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on Experimental Economics |
| By: | Sarah Jacobson (Williams College); Ragan Petrie (George Mason University) |
| Abstract: | Grassroots fundraising leverages favor trading within social networks to support the provision of a public good. We use a laboratory experiment to study the elements and dynamics of this type of fundraising institution. Peer-to-peer reciprocity is an important component of grassroots fundraising, and the ability to practice this targeted reciprocity in our experiment increases contributions to the public good by 14%. Subjects discriminate by rewarding group members who have been generous and withholding rewards from ungenerous group members. At least some of this reciprocal behavior is rooted in other-regarding preferences. When someone is rendered unable to benefit from favor trading, he gives much less to the public good than he does in other settings. People thus excluded from the "circle of reciprocity" thus provide a clean and strict test of indirect reciprocity, since they cannot benefit from a norm of cooperation. We do not observe indirect reciprocity. |
| Keywords: | public goods, reciprocity, experiment, peer-to-peer fundraising |
| JEL: | C91 H41 D01 |
| Date: | 2010–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wil:wileco:2010-21&r=exp |
| By: | José Luis Ferreira; Praveen Kujal; Stephen Rassenti |
| Abstract: | We test the strategic motive to sell forward in experimental Cournot duopoly and quadropoly environments with multiple forward markets. Using random matching, we test two versions of forward markets with finite (Allaz and Vila, 1993) and indefinite number of periods. We find that the results for the Allaz and Vila (1993) model are remarkably close to the predicted theoretical results for both duopolies and quadropolies. We then test a version of the model to allow for indefinitely many periods. There are multiple equilibria in this theoretical model, including both the competitive and collusive outcomes. We find that the initial "collusive hypothesis" is not ratified, and that outcomes are nearly competitive. Sales take place mostly in the first few openings of futures markets. Again, these results hold for both duopolies and quadropolies. |
| Date: | 2010–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cte:werepe:we1023&r=exp |
| By: | Brice Corgnet; Praveen Kujal; David Porter |
| Abstract: | We report experiments that examine trader reaction to ambiguity when dividend information is revealed sequentially. We find that experienced traders are better at internalizing ambiguity than inexperienced subjects. No significant differences are observed in the ambiguity versus control treatments regarding prices, price volatility and volumes for experienced subjects. However, relative to the control, prices are higher, volatility greater and trading unsophisticated for inexperienced subjects in the ambiguity treatment. Price changes are consistent with news revelation regardless of subject experience and the degree of ambiguity. Further, we do not find under or over price reactions to news. Regardless of experience, market reaction to news moves in line with fundamentals. |
| Keywords: | Experimental asset markets, Ambiguity, Market communications, Bounded rationality |
| JEL: | C92 G12 |
| Date: | 2010–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cte:werepe:ws1025&r=exp |
| By: | Heller, Yuval |
| Abstract: | Experimental evidence suggests that people tend to be overconfident in the sense that they overestimate the accuracy of their own predictions. In this paper we present a simple principal-agent model in which principal's interest in dispersing risk motivates him to hire overconfident agents. We show that the induced overconfidence satisfies experimental stylized facts (such as, hard-easy effect, false certainty effect and underuse of base rates). In addition, we show that overconfidence is a unique stable evolutionary strategy, and that it can Pareto-improve social welfare. Finally, we demonstrate applicability by: 1) demonstrating why CEOs hire overconfident intermediate managers, and 2) explaining why investors prefer overconfident entrepreneurs. |
| Keywords: | overconfidence; risk dispersion; hard-easy effect; evolutionary stability |
| JEL: | C72 C73 |
| Date: | 2010–09–26 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:25893&r=exp |
| By: | Blair L. Cleave; Nikos Nikiforakis; Robert Slonim |
| Abstract: | Do the social and risk preferences of participants in laboratory experiments represent the preferences of the population from which they are recruited? To answer this question, we conducted a classroom experiment with a population of 1,173 students using a trust game and a lottery choice task to measure individual preferences. Separately, all 1,173 students were invited to participate in a laboratory experiment. To determine whether selection bias exists, we compare the preferences of the individuals who eventually participated in a laboratory experiment to those in the population. We find that the social and risk preferences of the students participating in the laboratory experiment are not significantly different from the preferences of the population from which they were recruited. We further show that participation decisions across most subgroups (e.g., men vs. women) do not differ significantly. We therefore fail to find selection bias based on social and risk preferences. |
| Keywords: | selection bias; laboratory experiments; external validity; social preferences; risk preferences |
