New Economics Papers
on Experimental Economics
Issue of 2013‒06‒04
27 papers chosen by

  1. Justification and Legitimate Punishment By Xiao, Erte; Tan, Fangfang
  2. Resource scarcity, spite and cooperation By Sebastian Prediger; Bjoern Vollan; Benedikt Herrmann
  3. Surprising Gifts - Theory and Laboratory Evidence By Kiryl Khalmetski; Axel Ockenfels; Peter Werner
  4. Why Do People Volunteer? An Experimental Analysis of Preferences for Time Donations By Alexander L. Brown; Jonathan Meer; J. Forrest Williams
  5. Taking Punishment into your Own Hands: An Experiment By Julia Mueller; Peter Duersch
  6. Bundling Public with Private Goods By Gerrit Frackenpohl; Gert Pönitzsch
  7. Income and choice under risk By Arnt O. Hopland; Egil Matsen; Bjarne Strøm
  8. Correlation Neglect in Belief Formation By Benjamin Enke; Florian Zimmermann
  9. A Helping Hand or the Long Arm of the Law? Experimental Evidence on What Governments Can Do to Formalize Firms By de Andrade, Gustavo Henrique; Bruhn, Miriam; McKenzie, David
  10. Theoretical and Experimental Analysis of Auctions with Negative Externalities By Hu, Youxin; Kagel, John; Xu, Xiaoshu; Ye, Lixin
  11. Democracy and Regulation: The Effects of Electoral Competition on Infrastructure Investments By Arthur Schram; Aljaz Ule
  12. Cooperation Hidden Frontiers: The Behavioral Foundations of the Italian North-South Divide By M. Bigoni; S. Bortolotti; M. Casari; D. Gambetta; F. Pancotto
  13. Beliefs and (In)Stability in Normal-Form Games By Hyndman, Kyle; Terracol, Antoine; Vaksmann, Jonathan
  14. Are risk preferences dynamic? Within-subject variation in risk-taking as a function of background music By Halko, Marja Liisa; Kaustia, Markku
  15. Recalibrational Emotions and the Regulation of Trust-Based Behaviors By Eric Schniter; Timothy Shields
  16. Learning in a Black Box By H Peyton Young; H.H. Nax; M.N. Burton-Chellew; S.A. West
  17. Can You Trust the Good Guys? Trust Within and Between Groups with Different Missions By Fehrler, Sebastian; Kosfeld, Michael
  18. Does the better –than- average effect show that people are Overconfident?: two experiments. By Jean-Pierre Benoit; Juan Dubra
  19. Is the Contracting-Out of Intensive Placement Services More Effective than Provision by the PES? Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment By Krug, Gerhard; Stephan, Gesine
  20. 'Lucas' In The Laboratory By Elena Asparouhova; Peter Bossaerts; Nilanjan Roy; William Zame
  21. Modeling Unobserved Consumer Heterogeneity in Experimental Auctions: A Censored Random Parameters Approach By Collart, Alba J.; Palma, Marco A.
  22. Social Interaction and Public Goods Provision: A Case of Waste Management in Bandung, Indonesia By Martin Daniel Siyaranamual
