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on Experimental Economics |
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Issue of 2012‒09‒09
twenty-two papers chosen by |
| By: | Simon Gachter, Daniele Nosenzo and Martin Sefon (School of Economics, University of Nottingham); Daniele Nosenzo (School of Economics, University of Nottingham); Martin Sefton (School of Economics, University of Nottingham) |
| Abstract: | We compare social preference and social norm based explanations for peer effects in a three-person gift-exchange game experiment. In the experiment a principal pays a wage to each of two agents, who then make effort choices sequentially. In our baseline treatment we observe that the second agent's effort is influenced by the effort choice of the first agent, even though there are no material spillovers between agents. This peer effect is predicted by a model of distributional social preferences (Fehr-Schmidt, 1999). As we show from a norms-elicitation experiment, it is also consistent with social norms compliance. A conditional logit investigation of the explanatory power of payoff inequality and elicited norms finds that the second agent's effort can be best explained by the social preferences model. In further treatments with modified games we find that the presence/strength of peer effects changes as predicted by the social preferences model. As with the baseline treatment, a conditional logit analysis favors an explanation based on social preferences, rather than social norms following for these treatments. Our results suggest that, in our context, the social preferences model provides a parsimonious explanation for the observed peer effect. |
| Keywords: | peer effects, social influence, gift-exchange, experiment, social preferences, inequity aversion, measuring social norms. |
| Date: | 2012–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:not:notcdx:2012-01&r=exp |
| By: | Güth, Werner; Pull, Kerstin; Stadler, Manfred |
| Abstract: | Innovation economics is usually neglecting the psychological tradition of creativity research. Our study is an attempt to experimentally collect behavioral data revealing in how far personality characteristics like creativity, analytical skills and personality traits on the one hand and innovative capability, the topic of innovation economics, on the other hand are interrelated. We find that participants' performance in innovation games is related to their creativity, risk tolerance and self-control. Other personality traits such as participants' anxiety, independence, tough-mindedness, analytical skills and extraversion at best play a minor role. -- |
| Keywords: | Creativity,Personality traits,Innovation games,Experiments |
| JEL: | C91 L13 O31 |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:tuewef:44&r=exp |
| By: | Martin Dufwenberg; Maroš Servátka (University of Canterbury); Radovan Vadovič |
| Abstract: | We develop, and experimentally test, a behavioral model of deal- making which includes binding contracts and informal agreements as distinct but related special cases. The key assumptions: people are mostly honest; they suffer costs of overcoming temptation to renege; and they tend to split gains down the middle. |
| Date: | 2012–08–26 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cbt:econwp:12/14&r=exp |
| By: | Christoph Kuzmics; Thomas Palfrey; Brian Rogers |
| Abstract: | We study symmetric play in a class of repeated games when players are patient. We show that, while the use of symmetric strategy profiles essentially does not restrict the set of feasible payoffs, the set of equilibrium payoffs is an interesting proper subset of the feasible and individually rational set. We also provide a theory of how rational individuals play these games, identifying particular strategies as focal through the considerations of Pareto optimality and simplicity. We report experiments that support many aspects of this theory. JEL Code: C73, C92, D63 |
| Keywords: | symmetry, repeated games, focal points, experiments |
| Date: | 2012–07–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1551&r=exp |
| By: | Costa-Gomes, Miguel A.; Huck, Steffen; Weizsäcker, Georg |
