opportunities. We rst discuss the channels through which ac- cess to evasion a ects labor supply responses and then set up a laboratory experiment in which all participants undertake a real-e ort task over several rounds. Subjects face a tax rate, which varies across rounds and are required to pay taxes on earned income. The treatment group is given the opportunity to underreport income while the control group is not. We nd that partici- pants in the treatment group respond di erently to changes in the net-of-tax rate than participants in the control group. -- |
| JEL: | H21 H24 J22 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:vfsc13:80041&r=exp |
| By: | Roggemann, Hanne; Myriam, Hadnes; Andreas, Landmann |
| Abstract: | We investigate the impact of mutual support in case of financial losses within a multi-ethnical society in Vietnam by using an experimental approach. We test for the effects of ethnic discrimination with regards to risk sharing by conducting the Solidarity Game based on Selten & Ockenfels (1998). We find no evidence for ethnic discrimination between the groups. But, we can show remarkable differences in behavior when it comes to mutual support in times of idiosyncratic shocks where the richer group showed a rather altruistic behavior of mutual support towards the poorer and the poorer group based their decisions in the experimental lab on past real life experiences. -- |
| JEL: | C91 N35 D19 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:vfsc13:79716&r=exp |
| By: | Eisenkopf, Gerald |
| Abstract: | The paper presents experimental evidence on the impact of managers and their incentives on the behavior of group members in intergroup contests. I find that members follow the nonbinding investment recommendations of their group manager in particular if the managers payoff does not depend on the members behavior. Different incentives schemes induce the managers to lead the groups into different directions but incentivized managers are less capable of inducing very high or low contest investments. -- |
| JEL: | C92 D74 M12 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:vfsc13:79863&r=exp |
| By: | Manuela Angelucci; Dean Karlan; Jonathan Zinman |
| Abstract: | Theory and evidence have raised concerns that microcredit does more harm than good, particularly when offered at high interest rates. We use a clustered randomized trial, and household surveys of eligible borrowers and their businesses, to estimate impacts from an expansion of group lending at 110% APR by the largest microlender in Mexico. Average effects on a rich set of outcomes measured 18-34 months postexpansion suggest no transformative impacts. |
| JEL: | D12 D22 G21 O12 |
| Date: | 2014–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:19827&r=exp |
| By: | Lindner, Florian; Dutcher, E. Glenn; Balafoutas, Loukas; Ryvkin, Dmitry; Sutter, Matthias |
| Abstract: | Managers often use tournament incentive schemes which motivate workers to compete for the top, compete to avoid the bottom, or both. In this paper we test the effectiveness and efficiency of these incentive schemes. To do so, we utilize optimal contracts in a principal-agent setting, using a Lazear-Rosen type model that predicts equal effort and efficiency levels for three tournament incentive schemes: reward tournaments, punishment tournaments, and tournaments combining reward and punishment. We test the model s predictions in a laboratory experiment and find that the combination of reward and punishment produces the highest effort from agents, especially in contests of a relatively larger size. Punishment is shown to be more effective and, in larger contests, more efficient than rewards, and it is also the mechanism with the lowest variance of effort. Finally, we show that behavior in all mechanisms is consistent with a model of basic directional and reinforcement learning. -- |
| JEL: | M52 J33 C90 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:vfsc13:79885&r=exp |
| By: | Adrian Beck; Rudolf Kerschbamer; Jianying Qiu; Matthias Sutter |
| Abstract: | Credence goods, such as car repairs or medical services, are characterized by severe informational asymmetries between sellers and consumers, leading to fraud in the form of provision of insufficient service (undertreatment), provision of unnecessary service (overtreatment) and charging too much for a given service (overcharging). Recent experimental research involving a standard (student) subject pool has examined the influence of informational and market conditions on the type and level of fraud. We investigate whether professional car mechanics – as real sellers of credence goods – react in the same way to changes in informational and institutional constraints. While we find qualitatively similar effects in the fraud dimensions of undertreatment and overcharging for both subject pools, car mechanics are significantly more prone to supplying unnecessary services in all conditions, which could be a result of decision heuristics they learned in their professional training. |
| Keywords: | artefactual field experiment, car mechanics, credence goods |
| JEL: | C91 D82 C72 |
| Date: | 2014–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:inn:wpaper:2014-02&r=exp |
| By: | Dato, Simon; Nieken, Petra |