  23. Bonus Schemes and Trading Activity By Pikulina, E.S.; Renneboog, L.D.R.; Horst, J.R. ter; Tobler, P.N.
  24. Cross-cultural experimental economics and indigenous management research: Issues and contributions By Horak, Sven
  25. Findings from an Experimental Evaluation of Playworks: Effects on Play, Physical Activity and Recess. By Nicholas Beyler; Martha Bleeker; Susanne James-Burdumy; Jane Fortson; Rebecca A. London; Lisa Westrich; Katie Stokes-Guinan; Sebastian Castrechini
  26. Impact and Implementation Findings from an Experimental Evaluation of Playworks: Effects on School Climate, Academic Learning, Student Social Skills and Behavior. By Jane Fortson; Susanne James-Burdumy; Martha Bleeker; Nicholas Beyler; Rebecca A. London; Lisa Westrich; Katie Stokes-Guinan; Sebastian Castrechini
  27. Assessing Korean Consumers’ Valuation for BSE Tested and Country of Origin Labeled Beef Products By Lee, Sang Hyeon; Lee, Ji Yong; Han, Doo Bong; Nayga, Rodolfo M. Jr

  1. By: Xiao, Erte; Tan, Fangfang
    Abstract: Punishment can lose its legitimacy if the enforcer can profit from delivering punishment. We use a controlled laboratory experiment to examine how justification can combat profit-seeking punishment and promote the legitimacy of punishment. In a one-shot sender-receiver game, an independent third party can punish the sender upon seeing whether the sender has told the truth. Most third parties punish the senders regardless of how the senders behave when they can profit from punishment. However, majority third parties punish the sender if and only if the sender lies when they have to provide explanations for their punishment decisions. Our data also suggests that senders are more likely to perceive punishment as legitimate and behave honestly when they know the enforcer has to justify their punishment decisions. Our findings suggest that justification requirement plays an important role in building efficient punishment institutions.
    Keywords: third-party punishment, justification, sender-receiver game, experiment
    JEL: C72 C92 D63 D83
    Date: 2013–05–22
  2. By: Sebastian Prediger; Bjoern Vollan; Benedikt Herrmann
    Abstract: Using an experimental approach, this paper examines how scarcity of natural resources affects people’s readiness to cooperate and to engage in antisocial behaviour. The experiments were carried out with pastoralists from southern Namibia whose livelihoods are highly dependent on grazing availability on their collectively used rangelands. We split the study region into two areas according to exogenous differences in biomass production, a high-yield and a low-yield area, and conduct a one-shot public goods experiment and the joy-of-destruction experiment with pastoralists from both areas. Results from the joy-of-destruction experiment reveal that a substantial fraction of people is willing to reduce another subject’s income, although this comes at an own cost. We show that this kind of spiteful behaviour occurs twice as often in the area where resources are scarcer and hence competitive pressure is higher. By contrast, levels of cooperation are very similar across areas. This indicates that scarcity does not hamper cooperation, at least as long as a sub-survival level has not been reached. Our data further reveal a coexistence of prosocial and antisocial behaviour within individuals, suggesting that people’s motivations depend on the experimental environment they are acting in. One possible explanation is that subjects are ready to cooperate when substantial net gains can be realized, but turn to spiteful money burners when there is no scope for efficiency improvements and the risk of “falling behind” is particularly salient.
    Keywords: competition, natural resource scarcity, antisocial behaviour, cooperation, Namibia, lab-in-the-field experiments
    JEL: C71 C72 C91 D03 H41 Q24
    Date: 2013–05
  3. By: Kiryl Khalmetski; Axel Ockenfels; Peter Werner
    Abstract: People do not only feel guilt from not living up to others' expectations (Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007)), but may also like to exceed them. We propose a model that generalizes the guilt aversion model to capture the possibility of positive surprises when making gifts. A model extension allows decision makers to care about others' attribution of intentions behind surprises. We test the model in two dictator game experiments. Experiment 1 shows a strong causal effect of recipients' expectations on dictators' transfers. Moreover, in line with our model, the correlation between transfers and expectations can be both, positive and negative, obscuring the effect in the aggregate. Experiment 2 shows that dictators care about what recipients know about the intentions behind surprises.
    Keywords: guilt aversion, surprise seeking, dictator game, consensus effect
    JEL: C91 D64
    Date: 2013–05–09
  4. By: Alexander L. Brown; Jonathan Meer; J. Forrest Williams
    Abstract: We conduct a laboratory experiment to test if there are differences in behavior when subjects can donate either time or money to charity. Our subjects perform an effort task to earn money. In one condition they can have their efforts accrue to a charity instead of themselves. In other conditions subjects may only earn money for their private account but then donate it to a charity. We vary the timing and availability of donation opportunities in the monetary donation settings to test the impact of subtle solicitation pressure. We find that subjects with a more opportunities to donate will donate more often and in larger amounts. Further, subjects giving effort to charity give far more than subjects who give monetary donations – between two and five times as much, on average. We posit that this difference is driven by different warm glow from the two donation types.