| Abstract: | In many economic contexts, an elusive variable of interest is the agent's belief about relevant events, e.g. about other agents' behavior. A growing number of surveys and experiments ask participants to state beliefs explicitly but little is known about the causal relation between beliefs and other behavioral variables. This paper discusses the possibility of creating exogenous instrumental variables for belief statements, by informing the agent about exogenous manipulations of the relevant events. We conduct trust game experiments where the amount sent back by the second player (trustee) is exogenously varied. The procedure allows detecting causal links from beliefs to actions under plausible assumptions. The IV-estimated effect is significant, confirming the causal role of beliefs. It is only slightly and insignificantly smaller than in estimations without instrumentation, consistent with a mild effect of social norms or other omitted variables. -- In vielen ökonomischen Zusammenhängen sind die Erwartungen der Spieler bezüglich relevanter Ereignisse, z. B. über das Verhalten anderer Spieler, eine schwer zu fassende Variable von Interesse. Zwar werden in einer wachsenden Zahl von Untersuchungen und Experimenten Teilnehmer gebeten, ihre Erwartungen ausdrücklich zu nennen, jedoch ist noch wenig bekannt über die Kausalbeziehung zwischen Erwartungen und anderen Verhaltensvariablen. In diesem Paper wird die Möglichkeit diskutiert, Instrumente zur Erhebung von Erwartungen zu kreieren, bei denen der Spieler über exogene Manipulationen der relevanten Ereignisse informiert wird. Wir führen Experimente zu einem Vertrauensspiel durch, bei denen der Betrag, der durch den zweiten Spieler zurückgesendet wird (trustee), exogen variiert wird. Dieses Vorgehen erlaubt die Entdeckung kausaler Wirkungsketten von Erwartungen auf Entscheidungen unter plausiblen Annahmen. Der IV-geschätzte Effekt ist signifikant und bestätigt die kausale Rolle von Erwartungen. Er ist nur wenig kleiner als in Schätzungen ohne Instrumentation und konsistent mit einem leichten Effekt sozialer Normen oder anderen vernachlässigter Variablen. |
| Keywords: | Social Capital,trust game,instrumental variables,belief elicitation |
| JEL: | C72 C81 C91 D84 |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:wzbeoc:spii2012302&r=exp |
| By: | Ulrike Vollstädt (Jena Graduate School "Human Behaviour in Social and Economic Change", University of Jena); Robert Böhm (Center for Empirical Research in Economics and Behavioral Scienes (CEREB), University of Erfurt) |
| Abstract: | In reality, it is often groups rather than individuals that make decisions. In previous experiments, groups have frequently been shown to act differently from individuals in several ways. It has been claimed that inter-group interactions may be (1) more competitive, (2) more rational, or (3) more prosocial than inter-individual interactions. While some of these observed differences may be due to differences in the experimental designs, it is still not clear which of the three motivations is prevailing as they have often been behaviorally confounded in previous experiments. We use Rubinstein's alternating offers bargaining game to compare inter-individual with inter-group behavior since it allows separating the predictions of competitive, rational and prosocial behavior. We find that groups are, on average, more rational bargainers than individuals. |
| Keywords: | alternating offers bargaining experiment, inter-group behavior, inter-individual behavior |
| JEL: | C78 D70 |
| Date: | 2012–08–23 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2012-048&r=exp |
| By: | Christoph Engel (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn); Lilia Zhurakhovska (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn) |
| Abstract: | Both in the field and in the lab, participants frequently cooperate, despite the fact that the situation can be modelled as a simultaneous, symmetric prisoner’s dilemma. This experiment manipulates the payoff in case both players defect, and explains the degree of cooperation by a combination of five motives: the size of gains from cooperation, expectations about cooperativeness in the population in question, the degree of risk and loss aversion, and the degree by which a participant is tempted to inflict harm on another participant if this gives her a chance for an even higher payoff. Information about these motivational forces stems from additional within subjects tests. All five factors are significant only if one controls for all the other motives, which suggests that a prisoner’s dilemma is a game jointly characterised by these five motives. The need to control for the remaining explanations seems to be the reason why earlier attempts at explaining choices in the prisoner’s dilemma with personality have not been |
| Keywords: | efficiency, Risk aversion, Conditional Cooperation, prisoner’s dilemma, Belief, Loss Aversion, Risky Dictator Game |
| JEL: | H41 C72 C91 D03 |
| Date: | 2012–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2012_16&r=exp |