| Abstract: | We study the differences in behavior of males and females in a two-player tournament with sabotage in a controlled lab experiment. Implementing a real-effort design and a principal who is paid based on the agent s output, we find that males and females do not differ in their achievements in the real effort task but in their choice of sabotage. Males select significantly more sabotage leading to an on average higher winning probability but not to higher profits. If the gender of the opponent is revealed before the tournament, males increase their performance in the real effort task especially if the opponent is female. The gender gap in sabotage is persistent. We discuss possible explanations for our findings and their implications. -- |
| JEL: | C91 J16 M52 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:vfsc13:79750&r=exp |
| By: | Ludwig, Sandra; Thoma, Carmen |
| Abstract: | We analyze how subjects' self-assessment depends on whether its accuracy is observable to others. We find that women downgrade their self-assessment given observability while men do not. Women avoid the shame they may have if others observe that they overestimated themselves. Men, however, do not seem to be similarly shame-averse. This gender difference may be due to different societal expectations: While we find that men are expected to be overconfident, women are not. Shame-aversion may explain recent findings that women shy away from competition, demanding jobs and wage negotiations, as entering these situations shows a certain confidence of one's ability. -- |
| JEL: | C91 D03 J16 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:vfsc13:79814&r=exp |
| By: | Tausch F.; Cettolin E. (GSBE) |
| Abstract: | Risk sharing arrangements diminish individuals vulnerability to probabilistic events that negatively affect their financial situation. This is because risk sharing implies redistribution, as lucky individuals support the unlucky ones. We hypothesize that responsibility for risky choices decreases individuals willingness to share risk by dampening redistribution motives, and investigate this conjecture with a laboratory experiment. Responsibility is created by allowing participants to choose between two different risky lotteries before they decide how much risk they share with a randomly matched partner. Risk sharing is then compared to a treatment where risk exposure is randomly assigned. We find that average risk sharing does not depend on whether individuals can control their risk exposure. However, we observe that when individuals are responsible for their risk exposure, risk sharing decisions are systematically conditioned on the risk exposure of the sharing partner, whereas this is not the case when risk exposure is random. |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:unm:umagsb:2013045&r=exp |
| By: | Stracke, Rudi; Höchtl, Wolfgang; Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Sunde, Uwe |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates the effects of different prize structures on the effort choices of participants in two-stage elimination contests. A format with a single prize is shown to maximize total effort over both stages, but induces low effort in stage 1 and high effort in stage 2. By contrast, a format that allocates the same total amount to multiple prizes in such a way that the predicted effort remains constant across stages yields lower total effort provision. Experimental evidence suggests that (i) total effort is higher in the single prize format, but only for risk-neutral subjects; (ii) effort is constant across stages in the format with multiple prizes, independently of risk-attitudes; and (iii) the runner-up prize in the multiple prize format increases stage-1 and decreases stage-2 efforts in line with the theoretical prediction. -- |
| JEL: | C72 D72 J33 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:vfsc13:79883&r=exp |
| By: | Beblo, Miriam; Beninger, Denis; Cochard, Francois; Couprie, Helene; Hopfensitz, Astrid |
| Abstract: | We present the results of an experiment that measures social preferences within couples in a context where intra-household pay-off inequality can be reduced at the cost of diminishing household income. We measure social norms regarding this efficiency-equality trade-off and implement a cross-country comparison between France and Germany. In particular, we show that German households are more inequality averse and are thus less efficient than French households. A decomposition of this difference reveals that approximately 40% is driven by diverging sample compositions in the two countries, while 60% of the initial French/German difference remains unexplained. Beliefs differ significantly from observed behavior in both countries. Efficient choices are overestimated in the German sample and underestimated in the French. -- |
| JEL: | D13 C91 C92 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:vfsc13:79759&r=exp |
| By: | Engelmann, Dirk; Nikiforakis, Nikos |