    JEL: D64 H41
    Date: 2013–05
  5. By: Julia Mueller (Erasmus University Rotterdam); Peter Duersch (University of Heidelberg)
    Abstract: In a punishment experiment, we separate the demand for punishment in general from the demand to conduct punishment personally. Subjects experience an unfair split of their earnings from a real effort task and have to decide on the punishment of the person who determines the distribution. First, it is established whether the allocator's payoff is reduced and, afterwards, subjects take part in a second price auction for the right to (physically) carry out the act of payoff reduction themselves. Subjects bid positive amounts and are happier if they get to punish personally.
    Keywords: personal punishment, real effort task, experiment, auction
    JEL: C92 D03
    Date: 2013–05–27
  6. By: Gerrit Frackenpohl; Gert Pönitzsch
    Abstract: We propose a simple mechanism that might improve voluntary contributions to public goods. Using a laboratory experiment we analyze how bundling public with private goods affects individuals' valuations for both goods. In the experiment, subjects may purchase a private and a public good either separately or in the form of a bundle. The data show superadditivity for bundles of public and private goods, i.e., the willingness to pay for the bundle exceeds the willingness to pay for the two separate goods. In contrast, we find no superadditivity in control treatments with only private goods. We discuss several behavioral concepts which are in line with our results as well as implications for fundraisers and firms.
    Keywords: Public Goods, Bundling, Valuation, Superadditivity
    JEL: C91 D12 H41
    Date: 2013–05
  7. By: Arnt O. Hopland (Department of Economics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology); Egil Matsen (Department of Economics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology); Bjarne Strøm (Department of Economics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology)
    Abstract: This paper studies the relationship between income and risky choice in a field ex- periment where stakes are of first-orderimportance to the subjects' living standards. We combine observations of stopping decisions in a Norwegian game show with reliable data on each subject's income. Participants in the experiment are randomly drawn from a large subject pool that is representative of the Norwegian population. Our re- sults clearly indicate that people are risk-averse in making large-stake choices and that decision makers with high income are more willing to accept nancial risk.
    Keywords: Risky choice; Field experiment
    JEL: C9 C93 D81
    Date: 2013–04–16
  8. By: Benjamin Enke; Florian Zimmermann
    Abstract: Many information structures generate correlated rather than mutually independent signals, the news media being a prime example. This paper shows experimentally that in such context many people neglect these correlations in the updating process and treat correlated information as independent. In consequence, people’s beliefs are excessively sensitive to well-conncected information sources, implying a pattern of “overshooting” beliefs. Additionally, in an experimental asset market, correlation neglect not only drives overoptimism and overpessimism at the individual level, but also affects aggregate outcomes in a systematic manner. In particular, the excessive confidence swings caused by correlated signals give rise to predictable price bubbles and cashes. These findings are reminiscent of popular narratives according to which aggregate booms and busts might be driven by the spread of “stories”. Our results also lend direct support to recent models of boundedly rational social learning.
    Keywords: Beliefs, Correlation Neglect, Experiments, Markets, Overshooting
    JEL: C91 D03 D83 D84 D40
    Date: 2013–04
  9. By: de Andrade, Gustavo Henrique (Governo do Estado de Minas Gerais); Bruhn, Miriam (World Bank); McKenzie, David (World Bank)
    Abstract: Many governments have spent much of the past decade trying to extend a helping hand to informal businesses by making it easier and cheaper for them to formalize. Much less effort has been devoted to raising the costs of remaining informal, through increasing enforcement of existing regulations. We conducted a field experiment in Belo Horizonte, Brazil, in order to test which government actions work in getting informal firms to register. Firms were randomized to a control group or one of four treatment groups: the first received information about how to formalize; the second received this information and free registration costs along with the use of an accountant for a year; the third group was assigned to receive an enforcement visit from a municipal inspector; while the fourth group was assigned to have a neighboring firm receive an enforcement visit to see if enforcement has spillovers. We find zero or negative impacts of information and free cost treatments, and a significant but small increase in formalization from inspections. Our LATE estimates of the impact of actually receiving an inspection are much bigger, giving a 21 to 27 percentage point increase in the likelihood of formalizing. The results show most informal firms won't formalize unless forced to do so, suggesting formality offers little private benefit to them, but the tax revenue benefits to the governments of bringing firms of this size into the formal system more than offset the costs of inspections.