| By: | Fabrice Le Lec (Catholic University of Lille and LEM, UMR CNRS 8179); Benoît Tarroux (University of Rennes 1 - CREM, UMR CNRS 6211 - IDEP) |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates how people value choice. The experiment consists of eliciting subjects' willingness to accept for various choice sets. This approach allows us to assess whether prior to making their decision, people appreciate a wider set of options or not. In contrast with the existing literature, our experimental protocol controsl for several parameters usually left aside and provides an environment where usual explanations are unlikely to hold, e.g., complexity of task. Our results suggest that on average individuals are choice averse: the value of a choice set is significantly and robustly lower than the one of its preferred element. |
| Keywords: | Choice Aversion, Choice Attitude, Hyperchoice, Freedom of Choice, Choice Overload |
| JEL: | C91 D03 D63 |
| Date: | 2012–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tut:cremwp:201230&r=exp |
| By: | Nava Ashraf; Oriana Bandiera; Kelsey Jack |
| Abstract: | A substantial body of research investigates the design of incentives in firms, yet less is known about incentives in organizations that hire individuals to perform tasks with positive social spillovers. We conduct a field experiment in which agents hired by a public health organization are randomly allocated to four groups. Agents in the control group receive a standard volunteer contract often offered for this type of task, whereas agents in the three treatment groups receive small financial rewards, large financial rewards, and non-financial rewards, respectively. The analysis yields three main findings. First, non-financial rewards are more effective at eliciting effort than either financial rewards or the volunteer contract. The effect of financial rewards, both large and small, is much smaller and not significantly different from zero. Second, non-financial rewards elicit effort both by leveraging intrinsic motivation for the cause and by facilitating social comparison among agents. Third, contrary to existing laboratory evidence, financial incentives do not crowd out intrinsic motivation in this setting. < |
| Keywords: | incentives, non-monetary rewards, intrinsic motivation. |
| JEL: | J33 O15 M52 D82 |
| Date: | 2012–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cep:stieop:035&r=exp |
| By: | Daniele Nosenzo (School of Economics, University of Nottingham); Martin Sefton (School of Economics, University of Nottingham) |
| Abstract: | Recent work in experimental economics on the effectiveness of rewards and punishments for promoting cooperation mainly examines decentralized incentive systems where all group members can reward and/or punish one another. Many self-organizing groups and societies, however, concentrate the power to reward or punish in the hands of a subset of group members (‘central monitors’). We review the literature on the relative merits of punishment and rewards when the distribution of incentive power is diffused across group members, as in most of the extant literature, and compare this with more recent work and new evidence showing how concentrating reward/punishment power in one group member affects cooperation. |
| Keywords: | rewards,punishment, discretionary incentives, decentralized incentives, peer-to-peer incentives, centralized incentives, experiment |
| Date: | 2012–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:not:notcdx:2012-08&r=exp |
| By: | Alistair Wilson |
| Abstract: | I develop a novel model of group-based deliberation in which communication is costly in two directions: agents must pay separate costs to send and to receive messages. Equilibrium strategies have an intuitive characterization - those with the best information send, those with the worst information receive. But free-riding leads to less information exchange than is optimal. Testing the model`s predictions with an experiment I find that subjects overcommunicate when costs are high, but fail to benefit from this as much as they should. In welfare terms the experiment finds that listening costs are more harmful to welfare, in contrast with theory, which indicates sending costs. The experiment also suggests that the existence of costly communication channels can reduce total welfare. |
| Keywords: | Group Communication, Information transmission, Information public goods |
| JEL: | C72 C92 D83 D84 |
| Date: | 2012–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pit:wpaper:499&r=exp |
| By: | Bhirombhakdi, Kornpob; Potipiti, Tanapong |