| Abstract: | We investigate whether peer punishment is an efficient mechanism for enforcing cooperation in an experiment with a long time horizon. Previous evidence suggests that the costs of peer punishment can be outweighed by the benefits of higher cooperation, if (i) there is a sufficiently long time horizon and (ii) punishment cannot be avenged. However, in most instances in daily life, when individuals interact for an extended period of time, punishment can be retaliated. We use a design that imposes minimal restrictions on who can punish whom or when, and allows participants to employ a wide range of punishment strategies including retaliation of punishment. Similar to previous research, we find that, when punishment cannot be avenged, peer punishment leads to higher earnings relative to a baseline treatment without any punishment opportunities. However, in the more general setting, we find no evidence of group earnings increasing over time relative to the baseline treatment. Our results raise questions under what conditions peer punishment can be an efficient mechanism for enforcing cooperation. -- |
| JEL: | C92 D70 H41 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:vfsc13:79743&r=exp |
| By: | Montero García, Maria; Possajennikow, Alex; Sefton, Martín; Turocy, Theodore L. |
| Abstract: | We investigate a version of the classic Colonel Blotto game in which individual battles may have different values. Two players allocate a fixed budget across battlefields and each battlefield is won by the player who allocates the most to that battlefield. The winner of the game is the player who wins the battlefields with highest total value. We focus on the case where there is one large and several small battlefields, such that a player wins if he wins the large and any one small battlefield, or all the small battlefields. We compute the mixed strategy equilibrium for these games and compare this with choices from a laboratory experiment. The equilibrium predicts that the large battlefield receives more than a proportional share of the resources of the players, and that most of the time resources should be spread over more battlefields than are needed to win the game. We find support for the main qualitative features of the equilibrium. In particular, strategies that spread resources widely are played frequently, and the large battlefield receives more than a proportional share in the treatment where the asymmetry between battlefields is stronger. |
| Keywords: | Colonel Blotto, majoritarian contests, experiment |
| JEL: | C73 C91 D72 |
| Date: | 2013–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehu:ikerla:11222&r=exp |
| By: | Borghans L.; Golsteyn B.H.H. (ROA) |
| Abstract: | This paper analyzes whether defaults affect the choice for courses followed at work. In addition, we analyze whether the size of the default effect varies with employees’ personality and skill-deficiencies. We perform an experiment in which workers are hypothetically offered three courses which they can accept or exchange for other courses. Randomizing the default package of courses, we identify the default effect. Default courses are chosen approximately three times more often than other courses. They are chosen more often if people have skill-deficiencies in these courses, suggesting that people consider the default to be an advice. Women choose default courses more often than men. Women with less self-confidence and men with lower cognitive skills choose the default courses more often. |
| Keywords: | Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity; Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials; |
| JEL: | J24 J31 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:unm:umaror:2013002&r=exp |
| By: | Koch, Christian |
| Abstract: | Why do some people behave pro-socially while others do not? Using an experimental design based on Konow and Earley (JPubE, 2008), I investigate a reason already proposed by Aristotle in his Nicomachean Ethics: He claims that there is a nexus between virtues and well-being and that enduring well-being cannot be achieved by hedonic pleasures and material affluence, but only by virtuous behavior. In order to analyze this hypothesis, I use a within-subject design. Initially, participants answer an elaborated well-being questionnaire and then play six different cooperation games. I examine two questions in connection with the Aristotelian idea: First, do more virtuously behaving subjects report on average higher well-being? Second, if the answer is affirmative, what is the underlying causal relationship? I find a favorable correlation between well-being and virtuous behavior and examine different hypotheses about what leads to virtuous behavior: My experimental data is mostly in line with the hypothesis that virtuous behavior is both a long-run cause as well as a short effect of a specific type of long-run well-being, called eudaimonic well-being. To this extent, I find evidence in favor of a nexus between virtues and well-being. -- |
| JEL: | C91 D64 D03 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:vfsc13:80054&r=exp |
| By: | Heinz, Matthias; Drzensky, Frank |
| Abstract: | We analyze whether a principal s decision to layoff an agent affects the performance of the surviving agents. To study the impact of the decision in isolation, we conducted an experimental principal-agent game. We find that agents reduce their performance by 37% as a response to the decision. Heterogeneity in principals decisions can largely be explained by different beliefs about how agents react to layoffs. -- |
| JEL: | J63 C91 J82 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:vfsc13:79764&r=exp |
| By: | Enke, Benjamin; Zimmermann, Florian |