    Keywords: informality, enforcement, small enterprises
    JEL: O17 O12 C93 D21 L26
    Date: 2013–05
  10. By: Hu, Youxin; Kagel, John; Xu, Xiaoshu; Ye, Lixin
    Abstract: We investigate a private value auction in which a single "entrant" on winning imposes a negative externality on two "regular" bidders. In an English auction, when all bidders are active "regulars" free ride, exiting before price reaches their value. In a first-price sealed-bid auction incentives for free riding and aggressive bidding coexist, limiting free riding. We find substantial, though incomplete, free riding in the clock auction. In first-price auctions, regular bidders bid more aggressively than the "entrant" and both bid higher than in auctions with no externality. Predictions regarding revenue, efficiency, and successful entry between the two auctions are satisfied.
    Keywords: Auctions, externality, free riding, aggressive bidding, experiments.
    JEL: C91 D44 D82
    Date: 2012–12
  11. By: Arthur Schram (University of Amsterdam); Aljaz Ule (University of Amsterdam)
    Abstract: This paper investigates infrastructure investment in markets where regulation is subject to varying degrees of manipulation by elected politicians. Based on a model of price regulation in a market with increasing demand and long-term returns on investment we construct a multi-period game between a service provider, consumers with voting rights and elected decision makers. In each period the consumers elect a decision maker who may then regulate the price for service provision. Before an election the service provider chooses whether to increase its capacity. Investment is irreversible and profitable only with a sufficiently high price. We derive the subgame perfect equilibrium for this game and investigate the price and investment dynamics through an experiment with human subjects. The experimental results show that service providers invest when decision-makers' interests align with their own, though prices may rise inefficiently high when the regulatory framework is made independent of future political manipulation. Independency of regulation thus decreases efficiency and consumer surplus. In contrast, when decision-makers' interests do not align with service providers' we find efficiency only when regulation can be made independent from electoral dynamics.
    Keywords: Infrastructural investment, regulation, electoral competition, laboratory experiment
    JEL: L5 L43 D92 C9
    Date: 2013–03–18
  12. By: M. Bigoni; S. Bortolotti; M. Casari; D. Gambetta; F. Pancotto
    Abstract: Socio-economic performance differs not only across countries but within countries too and can persist even after religion, language, and formal institutions are long shared. One interpretation of these disparities is that successful regions are characterized by higher levels of trust, and, more generally, of cooperation. Here we study a classic case of within-country disparities, the Italian North-South divide, to find out whether people exhibit geographically distinct abilities to cooperate independently of many other factors and whence these differences emerge. Through an experiment in four Italian cities, we study the behavior of a sample of the general population toward trust and contributions to the common good. We find that trust and contributions vary in unison, and diminish moving from North to South. This regional gap cannot be attributed to payoffs from cooperation or to institutions, formal or informal, that may vary across Italy, as the experimental methodology silences their impact. The gap is also independent of risk and other-regarding preferences which we measure experimentally, suggesting that the lower ability to cooperate we find in the South is not due to individual \moral" flaws. The gap could originate from emergent collective properties, such as different social norms and the expectations they engender. The absence of convergence in behavior during the last 150 years, since Italy was unified, further suggests that these norms can persist overtime. Using a millennium-long dataset, we explore whether the quality of past political institutions and the frequency of wars could explain the emergence of these differences in norms.
    JEL: C90 D03
    Date: 2013–05
  13. By: Hyndman, Kyle; Terracol, Antoine; Vaksmann, Jonathan
    Abstract: In this paper, we use experimental data to study players' stability in normal-form games where subjects have to report beliefs and to choose actions. Subjects saw each of 12 games four times in a regular or isomorphic form spread over two days without feedback. We document a high degree of stability within the same (strategically equivalent) game, although time and changes in the presentation of the game do lead to less stability. To look at stability across different games, we adopt the level-k theory, and show that stability of both beliefs and actions is significantly lower. Finally, we estimate a structural model in which players either apply a consistent level of reasoning across strategically different games, or reasoning levels change from game to game. Our results show that approximately 30% of subjects apply a consistent level of reasoning across the 12 games, but that they assign a low level of sophistication to their opponent. The remaining 70% apply different levels of reasoning to different games.