| Abstract: | This study experimentally tests the performance in predicting decisions of a reciprocity model that was proposed by Dufwenberg et al. (2004). By applying a new approach, the study directly and individually predicts a subject's future decision from his past decision. The prediction performance is measured by the rate of correct predictions (accuracy) and the gain in the rate of the correct predictions (informativeness). Six scenarios of trust game are used to test the model's performance. Further, we compare the performance of the model with two other prediction methods; one method uses a decision in a dictator game to predict a decision in a trust game; the other uses personal information including IQ-test scores, personal attitudes and socio-economic factors. Seventy-nine undergraduate students participated in this hand-run experimental study. The results show that the reciprocity model has the best performance when compared with other prediction methods. |
| Keywords: | Reciprocity; Model performance; Trust game |
| JEL: | C91 |
| Date: | 2012–07–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:40954&r=exp |
| By: | Alex Possajennikov (School of Economics, University of Nottingham) |
| Abstract: | Using belief elicitation, the paper investigates the formation and the evolution of beliefs in a signalling game in which a common prior on Sender's type is not induced. Beliefs are elicited about the type of the Sender and about the strategies of the players. The experimental subjects often start with diuse uniform beliefs and update them in view of observations. However, the speed of updating is in uenced by the strength of the initial beliefs. An interesting result is that beliefs about strategies are updated faster than beliefs about types. In the medium run, for some specications of game parameters, this leads to outcomes being signicantly dierent from the outcomes of the game in which a common prior is induced. It is also shown that elicitation of beliefs does not considerably change the pattern of play. |
| Keywords: | beliefs,signalling,experiment,learning,belief elicitation |
| Date: | 2012–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:not:notcdx:2012-06&r=exp |
| By: | Steffen Altmann (Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)); Christian Traxler (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn and University of Marburg, Department of Economics) |
| Abstract: | We implement a randomized field experiment to study the impact of reminders on dental health prevention. Patients who are due for a check-up receive no reminder, a neutral reminder postcard, or reminders including additional information on the benefits of prevention. Our results document a strong impact of reminders. Within one month after receiving a reminder, the fraction of patients who make a check-up appointment more than doubles. The effect declines slightly over time, but remains economically and statistically significant. Including additional information in the reminders does not increase response rates. In fact, the neutral reminder has the strongest impact for the overall population as well as for important subgroups of patients. Finally, we document that being exposed to reminders repeatedly does neither strengthen nor weaken their effectiveness. |
| Keywords: | Field Experiment, Reminders, Nudges, Memory Limitations, Prevention, Dental Health, Framing |
| JEL: | D03 I11 C93 |
| Date: | 2012–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2012_15&r=exp |
| By: | Friedman, Daniel; Huck, Steffen; Oprea, Ryan; Weidenholzer, Simon |
| Abstract: | We study long-run learning in an experimental Cournot game with no explicit information about the payoff function. Subjects see only the quantities and payoffs of each oligopolist after every period. In line with theoretical predictions and previous experimental findings, duopolies and triopolies both reach highly competitive levels, with price approaching marginal cost within 50 periods. Using the new ConG software, we extend the horizon to 1,200 periods, far beyond that previously investigated. Already after 100 periods we observe a qualitative change in behavior, and quantity choices start to drop. Without pausing at the Cournot-Nash level quantities continue to drop, eventually reaching almost fully collusive levels in duopolies and often reaching deep into collusive territory for triopolies. Fitted models of individual adjustment suggest that subjects switch from imitation of the most profitable rival to other behavior that, intentionally or otherwise, facilitates collusion via effective punishment and forgiveness. Remarkably, subjects never learn the best-reply correspondence of the one-shot game. Our results suggest a new explanation for the emergence of cooperation. -- Wir untersuchen langfristiges Lernverhalten in experimentellen Cournot-Oligopolen, in denen die Teilnehmer keine direkten Informationen über die Gewinnfunktion haben. Im Einklang mit theoretischen Vorhersagen werden sowohl Duopole als auch Triopole extrem kompetitiv (mit Preisen nahe bei den Grenzkosten) binnen 50 Perioden. Der Einsatz der neuen ConG Software erlaubt uns die Zahl der Perioden auf 1.200 auszudehnen, weit