| Abstract: | A frequent feature of information structures is that they generate signals which are not mutually independent, but rather rely on a common set of underlying information. Using a simple experimental design, we show that in such contexts many people neglect correlations in the updating process, leading to systematically "overshooting" beliefs. This finding lends direct support to recent models of boundedly rational learning in social networks. In an experimental market setting, correlation neglect not only drives overoptimism and overpessimism at the individual level, but also affects aggregate outcomes in a systematic manner. In particular, the excessive confidence swings produced by correlated information structures translate into predictable price bubbles and crashes. Finally, we show the robustness of correlation neglect in a naturally occurring informational environment, in which subjects predict GDP growth on the basis of real news reports. -- |
| JEL: | D84 D03 D40 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:vfsc13:79900&r=exp |
| By: | Tsakas E.; Gaechter S.; Mengel F.; Vostroknutov A. (GSBE) |
| Abstract: | In a novel experimental design we study dynamic public good games in which wealth is allowed to accumulate. More precisely each agents income at the end of a period serves as her endowment in the following period. In this setting growth and inequality arise endogenously allowing us to address new questions regarding their interplay and effect on cooperation levels. We find that average cooperation levels in this setting are high between 20-60 of endowments and that amounts contributed do not decline over time. Introducing the possibility of punishment leads to lower group income, but less inequality within groups. In both treatments with and w/o punishment inequality and group income are positively correlated for poor groups with below median income, but negatively correlated for rich groups with above median income. There is very strong path dependence inequality in early periods is strongly negatively correlated with group income in later periods. These results give new insights into why people cooperate and should make us rethink previous results from the literature on repeated public good games regarding the decay of cooperation in the absence of punishment. |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:unm:umagsb:2013070&r=exp |
| By: | Karle, Heiko; Kirchsteiger, Georg; Peitz, Martin |
| Abstract: | In this paper we analyze a consumer choice model with price uncertainty, loss aversion, and expectation-based reference points. The implications of this model are tested in an experiment in which participants have to make a consumption choice between two sandwiches. We make use of the fact that participants di er in their reported taste di erence between the two sandwiches and the degree of loss aversion which we measure separately. We find that more loss averse participants are more likely to opt for the cheaper sandwich provided that their reported taste di erence is below some threshold, confirming the model s predictions. -- |
| JEL: | C91 D01 D11 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:vfsc13:79943&r=exp |
| By: | Güth, Werner; Pull, Kerstin; Stadler, Manfred; Zaby, Alexandra |
| Abstract: | We present a model of price leadership on homogeneous product markets where the price leader is selected endogenously. The price leader sets and guarantees a sales price to which followers adjust according to their individual supply functions. The price leader clears the market by serving the residual demand. As price leaders, firms with different marginal costs induce different prices. We compare two mechanisms to determine the price leader, majority voting and competitive bidding. According to the experimental data at least experienced price leaders with lower marginal costs choose higher prices. In the bidding treatment, compensation payments to the price leader crowd in efficiency concerns. -- |
| Keywords: | price leadership,majority voting,bidding,experimental economics |
| JEL: | D43 D74 L11 |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:tuewef:68&r=exp |
| By: | Werner, Peter; Bolton, Gary; Ockenfels, Axel |
| Abstract: | We study the role of transparency in a novel three-person profit sharing game in which managers and board directors decide on how to distribute the revenues of a company among themselves and shareholders, who are the residual claimants of the companies revenues. We examine two hypotheses. One is that the distribution of revenues is largely determined by an informal quid pro quo among the two decision makers at the expense of shareholders. The second hypothesis is that public transparency attenuates exaggerated manager pay because of increased social pressure. We find strong support for our first hypothesis, but reject the second one: Public transparency actually increases managerial wages as well as board director compensation, further reducing the revenue share that goes to shareholders. Competition to keep managers further magnifies these patterns. -- |
| JEL: | C92 G34 D63 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:vfsc13:79766&r=exp |
| By: | Neitzel, Jakob; Sääksvuori, Lauri |