    Keywords: Game theory, Beliefs, Stability, Level-$k$ thinking
    JEL: C72 C91 D83
    Date: 2013–05–23
  14. By: Halko, Marja Liisa; Kaustia, Markku
    Abstract: This paper investigates whether preference interactions can explain why risk preferences change over time and across contexts. We conduct an experiment in which subjects accept or reject gambles involving real money gains and losses. We introduce within-subject variation by alternating subjectively liked music and disliked music in the background. We find that favourite music increases risk-taking, and disliked music suppresses risk-taking, compared to a baseline of no music. Several theories in psychology propose mechanisms by which mood affects risktaking, but none of them fully explain our results. The results are, however, consistent with preference complementarities that extend to risk preference. --
    Keywords: Risk Taking,Music,Preference Interaction
    JEL: D81 G11
    Date: 2012
  15. By: Eric Schniter (Economic Science Institute, Chapman University); Timothy Shields (Economic Science Institute, Chapman University)
    Abstract: Though individuals differ in the degree to which they are predisposed to trust or act trustworthy, we theorize that trust-based behaviors are universally determined by the calibration of conflicting short- and long-sighted behavior regulation programs, and that these programs are calibrated by emotions experienced personally and interpersonally. In this chapter we review both the main-stream and evolutionary theories of emotions that philosophers, psychologists, and behavioral economists have based their work on and which can inform our understanding of trust-based behavior regulation. The standard paradigm for understanding emotions is based on mapping their positive and negative affect valence. While Valence Models often expect that the experience of positive and negative affect is interdependent (leading to the popular use of bipolar affect scales), a multivariate “recalibrational” model based on positive, negative, interpersonal, intrapersonal, short-sighted and long-sighted dimensions predicts and recognizes more complex mixed-valence emotional states. We summarize experimental evidence that supports a model of emotionally-calibrated trust regulation and discuss implications for the use of various emotion measures. Finally, in light of these discussions we suggest future directions for the investigation of emotions and trust psychology.
    Keywords: emotion, affect valence, recalibrational theory, trust game, experiment
    Date: 2013
  16. By: H Peyton Young; H.H. Nax; M.N. Burton-Chellew; S.A. West
    Abstract: Many interactive environments can be represented as games, but they are so large and complex that individual players are in the dark about what others are doing and how their own payoffs are affected.  This paper analyzes learning behavior in such 'black box' environments, where players' only source of information is their own history of actions taken and payoffs received.  Specifically we study repeated public goods games, where players must decide how much to contribute at each stage, but they do not know how much others have contributed or how others' contributions affect their own payoffs.  We identify two key features of the players' learning dynamics.  First, if a player's realized payoff increases he is less inclined to change his strategy, whereas if his realized payoff decreases he is more inclined to change his strategy.  Second, if increasing his own contribution results in higher payoffs he will tend to increase his contribution still further, whereas the reverse holds if an increase in contribution leads to lower payoffs.  These two effects are clearly present when players have no information about the game; moreover they are still present even when players have full information.  Convergence to Nash equilibrium occurs at about the same rate in both situations.
    Keywords: Learning, information, public goods games
    JEL: C70 C73 C91 D83 H41
    Date: 2013–04–23
  17. By: Fehrler, Sebastian (University of Zurich); Kosfeld, Michael (Goethe University Frankfurt)
    Abstract: NGOs and other non-profit organizations attract workers who strongly identify themselves with their missions. We study whether these "good guys" are more trustworthy and how such pronounced group identities affect trust and trustworthiness within the groups and toward out-groups. We find that subjects who strongly identify themselves with a non-profit mission are more trustworthy in a minimal group setting but also harshly discriminate against out-groups when subjects are grouped by the missions they identify themselves with.