mehr als jemals zuvor untersucht. Bereits nach 100 Perioden beobachten wir deutliche Verhaltensänderungen und niedrigere Produktionsmengen, die stetig weiter fallen, ohne am Cournot-Nash-Gleichgewicht zu verharren, sondern stattdessen nahezu voll kollusive Levels im Duopol erreichen und im Triopol tief in kollusives Terrain vordringen. Unsere Datenanalyse demonstriert, wie die Teilnehmer imitierendes Verhalten zugunsten anderer Regeln aufgeben, die - ob beabsichtigt oder nicht - Kooperation durch effektive Bestrafung und Vergebung unterstützen. Bemerkenswerterweise gelingt es den Teilnehmern auch bis zum Ende des Experiments nicht, die Beste-Antwort-Korrespondenz des (Einmal-)Spiels zu erlernen. Unsere Ergebnisse legen eine neue Erklärung für die Emergenz kooperativen Verhaltens nahe. |
| Keywords: | Cournot oligopoly,imitation,learning dynamics,cooperation |
| JEL: | C73 C91 D43 |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:wzbeoc:spii2012301&r=exp |
| By: | Felix Kolle (Cologne Graduate School in Management, Economics and Social Sciences) |
| Abstract: | We experimentally investigate cooperation in privileged groups which according to Olson (1965) are groups in which at least one member has an incentive to supply a positive amount of the public good. More specifically, we analyze group member heterogeneity with respect to two dimensions: capability and valuation. Our results reveal that with and without punishment opportunities, heterogeneity crucially aects cooperation and coordination within groups. Compared to non-privileged groups, asymmetric valuations for the public good have negative eects, and asymmetric capabilities in providing the public good have positive eects on voluntary contributions. The main reason for these results are the dierent externalities contributions have on the other group members’ payos affecting individuals’ willingness to cooperate. Hence, whether heterogeneity facilitates or impedes collective action, and whether privileged groups are as privileged as they initially seem is subject to the nature of their asymmetry. |
| Keywords: | public goods, heterogeneity, privileged groups, inequality, cooperation, punishment |
| Date: | 2012–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:not:notcdx:2012-07&r=exp |
| By: | Grimalday, Gianluca (Universitat Jaume I); Karz, Anirban (Delhi School of Economics, University of Delhi); Proto, Eugenio (University of Warwick) |
| Abstract: | Fairness emerges as a relevant factor in redistributive preferences in surveys and experiments. We study experimentally the impact of varying the probability with which players are assigned to initial positions in Ultimatum Games (UGs). In the baseline case players have equal opportunities of being assigned the proposer position ñ arguably the more advantaged one in UGs. Chances become increasingly unequal across three treatments. We also manipulate the inter-temporal allocation of opportunities over rounds. We Önd that: (1) The more initial chances are distributed unequally, the lower the acceptance rates of a given o§er; consequently, o§ers increase; (2) Being assigned a mere 1% chance of occupying the proposer role compared to none, significantly increases acceptance rates and decreases o§ers; (3) Players accept even extreme amounts of unequal chances within each round in exchange for overall equality of opportunities across rounds. Procedural fairness both static and dynamic - has clear relevance for individuals. |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cge:warwcg:92&r=exp |
| By: | Daniele Nosenzo (School of Economics, University of Nottingham); Theo Offerman (CREED, Department of Economics, University of Amsterdam); Martin Sefton (School of Economics, University of Nottingham); Ailko van der Veen (CBESS, School of Economics, University of East Anglia) |
| Abstract: | We experimentally investigate a repeated “inspection game” where, in the stage game, an employee can either work or shirk and an employer simultaneously chooses to inspect or not inspect. Combined payoffs are maximized when the employee works and the employer does not inspect. However, the unique equilibrium of the stage game is in mixed strategies with positive probabilities of shirking/inspecting. We examine the effects of allowing the employer to sanction or reward the employee after she has inspected the employee. We find that rewards or sanctions can both discourage shirking, and have similar effects on joint earnings. In games allowing sanctions a reduction in shirking is accomplished with a lower inspection rate and the efficiency gains accrue to employers. In games allowing rewards employers actively reward employees for working and the efficiency gains are shared more equitably. A treatment where employers can combine sanctions and rewards leads to efficiencies similar to the single-instrument treatments, and outcomes more closely resemble those of the reward treatment in that the efficiency gains are shared. |
