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on Experimental Economics |
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Issue of 2012‒12‒22
24 papers chosen by |
| By: | Fehr, Ernst (University of Zurich); Herz, Holger (University of Zurich); Wilkening, Tom (University of Melbourne) |
| Abstract: | Authority and power permeate political, social, and economic life, but empirical knowledge about the motivational origins and consequences of authority is limited. We study the motivation and incentive effects of authority experimentally in an authority-delegation game. Individuals often retain authority even when its delegation is in their material interest – suggesting that authority has non-pecuniary consequences for utility. Authority also leads to over-provision of effort by the controlling parties, while a large percentage of subordinates under-provide effort despite pecuniary incentives to the contrary. Authority thus has important motivational consequences that exacerbate the inefficiencies arising from suboptimal delegation choices. |
| Keywords: | organizational behavior, incentives, experiments and contracts |
| JEL: | C92 D83 D23 |
| Date: | 2012–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp7030&r=exp |
| By: | Taylor Jaworskiy (University of Arizona); Erik O. Kimbrough (Simon Fraser Unviersity) |
| Abstract: | In a novel laboratory asset market, traders buy and sell shares of a monopolist while observing its price and transaction history in real-time. Dividends are based on the profitability of the monopolist, also an experimental subject. Despite dividend uncertainty resulting from both monopolist behavior and imperfect information about product market fundamentals, the present value of the dividend stream provides the best estimate of observed asset prices. We compare our data to previous experimen- tal asset markets in which dividends were drawn from a known discrete distribution. While we still detect some mispricing, asset price bubbles are significantly smaller when dividends depend on an observable market process. |
| Keywords: | Asset Markets, Uncertainty, Experimental Economics |
| JEL: | C91 D84 |
| Date: | 2012–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sfu:sfudps:dp12-21&r=exp |
| By: | Erik O. Kimbrough (Simon Fraser Unviersity); Bart J. Wilson (Chapman University) |
| Abstract: | The history of the world is strewn with the remains of societies whose institutions failed to adapt to ecological change, but the determinants of institutional fragility are difficult to identify in the historical record. We report a laboratory experiment that explores the impact of an exogenous ecological shock on the informal rules of property and exchange. We find that geographically induced tribal sentiments, which are unobservable in the historical record, impede adaptation post-shock and that inequality declines as wealth and sociableness increase. Quantitative measures of individual and group sociality account for some of the di?erences in successful or failed adaptation. |
| Keywords: | Experimental Economics, Rules, Ecological Shocks |
| JEL: | C9 D02 D7 Q2 |
| Date: | 2012–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sfu:sfudps:dp12-20&r=exp |
| By: | Gioia de Melo (Universidad de la República (Uruguay). Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y de Administración. Instituto de Economía); Matías Piaggio (Universidad de la República (Uruguay). Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y de Administración. Instituto de Economía) |
| Abstract: | We provide a model and experimental evidence on the effects of non-monetary punishment (NMP) by peers among communities of Uruguayan fishers exploiting a common pool resource (CPR). We find a) experimental groups composed of fishers from different communities (out-groups) who are sometimes in conflict over fishing territories did not overxploit the resource more than gropus from a single community (in-groups) and, unlike in-groups, out-groups reduced their exploitation of the resource in response to the threat of punishment; b) cooperative individuals punished free riders while a substantial amount of punishment was targeted by free riders on cooperators, who [in turns] responded by increasing their exploitation of the resource; and c)wealthier individuals practiced greater overexploitation of the resource. Our results suggest that the relevance of in-group favoritism in promoting cooperation due to social preferences may be overrated, and that the effectiveness of peer punishment is greater when individuals are motivated by social preferencies and also that coordination is required to prevent anti-social targeting and to enhance the social signal conveyed by the punishment. |
| Keywords: | Non-monetary punishment, In-group bias, Frame field experiment, Social preferences, Common pool resource |
| JEL: | D03 O12 C93 |
| Date: | 2012–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ulr:wpaper:dt-16-12&r=exp |
| By: | Raphaële Préget; Phu Nguyen-Van; Marc Willinger |
