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on Experimental Economics |
| By: | Nielsen, Ulrik H. (Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen); Tyran, Jean-Robert (Department of Economics, University of Vienna); Wengström, Erik (Department of Economics, Lund University) |
| Abstract: | We use the strategy method to classify subjects into cooperator types in a large-scale online Public Goods Game and find that free riders spend more time on making their decisions than conditional cooperators and other cooperator types. This result is robust to reversing the framing of the game and is not driven by free riders lacking cognitive ability, confusion, or natural swiftness in responding. Our results suggest that conditional cooperation serves as a norm and that free riders need time to resolve a moral dilemma. |
| Keywords: | Response Time; Free Riding; Public Goods; Experiment |
| JEL: | C70 C90 D03 |
| Date: | 2013–09–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2013_029&r=exp |
| By: | Marcela Ibanez (Georg-August University Göttingen); Elke Schaffland (Georg-August University Göttingen) |
| Abstract: | In order to deal with crises, organizations often bring expert leaders from outside. However, relying in an outside leader can result in decreased performance of the organization. In this paper, we use an experiment to investigate the role of identity and skills of the outside leader on the performance of the organization. Our results indicate that outside leaders are less committed than inside leaders and that group members cooperate less with an outsider than an inside leader. |
| Keywords: | Social Identity; Leadership; Public Good Game; Lab Experiment |
| Date: | 2013–09–16 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:got:gotcrc:149&r=exp |
| By: | Aurélien Baillon; Han Bleichrodt; Alessandra Cillo |
| Abstract: | We performed a new test of transitivity based on individual measurements of the main intransitive choice models in decision under uncertainty. Our test is tailor-made and, therefore, more likely to detect violations of transitivity than previous tests. In spite of this, we observed only few intransitivities and we could not reject the hypothesis that these were due to random error. A possible explanation for the poor predictive performance of the intransitive choice models is that they only allow for interactions between acts, but exclude within-act interactions by retaining the assumption that preferences are separable overstates of nature. Prospect theory, which relaxes separability but retains transitivity, predicted choices significantly better than the nontransitive choice models. We conclude that descriptively realistic models need to allow for within-act interactions, but may retain transitivity. Subject classifications: Utility/preference: Estimation. Decision analysis: Risk. Area of review: Decision Analysis. |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:igi:igierp:496&r=exp |