| JEL: | C90 |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mlb:wpaper:1106&r=exp |
| By: | Daniele Nosenzo (University of Nottingham); Martin Sefton (University of Nottingham) |
| Abstract: | In this paper we examine voluntary contributions to a public good, embedding Varian (1994)’s voluntary contribution game in extended games that allow players to choose the timing of their contributions. We show that predicted outcomes are sensitive to the structure of the extended game, and also to the extent to which players care about payoff inequalities. We then report a laboratory experiment based on these extended games. We find that behavior is similar in the two extended games: subjects avoid the detrimental move order of Varian’s model, where a person with a high value of the public good commits to a low contribution, and instead players tend to delay contributions. These results suggest that commitment opportunities may be less damaging to public good provision than previously thought. |
| Keywords: | Public Goods, Voluntary Contributions, Sequential Contributions, Endogenous Timing, Action Commitment, Observable Delay, Experiment |
| JEL: | H41 C72 C92 |
| Date: | 2010–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cdx:dpaper:2010-14&r=exp |
| By: | Johannes Abeler (University of Nottingham); Felix Marklein (University of Bonn) |
| Abstract: | Fungibility of money is a central assumption in the theory of consumer choice: any unit of money is substitutable for another. This implies that the composition of income or wealth is irrelevant for consumption. We find in a field experiment that even in a simple, incentivized setup many subjects do not treat money as fungible. When a label is attached to a part of their budget, subjects change consumption according to the label. A controlled laboratory experiment confirms this result and further shows that subjects with lower cognitive abilities are more likely to violate fungibility. The findings lend support to behavioral models of narrow bracketing and mental accounting. One implication of our result is that in-kind benefits distort consumption more strongly than usually assumed. |
| Keywords: | Fungibility, In-kind Benefits, Mental Accounting, Narrow Bracketing, Field Experiment, Laboratory Experiment |
| JEL: | C91 C93 D01 H31 I38 |
| Date: | 2010–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cdx:dpaper:2010-13&r=exp |
| By: | Martin Dufwenberg (University of Arizona); Simon Gaechter (University of Nottingham); Heike Hennig-Schmidt (University of Bonn) |
| Abstract: | Psychological game theory can provide rational-choice-based framing effects; frames influence beliefs, beliefs influence motivations. We explain this theoretically and explore empirical relevance experimentally. In a 2?2 design of one-shot public good games we show that frames affect subject’s first- and second-order beliefs, and contributions. From a psychological gametheoretic framework we derive two mutually compatible hypotheses about guilt aversion and reciprocity under which contributions are related to second- and first-order beliefs, respectively. Our results are consistent with either. |
| Keywords: | framing; psychological game theory; guilt aversion; reciprocity; public good games; voluntary cooperation |
| JEL: | C91 C72 D64 Z13 |
| Date: | 2010–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cdx:dpaper:2010-16&r=exp |
| By: | Drichoutis, Andreas; Nayga, Rodolfo |
| Abstract: | We test whether induced mood states have an effect on elicited risk and time preferences. Risk preferences between subjects in the control, positive mood, and negative mood treatments are neither economically nor statistically significant. However, we find that subjects induced into a positive mood exhibit higher discount rates and that subjects under negative mood do not differ significantly with a control group. Results also suggest that irrespective of mood state, introducing a cognitively demanding task before risk preference elicitation increases risk aversion and females are less risk averse when in all-female sessions than when in mixed-gender sessions. |
| Keywords: | discount rates; risk aversion; lab experiment; mood; affect |
| JEL: | D81 D00 C91 |
| Date: | 2010–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:25731&r=exp |
| By: | Giovanna Devetag; Sibilla Di Guida |
| Abstract: | In this paper we test the effect of descriptive "features" on initial strategic behavior in normal form games, where "descriptive" are all those features that can be modified without altering the (Nash) equilibrium structure of a game. We observe that our experimental subjects behave according to some simple heuristics based on descriptive features, and that these heuristics are stable even across strategically different games. This suggests that a categorization of games based on features may be more accurate in predicting agents' initial behavior than the standard categorization based on Nash equilibria, as shown by the analysis of individual behavior. Anaysis of choice patterns and individual response times suggests that non-equilibrium choices may be due to the use of incorrect and simplified mental representations of the game structure, rather than to beliefs in other players' irrationality. Of the four stationary concepts analyzed (Nash equilibrium, QRE, action sampling, and payoff sampling), QRE results the best in fitting the observed data. |
| Keywords: | normal form games, one-shot games, response times, similarity, categorization, focal points |
| JEL: | C72 C91 C92 |
| Date: | 2010–10–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ssa:lemwps:2010/18&r=exp |