| Abstract: | We show that the preference to act as a leader rather than as a follower is related to subjects’ behavioral type. We rely on the methodology proposed by Fischbacher et al. (2001) and Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) in order to identify subjects’ behavioral types. We then link the likelihood to act as a leader in a repeated public goods game to the elicited behavioral types. The leader in a group is defined as the subject who voluntarily decides in the first place about his contribution. The leader’s contribution is then reported publicly to the remaining group members who are requested to take their contribution decisions simultaneously. Our main findings are that leaders emerge in almost all rounds and that conditional cooperators are more likely to act as leaders compared to free riders. We also find that voluntary leaders, irrespective of their behavioral type, contribute more than the followers. However leadership does not prevent the decay that is commonly observed in linear public goods experiments. |
| Keywords: | Public Goods, Experimental Economics, Voluntary Contribution Mechanism, Leadership. |
| JEL: | H41 C92 |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ulp:sbbeta:2012-21&r=exp |
| By: | Enrica Carbone; Gerardo Infante |
| Abstract: | Over the last ten years the literature in experimental economics has seen a growing interest in groups and how they compare to individuals in different settings. This paper contributes to the literature on this topic by investigating the comparison between groups and individuals with respect to intertemporal consumption problems. Empirical evidence has shown how dynamic optimization problems, representing intertemporal consumption decisions, involve computational difficulties that agents are not always equipped to solve optimally. Several econometric estimations on household and aggregate data seem to show that people do not save enough. Similarly, in many experiments, results suggest that people are very different in how they solve this class of problems and in how they react to changes in the decision environment. We present an experiment comparing group and individual planning under risk and uncertainty. Our study is focussed on investigating how groups perform in intertemporal decision making tasks, in particular observing the significance of group planning compared to individuals when choosing under risk and uncertainty. Results suggest that groups perform better than individuals when planning under risk, while the opposite happens in the case of planning under uncertainty. Interestingly, when comparing the behaviour of our agents in the second lifecycle (denominated "sequence") groups seem to lose all their advantage on individuals (in terms of less deviation from optimum). We interpret this as a "stability effect" caused by the random matching rule adopted during the groups sessions. |
| Keywords: | Collective Decision Making, Intertemporal Consumer Choice,Life Cycle, Risk, Uncertainty, Laboratory Experiments. |
| JEL: | D12 D91 D81 C91 C92 |
| Date: | 2012–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:usi:labsit:042&r=exp |
| By: | Uwe Dulleck; Jonas Fooken; Yumei He |
| Abstract: | We study discrimination based on the hukou system, a policy segregating migrants and locals in urban China. We hired household aids as participants in our artefactual field experiment and use a gift exchange game to study labor market discrimination. We find that social discrimination based on hukou status also implies individual level discrimination. To identify whether discrimination is statistical or taste-based we introduce the wage promising game, a gift exchange game with a cheap talk wage promise. We find that discrimination is taste-based: Status is exogenous for our participants, migrants and locals behave similarly and discrimination increases when reasons for statistical discrimination are removed. |
| Keywords: | labor market discrimination, artefactual field experiment, hukou |
| JEL: | J7 C93 P36 |
| Date: | 2012–11–28 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:qut:qubewp:wp002&r=exp |
| By: | Katharina Eckartz (Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, International Max Planck Research School on Adapting Behavior in a Fundamentally Uncertain World); Oliver Kirchkamp (Chair for Empirical and Experimental Economics, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena); Daniel Schunk (University of Mainz) |
| Abstract: | We compare performance in a word based creativity task under three incentive schemes: a flat fee, a linear payment and a tournament. Furthermore, we also compare performance under two control tasks (Raven's advanced progressive matrices or a number-adding task) with the same treatments. In all tasks we find that incentives seem to have very small effects and that differences in performance are predominantly related to individual skills. |
| Keywords: | Creativity, Incentives, Real effort task, Experimental economics |
| JEL: | C91 J33 |
| Date: | 2012–12–13 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2012-068&r=exp |
| By: | Luba Petersen (Simon Fraser Unviersity); Abel Winn (Chapman University) |
| Abstract: | Our experiments refine and extend the work of Fehr and Tyran (2001), who suggest that money illusion can contribute significantly to nominal inertia in strategically complementary environments. By controlling for strategic uncertainty, visual focal points and cognitive load we find that participants exhibit no first order money illusion, though second order money illusion plays a minor role. The presence of a focal point in our experiments reduces the duration of price stickiness compared to FT’s original experiments when participants played against one another. What stickiness remains is explained by the difficulty of finding the NE among 1800 payoffs. Second order money illusion appears to explain the persistent asymmetry between price adjustment following positive and negative monetary shocks. However, this is a modest effect manifested in an apparent preference for (aversion to) high (low) nominal payoffs within a set of maximum real payoffs. These findings indicate that FT’s proposed form of money illusion is not a compelling explanation for sluggish price adjustment. |