| Abstract: | This paper shows how conflicting normative views of fair contribution rules can be used to design sequential contribution mechanisms to foster human cooperation in heterogeneous populations. Our model predicts that a sequential mechanism which solicits contributions first from wealthy actors generates greater public good provision and narrows wealth inequality more than any alternative sequential mechanism. Our experimental data show that the mechanism with rich first-movers generates greater contributions than alternative mechanisms, as predicted. Results suggest how altering the sequential order of contributions may affect public good provision and help organizations to increase the total value of solicited contributions. -- |
| JEL: | C92 D63 H41 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:vfsc13:79904&r=exp |
| By: | Schröder, Melanie; Schmitt, Norma; Heynemann, Britta; Brünn, Claudia |
| Abstract: | Complementary to microsimulation studies focusing on the impact of labor supply as a choice of hours worked we shed light on another variable that survey data are not capable of taking into account: the choice of work e ffort. Our aim is to investigate the eff ect of individual and joint taxation on partners' labor supply within an experimental setting. 116 participants (58 real couples) perform under a piece rate compensation on real e ffort tasks in two stages. The couple's income is taxed jointly for one stage and individually for the other. Surprisingly, our data reveal that men, when being in the position of a secondary earner, are more susceptible to changes in tax scheme while women do not react to a change in tax scheme at all. Besides the male breadwinner model we also demonstrate that fairness considerations play a role. -- |
| JEL: | H31 C93 J22 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:vfsc13:79735&r=exp |
| By: | Walkowitz, Gari; Lönnqvist, Jan-Erik; Irlenbusch, Bernd |
| Abstract: | In four studies (S1-S4; N = 320) we investigated whether moral hypocrisy (MH) is motivated by conscious impression management concerns or whether it is self-deceptive. In a dictator game, MH occurred both within participants (saying one thing, doing another; S1) and between participants (doing one thing when it is inconsequential, doing another thing when it affects payoffs; S2). People were willing to let an ostensibly fair coin determine payoffs only if they could fudge the results of the coin flip, suggesting that hypocrites do not deceive themselves (S3). Also supporting this view, MH was associated with adherence to Conformity values (S1-S2), indicative of a desire to appear moral in the eyes of others but not indicative of self-deception. Universalism values were predictive of moral integrity (S1, S3-S4). Applying our findings, we show that MH can be reduced by increasing the collective awareness about its prevalence in a specific situation (S4). -- |
| JEL: | A13 C91 M14 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:vfsc13:79701&r=exp |
| By: | Kirchkamp, Oliver; Prömpers, Henning |
| Abstract: | With the help of lab experiments we study the impact of discharging insolvent debtors of their residual debt. We investigate the impact of different participation rules and the impact of different types of lenders. We find that higher participation rates encourage risk taking behaviour of borrowers. Higher participation rates also reduce the amount of moonlighting. Most importantly, institutional lenders can suffer more from moonlighting than private lenders. -- |
| JEL: | C92 D14 D86 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:vfsc13:79851&r=exp |
| By: | Irlenbusch, Bernd; Hennig-Schmidt, Heike; Rilke, Rainer; Walkowitz, Gari |
| Abstract: | We experimentally investigate the relevance of (asymmetric) outside options in ultimatum bargaining. Building on the generalized equity principle formulated by Selten (1978) we derive three di erent equity rules. These equity rules can explain 43% of all o ers. Our within-subject design allows us to show that proposers apply the equity rules in a self-serving manner, i.e., proposers tend to follow the rules that suggest the highest payo for them. This tendency leads to high ine ciencies due to frequent rejections. -- |
| JEL: | C78 C91 D63 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:vfsc13:79975&r=exp |
| By: | Sliwka, Dirk; Manthei, Kathrin |
| Abstract: | We examine the benefits of objective performance measurement in a field experiment conducted in a retail bank. At the outset objective performance measures of pro fits in each branch were only available on the branch level and managers allocated bonuses to their employees based on subjective assessments. In a subset of the branches, managers then obtained access to individual performance measures. We find a significant positive impact of objective performance measurement on effort and financial performance. This productivity increase is mainly driven by larger branches and higher sales for non-core products which is well in line with a formal economic model on the optimal allocation of monitoring efforts under subjective evaluations in multitask environments. -- |
| JEL: | C93 J33 D23 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:vfsc13:79968&r=exp |
| By: | Gobien, Simone; Vollan, Björn |