| Keywords: | inspection game, costly monitoring, discretionary incentives, rewards, punishment, experiment |
| Date: | 2012–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:not:notcdx:2012-10&r=exp |
| By: | Kenneth L. Sørensen (Department of Economics and Business, Aarhus University, Denmark) |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates effects on wages of a Danish field experiment intensifying Active Labor Market Policies (ALMP).We link unemployed workers who participated in an ALMP experiment called “Quickly Back” carried out by the Danish Ministry of Employment 2005-2006 in two counties to matched employer-employee and public transfer register data up to 2008 enabling us to analyze exact labor market transitions and jobs of the participants. Men in one of the counties experienced significant higher probability of earning higher short and long term wages after treatment. Treated men in the other county encountered a higher probability of earning lower wages than non-treated in the short term. Women saw small positive or zero effects on wages. |
| Keywords: | Active Labor Market Policies, controlled experiment, wages, Mixed Proportional Hazard model |
| JEL: | C41 J31 J64 |
| Date: | 2012–08–31 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aah:aarhec:2012-20&r=exp |
| By: | Ludwig Ensthaler; Olga Nottmeyer; Georg Weizsäcker |
| Abstract: | Multiplicative growth processes that are subject to random shocks often have a skewed distribution of outcomes. A simple laboratory experiment shows that participants either strongly underestimate skewness or ignore it completely. The participants' choices reveal bounds on their subjective medians of a financial asset's price that is subject to stochastic growth. The observed bias in expectations is irrespective to risk preferences and fairly robust to feedback. It is consistent with a behavioral model in which geometric growth is confused with linear growth. The bias is a possible explanation of investors' misunderstandings of real-world financial products like leveraged ETFs. |
| Keywords: | Skewness, belief biases, binomial tree |
| JEL: | C91 D03 |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp1238&r=exp |
| By: | Makoto Nakada (Hitotsubashi University) |
| Abstract: | This paper suggests a hypothesis that feelings of attachment change subjective valuation through reference point shifts. This attachment hypothesis can explain seemingly contradictory results of recent experiments concerning what are called endowment effects, in which there exists disparities of valuation between owners and nonowners. That is, individuals who are attached to a good value it highly. We propose a model of value function that illustrates the attachment hypothesis. In this model, feelings of attachment shift the reference point. In addition, we test the effect of attachment on subjective valuation by experimentally controlling attachment, using a psychological method called priming manipulation. |
| Date: | 2012–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kei:dpaper:2012-012&r=exp |
| By: | Giorgia Barboni; Tania Treibich |
| Abstract: | The widespread evidence of multiple bank lending relationships in credit markets suggests that firms are interested in setting up a diversity of banking links. However, it is hard to know from the empirical data whether a firm's observed number of lenders is symptomatic of financial constraints or rather a well-designed strategy. By setting up a model and testing it in a controlled laboratory experiment we are able to uncover the conditions favoring multiple versus single lending strategies of borrowers, as well as the probability to get funding from lenders. We find that borrowers adjust the way they signal their trustworthiness according to the experimental design: they do so by choosing a single lending strategy when the asymmetry of informations is high. Multiple lending is therefore strategically chosen by dishonest borrowers. Instead, when relationship building is possible, the single lending choice reinforces the positive effect of repeatedly interacting with the same lender. In this case, multiple lending is related to borrowers' financial constraints. Finally, when information upon borrowers' behavior is made available, lenders are more likely to punish free-riding behaviors than simple default due to project failure. |
| Keywords: | Repeated Games, Information Asymmetries, Multiple Lending, Relationship lending |
| Date: | 2012–08–27 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ssa:lemwps:2012/13&r=exp |