| Keywords: | Money illusion, price adjustment, money, shock, laboratory experiment, strategic complementarities |
| JEL: | D21 D43 D84 D83 E4 E5 |
| Date: | 2012–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sfu:sfudps:dp12-19&r=exp |
| By: | Jeannette Brosig-Koch; Klemens Keldenich |
| Abstract: | This paper uses a laboratory experiment to analyze the impact of different types of information on consumption and savings behavior. Based on a buffer stock savings model, three treatment dimensions are used: The amount of information subjects receive about the likelihood of income shocks, whether subjects are informed about other people's beliefs about these shocks, and the framing of shocks. The results reveal that – even with little information about the random term determining the income shock – consumption decisions are surprisingly close to the optimal consumption path. If at all, more information rather worsens than improves consumption behavior. Nevertheless, in line with the theoretical prediction, observed behavior is robust to the framing and other people's beliefs about income shocks. Given that actual decisions are significantly correlated with the optimal consumption amount (and not with easier accessible variables like cash-on-hand) suggests that subjects do not simply use naive heuristics to determine their consumption. |
| Keywords: | Consumption; framing; beliefs |
| JEL: | C91 |
| Date: | 2012–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rwi:repape:0387&r=exp |
| By: | Enrica Carbone; Gerardo Infante |
| Abstract: | Previous experimental results (Ballinger et al. (2003) and Carbone and Hey (2004)) have found that many agents fail to correctly take into account the length of the planning horizon also finding some support (See Carbone (2006)) for descriptive models, such as the Rolling Model. This paper presents an experimental analysis on the effect of a short planning horizon on intertemporal consumption choices. The purpose of the study is to test whether very short horizons are more easily perceived by agents, allowing them to plan optimally. This experiment tests a somewhat implicit assumption of the Rolling Model, or of similar descriptive approaches, namely that people might be able to use the optimal strategy if they are faced with shorter planning horizons. Moreover, this hypothesis is tested in the cases of decision making under certainty, risk and uncertainty, in order to analyze how these environments may affect the perception of the length of the planning horizon. Results suggest that planning periods have a significant effect on deviations from unconditional optimum in all sequences and all treatments. This finding has been interpreted as evidence of participants not using the optimal strategy. When conditional deviations are considered, results are confirmed only in the case of decision making under uncertainty. This second finding has been interpreted as suggesting that uncertainty on income seems to prevent participants from improving their decision making. |
| Keywords: | Intertemporal Consumer Choice, Life Cycle, Risk, Uncertainty, Laboratory Experiments, Short Planning Horizon. |
| JEL: | D12 D91 D81 C91 C92 |
| Date: | 2012–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:usi:labsit:043&r=exp |
| By: | Bigoni, Maria (University of Bologna); Camera, Gabriele (University of Basel); Casari, Marco (University of Bologna) |
| Abstract: | We study the individual behavior of students and workers in an experiment where they repeatedly face the same cooperative task. The data show that clerical workers differ from college students in overall cooperation rates, strategy adoption and use of punishment opportunities. Students cooperate more than workers. Cooperation increases in both subject pools when a personal punishment option is available. Students are less likely than workers to adopt strategies of unconditional defection, and more likely to select strategies of conditional cooperation. Finally, students are more likely than workers to sanction uncooperative behavior by adopting decentralized punishment, and also personal punishment when available. |
| Keywords: | non-standard subject pools, prisoner's dilemma, peer punishment, artefactual field experiment, stranger matching |
| JEL: | C90 C70 D80 |
| Date: | 2012–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp7051&r=exp |
| By: | Angelova, Vera; Attanasi, Giuseppe; Hiriart, Yolande |
| Date: | 2012–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ler:wpaper:25818&r=exp |
| By: | Bouton, Laurent; Castanheira, Micael; Llorente-Saguer, Aniol |
| Abstract: | This paper both theoretically and experimentally studies the properties of plurality and approval voting when the majority is divided as a result of information imperfections. The minority backs a third alternative, which the majority views as strictly inferior. The majority thus faces two problems: aggregating information and coordinating to defeat the minority candidate. Two types of equilibria coexist under plurality: either voters aggregate information, but this requires splitting their votes, or they coordinate but cannot aggregate information. With approval voting, expected welfare is strictly higher, because some voters multiple vote to achieve both goals at once. In the laboratory, we observe both types of equilibrium under plurality. Which one is selected depends on the size of the minority. Approval voting vastly outperforms plurality. Finally, subject behavior suggests the need to study asymmetric equilibria. |