    Keywords: trustworthiness, trust, group identity, social identity theory, discrimination, organization
    JEL: C72 C92 M51
    Date: 2013–05
  18. By: Jean-Pierre Benoit; Juan Dubra
    Abstract: We conduct two experiments of the claim that people are overconfident, using new tests of overplacement that are based on a formal Bayesian model. Our two experi- ments, on easy quizzes, find overplacement. More precisely, we find apparently over- confident data that cannot be accounted for by a rational population of expected utility maximizers with a good understanding of the nature of the quizzes they took. The finding is of particular interest because Benoit and Dubra (2011) have shown that the vast majority of the existing findings on the better-than-average efect are actually consistent with Bayesian updating.
    Keywords: Overcon?dence; Better than Average; Experimental Economics; Irrationality; Signalling Models.
    JEL: D11 D12 D82 D83
    Date: 2013
  19. By: Krug, Gerhard (Institute for Employment Research (IAB), Nuremberg); Stephan, Gesine (Institute for Employment Research (IAB), Nuremberg)
    Abstract: There is a longstanding debate on the advantages of quasi-markets for placement services compared to their public deliverance. During 2009, the German Public Employment Service (PES) implemented a randomized field experiment to investigate if intensive services for hard-to-place unemployed individuals can be provided more effectively by such private providers or by PES in-house teams. Unemployed persons were assigned to intensive services for a period of eight months. This paper presents the first results of this experiment; the observation period covers 18 months after assignment. Initial in-house provision reduces accumulated days in unemployment by one to two months. Approximately two thirds of this effect is attributable to labor market withdrawals. The effect on the share of individuals in a given labor market status (unemployed, employed, and withdrawn) occurs mainly during the program period of eight months and disappears by the end of the observation period. We conclude that in a particular environment, the public provision of placement services can be as least as effective as contracting-out - a simple comparison of effectiveness might, however, be misleading.
    Keywords: intensive placement services, contracting-out, randomized field experiment
    JEL: J68 J64 J65
    Date: 2013–05
  20. By: Elena Asparouhova; Peter Bossaerts; Nilanjan Roy; William Zame
    Abstract: This paper reports on experimental tests of an instantiation of the Lucas asset pricing model with heterogeneous agents and time-varying private income streams. Central features of the model (infinite horizon, perishability of consumption, stationarity) present difficult challenges and require a novel experimental design. The experimental evidence provides broad support for the qualitative pricing and consumption predictions of the model (prices move with fundamentals, agents smooth consumption) but sharp differences from the quantitative predictions emerge (asset prices display excess volatility, agents do not hedge price risk). Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) tests of the stochastic Euler equations yield very different conclusions depending on the instruments chosen. It is suggested that the qualitative agreement with and quantitative deviation from theoretical predictions arise from agents' expectations about future prices, which are almost self-fulfilling and yet very different from what they would need to be if they were exactly self-fulfilling (as the Lucas model requires).
    JEL: C92 E21 E32 G12
    Date: 2013–05
  21. By: Collart, Alba J.; Palma, Marco A.
    Keywords: Research Methods/ Statistical Methods,
    Date: 2013–05
  22. By: Martin Daniel Siyaranamual (Department of Economics, Padjadjaran University)
    Abstract: Successful minimisation of the gap between hypothetical and actual be-haviours requires to consider the dimension of individual social interaction in the decision process. While this dimension has been acknowledged to play an important role in the construction of private good preferences, however, in the context of public good, the role of social interaction has not been adequately examined. Therefore, to shed a light on the role of social interaction in shaping preferences toward public good, I conduct a contingent valuation (CV) study in which the respondents are enabled to have social interactions prior their willingness to pay (WTP) elicitation question. And in order to do this, I construct a sampling design where respondents are divided into three different groups, namely treated, untreated, and control groups. The respondents in the treated and untreated groups were allowed to interact/discuss with each other, within and across groups, prior to the WTP elicitation question. I find that treated and untreated respon-dents with social interactions have higher and significant likelihood to purchase the public good relatively to control respondents. While those who did not have interaction have a lower WTP for the improvement of waste management.