| Abstract: | Mutual aid among villagers in developing countries often is the sole possibility to insure against economic shocks. By using field laboratory experiments in Cambodian villages we study social cohesion in newly resettled and established communities which are both part of a land distribution project. All participants signed up voluntarily for the project, share comparable socio-demographic attributes and have similar preexisting network ties. We use a version of the solidarity game to identify the effect of a voluntary resettlement program on the willingness to help fellow villagers after an income shock. The voluntary resettled players only transfer between 41 % and 57 % of the amount the non-resettled players transfer to an anonymous community member. The solidarity differences are not only driven by lower expectations that the others would also help but are based on more selfish preferences among resettled farmers. Our findings are relevant for resettlement policies, because recipients might have to get additional compensation and formal insurance against the negative social consequences of resettlement until social cohesion is eventually re-established. -- |
| JEL: | C93 O15 O22 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:vfsc13:79985&r=exp |
| By: | Duffy, John; Bao, Te (Groningen University) |
| Abstract: | Adaptive learning and eductive learning are two widely used ways of modeling learning behavior in macroeconomics. Both approaches yield restrictions on model parameters under which agents are able to learn a rational expectation equilibrium (REE) but these restrictions do not always overlap with one another. In this paper we report on an experiment where we exploit such differences in stability conditions under adaptive and eductive learning to investigate which learning approach provides a better description of the learning behavior of human subjects. Our results suggest that adaptive learning is a better predictor of whether a system converges to REE, while the path by which the system converges appears to be a mixture of both adaptive and eductive learning model predictions. |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:rugsom:14002-eef&r=exp |
| By: | Artinger, Sabrina |
| Abstract: | How does demand uncertainty affect entry into skill-based competition? I investigate this question in a market entry experiment with skill-based payoffs by systematically varying two key elements of the market environment: demand risk and expected market size. Results show that people's reactions to demand risk depend on the market size: in small markets people enter more when demand is risky, in large markets they enter less when demand is risky. This leads to substantial inefficiencies in both cases: demand risk significantly amplifies overentry in small markets and underentry in large markets. Skill and confidence have strong main effects but do not moderate reactions to demand risk or market size. This result has important implications for market design and regulation. -- |
| JEL: | D03 D80 D23 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:vfsc13:79962&r=exp |
| By: | Stadelmann, David; Portmann, Marco; Eichenberger, Reiner |
| Abstract: | Exploiting a natural voting experiment we identify female preferences for real policy issues in the electorate. We then analyze whether female or male politicians in parliament more closely correspond to female preferences. Holding constant revealed constituent preferences, there is generally no difference between male and female politicians with respect to representation of female preferences. However, when focusing only on social and redistribution issues, we find that female politicians correspond in their decisions more closely to female preferences. -- |
| JEL: | J16 D72 H50 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:vfsc13:79748&r=exp |
| By: | Philip J. Cook; Kenneth Dodge; George Farkas; Roland G. Fryer, Jr; Jonathan Guryan; Jens Ludwig; Susan Mayer; Harold Pollack; Laurence Steinberg |
| Abstract: | There is growing concern that improving the academic skills of disadvantaged youth is too difficult and costly, so policymakers should instead focus either on vocationally oriented instruction for teens or else on early childhood education. Yet this conclusion may be premature given that so few previous interventions have targeted a potential fundamental barrier to school success: “mismatch” between what schools deliver and the needs of disadvantaged youth who have fallen behind in their academic or non-academic development. This paper reports on a randomized controlled trial of a two-pronged intervention that provides disadvantaged youth with non-academic supports that try to teach youth social-cognitive skills based on the principles of cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT), and intensive individualized academic remediation. The study sample consists of 106 male 9th and 10th graders in a public high school on the south side of Chicago, of whom 95% are black and 99% are free or reduced price lunch eligible. Participation increased math test scores by 0.65 of a control group standard deviation (SD) and 0.48 SD in the national distribution, increased math grades by 0.67 SD, and seems to have increased expected graduation rates by 14 percentage points (46%). While some questions remain about the intervention, given these effects and a cost per participant of around $4,400 (with a range of $3,000 to $6,000), this intervention seems to yield larger gains in adolescent outcomes per dollar spent than many other intervention strategies. |
| JEL: | I0 I20 I24 I3 J24 Z18 |
| Date: | 2014–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:19862&r=exp |