| Keywords: | Approval Voting; Experiments; Multicandidate Elections; Plurality |
| JEL: | C72 C92 D70 P16 |
| Date: | 2012–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:9234&r=exp |
| By: | Mathieu Désolé; Stefano Farolfi; Patrick Rio |
| Abstract: | This paper uses a CGT TU game modified into a coordination experiment to explore the causal effect of context on players’ behaviour. An analytical framework focusing on four attributes representative of the game’s context is proposed and an experimental protocol based on this framework allows testing hypotheses regarding the influence of context on players’ choices. Results show that attributes such as Repetition and Communication seem to have a higher influence than Illustration on players’ behaviour. The peculiar nature of the experimental results in the control group, showing the emergence of a focal point other than the outcome prescribed by the theory, allows discussing the expected “noise” observed in the treatments from a new perspective. |
| Date: | 2012–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lam:wpaper:12-36&r=exp |
| By: | Hoogendoorn, Sander M. (University of Amsterdam); Parker, Simon C. (University of Western Ontario); van Praag, Mirjam (University of Amsterdam) |
| Abstract: | This paper studies the impact of diversity in cognitive ability among members of a team on their performance. We conduct a large field experiment in which teams start up and manage real companies under identical circumstances. Exogenous variation in – otherwise random – team composition is imposed by assigning individuals to teams based on their measured cognitive abilities. The setting is one of business management practices in the longer run where tasks are diverse and involve complex decision-making. We propose a model in which greater ability dispersion generates greater knowledge for a team, but also increases the costs of monitoring necessitated by moral hazard. Consistent with the predictions of our model, we find that team performance as measured in terms of sales, profits and profits per share first increases, and then decreases, with ability dispersion. Teams with a moderate degree of ability dispersion also experience fewer dismissals due to fewer shirking members in those teams. |
| Keywords: | ability dispersion, team performance, field experiment, entrepreneurship, knowledge pooling, moral hazard |
| JEL: | C93 D83 J24 L25 L26 M13 M54 |
| Date: | 2012–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp7044&r=exp |
| By: | Crépon, Bruno; Duflo, Esther; Gurgand, Marc; Rathelot, Roland; Zamora, Philippe |
| Abstract: | This paper reports the results from a randomized experiment designed to evaluate the direct and indirect (displacement) impacts of job placement assistance on the labor market outcomes of young, educated job seekers in France. We use a two-step design. In the first step, the proportions of job seekers to be assigned to treatment (0%, 25%, 50%, 75% or 100%) were randomly drawn for each of the 235 labor markets (e.g. cities) participating in the experiment. Then, in each labor market, eligible job seekers were randomly assigned to the treatment, following this proportion. After eight months, eligible, unemployed youths who were assigned to the program were significantly more likely to have found a stable job than those who were not. But these gains are transitory, and they appear to have come partly at the expense of eligible workers who did not benefit from the program, particularly in labor markets where they compete mainly with other educated workers, and in weak labor markets. Overall, the program seems to have had very little net benefits. |
| Keywords: | Counseling; Displacement effects; Job Placement; Randomized experiment |
| JEL: | C93 J64 J68 |
| Date: | 2012–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:9251&r=exp |
| By: | Maxence Soumare (Laboratoire J.-A. Dieudonné - Université de Nice-Sophia Antipolis); Jørgen Vitting Andersen (Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne); Francis Bouchard (HEC Montréal); Alain Elkaim (HEC Montréal); Dominique Guegan (Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - Paris School of Economics); Justin Leroux (HEC Montréal); Michel Miniconi (Laboratoire J.-A. Dieudonné - Université de Nice-Sophia Antipolis); Lars Stentoft (HEC Montréal) |
| Abstract: | A general framework is suggested to describe human decision making in a certain class of experiments performed in a trading laboratory. We are in particular interested in discerning between two different moods, or states of the investors, corresponding to investors using fundemental investment strategies, technical analysis investment strategies respectively. Our framework accounts for two opposite situations already encountered in experimental setups : i) the rational expectations case, and ii) the case of pure speculation. We consider new experimental conditions which allow both elements to be present in the decision making process of the traders, thereby creating a dilemma in terms of investment strategy. Our theoretical framework allows us to predict the outcome of this type of trading experiments, depending on such variables as the number of people trading, the liquidity of the market, the amount of information used in technical analysis strategies, as well as the dividends attributed to an asset. We find that it is possible to give a qualitative prediction of trading behavior depending on a ratio that quantifies the fluctuations in the model. |