    Keywords: Social interactions, Contingent valuation, Bandung, Solid waste manage-ment
    JEL: Q51 R11 R22
    Date: 2013–05
  23. By: Pikulina, E.S.; Renneboog, L.D.R.; Horst, J.R. ter; Tobler, P.N. (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research)
    Abstract: Abstract: Little is known about how different bonus schemes affect traders’ propensity to trade and which bonus schemes improve traders’ performance. We study the effects of linear versus threshold (convex) bonus schemes on traders’ behavior. Traders purchase and sell shares in an experimental stock market on the basis of fundamental and technical information (evolution of the market index, past share price evolution, realized earnings, and analysts’ earnings forecasts). We find that traders trade more intensively (the number of transactions augments) under the threshold than under the linear bonus scheme. When market conditions are such that a higher profitability can be more easily reached, trading frequency only increases little under a threshold scheme, but the size of trades is significantly larger than in the case of market conditions with lower profitability. Furthermore, trading intensity significantly decreases when bonus thresholds are reached but only after building in a safety margin. Under the threshold scheme, the traders’ performance is lower (even when there are no transaction costs) than under the linear bonus scheme as a consequence of poorer market timing. This is especially the case when earning money by trading is relatively difficult (under low profitability conditions). Nevertheless, under low profitability conditions, traders seem to collect more information about the relationships between share price and market returns, earnings, and earnings forecasts, apply more effort to understand those relationships, and finally show better performance.
    Keywords: Bonus;Compensation;Investment Decisions;Trading Behavior.
    JEL: G11 J33
    Date: 2013
  24. By: Horak, Sven
    Abstract: Cross-Cultural Experimental Economics (CCEE) and Indigenous Management Research (IMR) are dynamic and flourishing disciplines today. Whereas the former lacks a deep understanding of the distinctive factors leading to behavioral differences so far, the latter gives priority to deep contextualization and cultural embeddedness of the research design. This paper argues that both disciplines can mutually benefit from each other. Based on a review of 23 articles, four general research fields are identified that CCEE is concerned with: fairness, cooperation, trust and norm enforcement. In these fields CCEE and IMR can meet and mutually advance knowledge: CCEE can benefit by applying increased contextualization in the future, i.e., by integrating indigenous context-specific variables explicitly into future research designs; IMR can benefit by applying a replicable quantitative research methodology enabling high-quality IMR (Tsui 2004). Both approaches will benefit from increased validity if research designs are systematically integrated in a mixed method design for future research. --
    Keywords: culture,cross-cultural economic experiments,indigenous management research,research methods,contextualization
    Date: 2013
  25. By: Nicholas Beyler; Martha Bleeker; Susanne James-Burdumy; Jane Fortson; Rebecca A. London; Lisa Westrich; Katie Stokes-Guinan; Sebastian Castrechini
    Keywords: Playworks, Play, Physical Activity, Recess
    JEL: I
    Date: 2013–05–30
  26. By: Jane Fortson; Susanne James-Burdumy; Martha Bleeker; Nicholas Beyler; Rebecca A. London; Lisa Westrich; Katie Stokes-Guinan; Sebastian Castrechini
    Keywords: Playworks, School Climate, Academic Learning, Student Social Skills and Behavior
    Date: 2013–03–30
  27. By: Lee, Sang Hyeon; Lee, Ji Yong; Han, Doo Bong; Nayga, Rodolfo M. Jr
    Abstract: The objective of this study is to estimate Korean consumers’ willingness to pay (WTP) for beef products with BSE testing and country of origin labeling. We use a choice experiment to examine consumers’ valuation for beef products with these labels. In addition to analysis using the pooled sample, we also conduct sub-sample analyses based on consumers’ level of risk perception about beef consumption and selected socio-demographic characteristics. Results suggest that Korean consumers value BSE tested beef. They also have a preference for domestic beef vis-à-vis imported beef. When we conducted separate analysis between respondents who have low vs high risk perception about beef consumption, results suggest that those with high risk perception tend to value BSE testing more than country of origin labeling while those with low risk perception value country of origin labeling more than BSE testing. Moreover, results from separate analysis between respondents who have higher education vs lower education and between older vs younger respondents suggest that young or high educated respondents tend to value BSE testing and imported beef from countries which have not experienced BSE outbreaks more than do older or lower educated respondents.
    Keywords: Willingness-to-Pay, BSE test label, Risk Perception, Country of Origin, Choice Experiment, Agricultural and Food Policy, Demand and Price Analysis, Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety, Institutional and Behavioral Economics,
    Date: 2013

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