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on Experimental Economics |
| By: | Heinz, Matthias; Juranek, Steffen; Rau, Holger A. |
| Abstract: | We analyze dictator allocation decisions in an experiment where the recipients have to earn the pot to be divided with a real-effort task. As the recipients move before the dictators, their effort decisions resemble the first move in a trust game. Depending on the recipients' performance, the size of the pot is either high or low. We compare this real-effort treatment to a baseline treatment where the pot is a windfall gain and where a lottery determines the pot size. In the baseline treatment, reciprocity cannot play a role. We find that female dictators show reciprocity and decrease their taking-rates significantly in the real-effort treatment. This treatment effect is larger when female dictators make a decision on recipients who successfully generated a large pot compared to the case where the recipients performed poorly. By contrast, there is no treatment effect with male dictators, who generally exhibit more sefish behavior. -- |
| Keywords: | Gender,Reciprocity,Dictator Game,Real Effort |
| JEL: | C72 C91 |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:dicedp:24&r=exp |
| By: | Torero, Maximo; Viceisza, Angelino |
| Abstract: | We conduct framed trust games using contract dairy farmers in Vietnam as first movers to assess the impact of potential collusion on trust. Disaggregated analysis suggests that female farmers are more likely to trust overall, but are also more responsive to the addition of a third party and potential collusion. A third party induces them to trust at higher levels, but potential collusion between the trustee and the third party also induces them to trust at lower levels. Our findings corroborate well with existing studies on gender differences in decision making, which suggest that women's social preferences are more context-specific than men's. |
| Keywords: | collusion, field experiment, Gender, trust game, |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fpr:ifprid:1100&r=exp |
| By: | Ilyana Kuziemko; Ryan W. Buell; Taly Reich; Michael I. Norton |
| Abstract: | Why do low-income individuals often oppose redistribution? We hypothesize that an aversion to being in "last place" undercuts support for redistribution, with low-income individuals punishing those slightly below themselves to keep someone "beneath" them. In laboratory experiments, we find support for "last-place aversion" in the contexts of risk aversion and redistributive preferences. Participants choose gambles with the potential to move them out of last place that they reject when randomly placed in other parts of the distribution. Similarly, in money- transfer games, those randomly placed in second-to-last place are the least likely to costlessly give money to the player one rank below. Last-place aversion predicts that those earning just above the minimum wage will be most likely to oppose minimum-wage increases as they would no longer have a lower-wage group beneath them, a prediction we confirm using survey data. |
| JEL: | C91 D31 D72 H23 I3 J38 |
| Date: | 2011–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:17234&r=exp |
| By: | Driouchi, Ahmed; Chetioui, Youssef; Baddou, Meryem |
| Abstract: | To select one of several products (or to buy nothing) is a daily decision. Its foundations vary from one person to another and are based on perceptions, preferences, and other criteria. The standard theoretical perspective conveys that people choose options with the highest net benefit. However, the zero price model, proposed by Shampanier, Mazar, and Ariely (SMA) (2007), suggests that decisions about free (zero price) products do not simply subtract costs from benefits but instead perceive other gains and costs associated with free products. This paper tests this second alternative by contrasting demand for telecommunication products in Morocco, mainly SMS and calls. The price difference is maintained between the cheaper and expensive options such that the cheaper product is priced at either a low positive price (cost condition) or zero price (free condition). The results suggest that more participants choose the cheaper option, whereas fewer participants choose the more expensive one. People act as if zero pricing is a special price, as suggested by the zero price model. The paper tests also the affect as an explanation to the zero price effect. The result suggests that the price effect cannot be fully attributed to this dimension. |
| Keywords: | free; zero; price; affect; telecommunications; Morocco. |
| JEL: | D12 D01 C93 |
| Date: | 2011–07–20 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:32352&r=exp |
| By: | Dasgupta, Utteeyo; Gangadharan, Lata; Maitra, Pushkar; Mani, Subha; Subramanian, Samyukta |
| Abstract: | This paper combines unique survey and experimental data to examine the determinants of self-selection into a vocational training program. Women residing in selected disadvantaged areas in New Delhi, India were invited to apply for a 6-month long free training program in stitching and tailoring. A random subset of applicants and non-applicants were invited to participate in a set of behavioral experiments and in a detailed socio-economic survey. We find that applicants and non-applicants differ both in terms of observables (captured using survey data) and also in terms of a number of intrinsic traits (captured via the behavioral experiments). Overall our results suggest that there is valuable information to be gained by dissecting the black box of unobservables using behavioral experiments. |
| Keywords: | Labor Market Training Programs; Selection; Survey Data; Field Experiments; Risk; Competition |
| JEL: | J24 C81 C93 |
| Date: | 2011–07–16 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:32383&r=exp |
| By: | Anja Sautmann |
| Abstract: | This paper experimentally tests the predictions of a principal-agent model in which the agent has biased beliefs about his ability. Overcondent workers are found to earn lower wages than undercondent ones because they overestimate their expected payo, and principals adjust their oers accordingly. Moreover, the prot-maximizing contract distorts eort by varying incentives according to self-condence, although only the most successful principals use this strategy. These ndings have implications for the labor market; in particular, self-condence is often correlated with gender, implying that principals would prefer to hire men over women simply because they are more overcondent. |
| Keywords: | # |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bro:econwp:2011-10&r=exp |