| Keywords: | Decision making, game theory, complex systems theory, technical analysis, rational expectations. |
| JEL: | D81 D84 C0 |
| Date: | 2012–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mse:cesdoc:12083&r=exp |
| By: | Bartling, Björn (University of Zurich); Fehr, Ernst (University of Zurich); Schmidt, Klaus M. (University of Munich) |
| Abstract: | Employment contracts give a principal the authority to decide flexibly which task his agent should execute. However, there is a tradeoff, first pointed out by Simon (1951), between flexibility and employer moral hazard. An employment contract allows the principal to adjust the task quickly to the realization of the state of the world, but he may also abuse this flexibility to exploit the agent. We capture this tradeoff in an experimental design and show that principals exhibit a strong preference for the employment contract. However, selfish principals exploit agents in one-shot interactions, inducing them to resist entering into employment contracts. This resistance to employment contracts vanishes if fairness preferences in combination with reputation opportunities keep principals from abusing their power, leading to the widespread, endogenous formation of efficient long-run employment relations. Our results inform the theory of the firm by showing how behavioral forces shape an important transaction cost of integration – the abuse of authority – and by providing an empirical basis for assessing differences between the Marxian and the Coasian view of the firm, as well as Alchian and Demsetz's (1972) critique of the Coasian approach. |
| Keywords: | theory of the firm, transaction cost economics, authority, power abuse, employment relation, fairness, reputation |
| JEL: | C91 D23 D86 M5 |
| Date: | 2012–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp7029&r=exp |
| By: | Natalia Letki (PGPE Project, Institute of Sociology, University of Warsaw); Mierina, I. (Inta) |
| Abstract: | In this paper we treat social networks as a resource of individuals, that is used in conjunction with other types of capital, and similarly to other types of capital, its use is context-specific. We propose a conditional mechanism for how context determines networks use: not only does context affect network mobilisation, but that it affects behaviour of different groups differently. We test this proposition on the example of social and economic polarisation influencing probability of turning to networks for help by different income groups. Our findings show that although the poor have the greatest need to turn to networks to compensate for the shortage of other forms of capital, when context becomes adverse, in comparison with other groups they are always disadvantaged in terms of networks mobilisation. |
| Keywords: | social capital, networks, inequality, income, post-communist, Central Eastern Europe |
| Date: | 2012–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aia:ginidp:45&r=exp |
| By: | Schleich, Joachim; Klobasa, Marian; Götz, Sebastian; Brunner, Marc |
| Abstract: | This paper analyzes the effects of providing feedback on electricity consumption in a field trial involving more than 1,500 households in Linz, Austria. About half of these households received feedback together with information about electricity-saving measures (pilot group), while the remaining households served as a control group. Participation in the pilot group was random, but households were able to choose between two types of feedback: access to a web portal or written feedback by post. Results from cross section OLS regression suggest that feedback provided to the pilot group corresponds with electricity savings of around 4.5 % for the average household. Our results from quantile regressions imply that for house-holds in the 30th to the 70th percentile, feedback on electricity consumption is statistically significant and effects are highest in absolute terms and as a share of electricity consumption. For percentiles below or above this range, feedback ap-pears to have no effect. Finally, controlling for a potential endogeneity bias induced by non random participation in the feedback type groups, we find no difference in the effects of feedback provided via the web portal and by post. -- |
| Keywords: | smart metering,feedback,household electricity consumption |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:fisisi:s82012&r=exp |
| By: | Zack Brown; Nick Johnstone; Ivan Haščič; Laura Vong; Francis Barascud |
