nep-exp New Economics Papers
on Experimental Economics
Issue of 2011‒10‒22
seven papers chosen by
Daniel Houser
George Mason University

  1. Punishment, reward, and cooperation in a framed field experiment By Noussair, Charles; van Soest, Daan; Stoop, Jan
  2. Immoral criminals? An experimental study of social preferences among prisoners. By Birkeland, Sigbjørn; Cappelen, Alexander W.; Sørensen, Erik Ø.; Tungodden, Bertil
  3. Do consumers prefer offers that are easy to compare? An experimental investigation By Paolo Crosetto; Alexia Gaudeul
  4. Social Interactions and Long-Term Fertility Dynamics.A Simulation Experiment in the Context of the French Fertility Decline By Sandra González-Bailón; Tommy E. Murphy
  5. HIV Testing and Risky Sexual Behavior By Erick Gong
  6. Experimental Evidence on the Effect of Childhood Investments on Postsecondary Attainment and Degree Completion By Susan Dynarski; Joshua M. Hyman; Diane Whitmore Schanzenbach
  7. Space-filling Latin hypercube designs for computer experiments. By Dam, E.R. van; Hertog, D. den; Husslage, B.G.M.; Rennen, G.

  1. By: Noussair, Charles; van Soest, Daan; Stoop, Jan
    Abstract: We report a framed field experiment, in which we study the effectiveness of punishment and reward in sustaining cooperation in a social dilemma. Punishments tend to be directed at non-cooperators and rewards are assigned by those who are relatively cooperative. In contrast to the results typically found in laboratory experiments, however, we find that punishments and rewards fail to increase cooperation.
    Keywords: Field experiment; public goods game; social preferences; punishment; reward
    JEL: C92 C93 C72
    Date: 2011–09–26
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:34067&r=exp
  2. By: Birkeland, Sigbjørn (Dept. of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration); Cappelen, Alexander W. (Dept. of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration); Sørensen, Erik Ø. (Dept. of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration); Tungodden, Bertil (Dept. of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration)
    Abstract: This paper studies the pro-social preferences of criminals by comparing the behavior of a group of prisoners in a lab experiment with the behavior of a benchmark group recruited from the general population. We find a striking similarity in the importance the two groups attach to pro-social preferences in both in strategic and non-strategic situations. This result also holds when the two groups interact. Data from a large internet experiment,matched with official criminal records, suggest that our main finding from the lab experiment is not influenced by the additional scrutiny experienced by participants in prison.
    Keywords: Pro-social preferences; Criminals; Lab experiment
    JEL: C91 D63 K40
    Date: 2011–09–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:nhheco:2011_015&r=exp
  3. By: Paolo Crosetto (Max Planck Institute for Economics, Jena); Alexia Gaudeul (Graduate School "Human Behavior in Social and Economic Change" (GSBC), Friedrich Schiller University, Jena)
    Abstract: Consumers make mistakes when facing complex purchasing decision problems but if at least some consumers choose only among offers that are easy to compare with others then firms will adopt common ways to present their offers and thus make choice easier (Gaudeul and Sugden, 2011). We design an original experiment to identify consumers' choice heuristics in the lab. Subjects are presented with menus of offers and do appear to favour offers that are easy to compare with others in the menu. While not all subjects do so, this is enough to deter firms from introducing spurious complexity in the way they present products.
    Keywords: Bounded Rationality, Cognitive Limitations, Common Standards, Consumer Choice, Experimental Economics, Heuristics, Libertarian Paternalism, Pricing Formats, Spurious Complexity
    JEL: D83 L13 D18
    Date: 2011–10–12
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2011-044&r=exp
  4. By: Sandra González-Bailón; Tommy E. Murphy
    Abstract: We build an agent-based simulation model that incorporates both historical data on population characteristics and spatial information on the geography of France to experimentally study the role of social interactions in fertility decisions. We assess how different behavioural and interdependence assumptions cause variations in macro dynamics and diffusion patterns. The analyses show that incorporating social interactions into the model contribute to mimic empirically observed behaviour. Our findings suggest individual-level mechanisms through which the observed demographic transition was materialised. Keywords fertility decline, demographic transition, diffusion, France, simulation experiments, agent-based models, decision-making, social norms, social interactions. JEL classification N33, J13, C15.
    Date: 2011
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:igi:igierp:419&r=exp
  5. By: Erick Gong
    Abstract: Using data from a study that randomly assigns offers of HIV testing in two urban centers in East Africa, I examine the effects of testing, taking into account people's beliefs of their HIV status prior to testing. I objectively measure risky sexual behavior using sexually transmitted infections (ÒSTIsÓ) contracted during the 6 month study as proxies. Individuals surprised by an HIV-positive test are over nine times more likely to contract an STI indicating an increase in risky sexual behavior. Individuals surprised by an HIV-negative test are 84% less likely to contract an STI indicating a decrease in risky sexual behavior. Using these estimates, I simulate the effects of testing on new HIV infections. I find the overall number of HIV infections increases by 30% when people are tested compared to when they are unaware of their status - an unintended consequence of testing.
    Keywords: HIV/AIDS; risk behavior; information; beliefs
    JEL: D84 I18 O12
    Date: 2011–10
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mdl:mdlpap:1101&r=exp
  6. By: Susan Dynarski; Joshua M. Hyman; Diane Whitmore Schanzenbach
    Abstract: This paper examines the effect of early childhood investments on college enrollment and degree completion. We use the random assignment in the Project STAR experiment to estimate the effect of smaller classes in primary school on college entry, college choice, and degree completion. We improve on existing work in this area with unusually detailed data on college enrollment spells and the previously unexplored outcome of college degree completion. We find that assignment to a small class increases the probability of attending college by 2.7 percentage points, with effects more than twice as large among blacks. Among those with the lowest ex ante probability of attending college, the effect is 11 percentage points. Smaller classes increase the likelihood of earning a college degree by 1.6 percentage points and shift students towards high-earning fields such as STEM (science, technology, engineering and medicine), business and economics. We confirm the standard finding that test score effects fade out by middle school, but show that test score effects at the time of the experiment are an excellent predictor of long-term improvements in postsecondary outcomes. We compare the costs and impacts of this intervention with other tools for increasing postsecondary attainment, such as Head Start and financial aid, and conclude that early investments are no more cost effective than later investments in boosting adult educational attainment.
    JEL: I21 I28 J24
    Date: 2011–10
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:17533&r=exp
  7. By: Dam, E.R. van (Universiteit van Tilburg); Hertog, D. den (Universiteit van Tilburg); Husslage, B.G.M. (Universiteit van Tilburg); Rennen, G. (Universiteit van Tilburg)
    Date: 2011
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ner:tilbur:urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-4334874&r=exp

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