| Abstract: | Default options have been shown to affect behaviour in a variety of economic choice tasks, including health care and retirement savings. Less research has tested whether defaults affect behaviour in the domain of energy efficiency. This study uses data from a randomized controlled experiment in which the default settings on office thermostats in an OECD office building were manipulated during the winter heating season, and employees’ chosen thermostat setting observed over a 6 week period. Using difference-in-differences, panel, and censored regression models (to control for maximum allowable thermostat settings), we find that a 1°C decrease in the default caused a reduction in the chosen setting by 0.38°C on average. Sixty-five percent of this effect could be attributed to office occupant behaviour (p-value=0.044). The difference-in-differences model shows that small decreases in the default (1°) led to a greater reduction in chosen settings than large decreases (2°). We also find that office occupants who are more apt to adjust their thermostats prior to the intervention were less susceptible to the default. We find no evidence that offices with multiple occupants displayed different patterns in thermostat choices than single-occupant offices. We conclude that this kind of intervention can increase building-level energy efficiency, and discuss potential explanations and broader policy implications of our findings.<BR>Il a été démontré que les options par défaut influaient sur le comportement dans diverses situations de choix économique, portant par exemple sur le système de santé ou le régime de retraite. Cependant, l’incidence des options par défaut sur le comportement dans le domaine de l’efficacité énergétique a fait l’objet de travaux de recherche moins nombreux. Pour cette étude, des données ont été recueillies dans le cadre d’une expérience aléatoire contrôlée ayant consisté à manipuler le réglage par défaut des thermostats installés dans les bureaux d’un bâtiment de l'OCDE pendant la période de chauffage hivernale, et à observer le réglage choisi par les salariés sur une période de 6 semaines. Des modèles fondés sur la méthode des « différences de différences », des données de panel et une analyse de régression censurée (prenant en compte les réglages thermostatiques maximum admissibles) permettent de constater qu’une baisse de la température par défaut de 1°C se traduit par une réduction de 0.38°C en moyenne de la température choisie. Soixante-cinq pour cent de cet effet pourrait être attribué au comportement de l’occupant du bureau (valeur-p=0.044). Le modèle de « différences de différences » montre qu’une légère baisse de la température par défaut (1°) entraîne une plus forte réduction de la température choisie qu’une baisse importante (2°). Nous constatons aussi que les occupants des bureaux les plus enclins à ajuster leur thermostat avant l’intervention ont été moins sensibles au réglage par défaut. Nous ne trouvons pas de différence quant aux choix de température entre les bureaux occupés par plusieurs personnes et les bureaux individuels. Nous concluons que ce type d’intervention peut accroître l’efficacité énergétique au niveau des bâtiments, et examinons les explications possibles et les enseignements plus généraux qui peuvent être tirés de nos résultats pour l’élaboration des politiques publiques. |
| Keywords: | energy efficiency, behavioural economics, field experiments |
| JEL: | B5 C1 C9 H3 Q4 |
| Date: | 2012–12–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oec:envaaa:51-en&r=exp |
| By: | Li, Xi Hao |
| Abstract: | Under the background of the electronic security trading platform Xetra operated by Frankfurt Stock Exchange, we consider the Xetra auction market system (XAMS) from `bottom-up', which the interaction among heterogeneous traders and Xetra auction market mechanism generates non-equilibrium price dynamics. First we develop an integrative framework that serves as general guidance for analyzing the economic system from `bottom-up' and for seamlessly transferring the economic system into the corresponding agent-based model. Then we apply this integrative framework to construct the agent-based model of XAMS. By conducting market experiments with the computer implementation of the agent-based model of XAMS, we investigate the role of the price setter who assumes its trading behavior can manipulate the market price. The main finding is that the introduction of the price setter in the setting of XAMS improves market efficiency while does not significantly influence price volatility of the market. |
| Keywords: | agent-based modelling; computational market experiment; electronic security trading platform; Xetra; non-equilibrium priced ynamics; automatic trading |
| JEL: | C6 C9 G1 D5 D6 B4 D4 |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:43183&r=exp |
| By: | Kris De Jaegher; Britta Hoyer |
| Abstract: | This paper presents a game-theoretic rationale for the beneficial effect of a common enemy on cooperation. In a defence game against a common natural threat, the value of the public good of defence is equal to the sum of the players' defensive efforts. The game therefore takes the form of a prisoner's dilemma, leading to free-riding. When the same defence game is played against a common enemy, the value of the public good of defence is equal to the smallest defensive effort. The game now takes the form of a stag hunt, so that a cooperative equilibrium becomes possible. For this reason, an informed and benevolent government may not want to inform the public that it is facing a common natural threat rather than a common enemy. At the same time, the common enemy has an incentive to mimic nature, and perform only random rather than targeted attacks. |
| Keywords: | Common Enemy Effect; Defence Games; Prisoner's Dilemma; Stag Hunt. |
| JEL: | D74 H41 C72 |
| Date: | 2012–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:use:tkiwps:1224&r=exp |