| By: | Farzana Afridi; Sherry Xin Li; Yufei Ren |
| Abstract: | They conduct an experimental study to investigate the causal impact of social identity on individuals' response to economic incentives. They focus on China‟s decades old household registration system, or the hukou institution, which categorizes citizens into urban and rural residents, and favors the former over the latter in resource allocation. Their results indicate that making individuals' hukou status salient and public significantly reduces the performance of rural migrant students on an incentivized cognitive task by 10 percent. This leads to a leftward shift of their earnings distribution – the proportion of rural migrants below the 25th earnings percentile increases significantly by almost 19 percentage points. [Working Paper No. 190] |
| Keywords: | social identity, hukou, inequality, field experiment, China |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ess:wpaper:id:3003&r=exp |
| By: | Carlsson, Magnus (Centre for Labour Market Policy Research (CAFO)) |
| Abstract: | The idea with using field experiments for measuring discrimination in hiring is basically making all variables of a job applicant that are observable to the employer also observable to the researcher. This in turn should provide scope for measuring the true level of discrimination in hiring, which is very challenging if traditional ex post regression analysis of public microdata is used. However, most of the conducted field experiments have so far ignored that at what level the observable characteristics of the job candidates are standardized by the experiment might influence the measured degree of discrimination. In the current paper, a simple framework is first presented to illustrate the issue and then data from a field experiment conducted in the Swedish labor market is utilized to empirically analyze the question. The analysis show that the predicted difference in callback rate to a job interview between applicants with a typical Swedish and a typical Arabic name varies significantly over applications with different attributes attached. The conclusion is that studies which standardize the characteristics of the job applicants at a particular level might obtain very non generalizable results. At the end of the paper, we give some suggestions for how the field experimental methodology might be improved. |
| Keywords: | field experiment on hiring; employer discrimination |
| JEL: | J64 J71 |
| Date: | 2010–10–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:vxcafo:2010_002&r=exp |
| By: | Angela A. Hung; Aileen Heinberg; Joanne K. Yoong |
| Abstract: | The aim of this study was to understand the potential effects of different information disclosures regarding risk on retirement investing behavior. The authors developed and tested two modifications to the section on investment performance on the prototype DOL Model Comparative Chart, providing additional risk and return information in a clear graphical manner. One modification provided summary risk ratings, while the other provided a visual representation of actual returns series over 10 years. They conducted an experiment using a nationally representative internet survey. All participants were asked to perform the same hypothetical task allocating retirement investments over a range of six possible typical investment fund options. Treatment groups were randomly allocated to receive different representations of the same risk/return information. They also investigated order effects by randomizing the presentation order of the six investment options. Alternative representations of the risk/return information had a statistically significant effect on allocation decisions, but the practical significance is difficult to determine: although different treatment groups chose different allocations across the six investment options, the risk/return characteristics of the resulting portfolios were very similar. Perhaps surprisingly, the effects of the alternative disclosure forms do not seem to vary across individuals with different levels of financial literacy, or across individuals with different levels of risk aversion. Order effects were stronger than the disclosure form effects, but were independent of the risk characteristics of the investment options: the first and last investment options presented tend to receive larger allocations. Furthermore, the order effects do not appear to be offset by providing additional risk/return information. Their results are consistent with findings that summary disclosure forms are popular with consumers and help them feel more confident about their decisions; our results go further in showing that alternative forms do lead to different choices, but that those different choices may not result in practically significant differences in investment outcomes. |
| JEL: | D14 G11 J26 |
| Date: | 2010–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ran:wpaper:788&r=exp |
| By: | Rupert Sausgruber; Jean-Robert Tyran |
| Abstract: | We let consumers vote on tax regimes in experimental markets. We test if taxes on sellers are more popular than taxes on consumers, i.e. on voters themselves, even if taxes on sellers are inefficiently high. Taxes on sellers are more popular if voters underestimate the extent of tax shifting in the market. We show that inexperienced voters are prone to such a tax-shifting bias, that experience is an effective de-biasing mechanism, but that pre-vote deliberation about tax regimes makes initially held opinions more extreme rather than correct. Our results suggest that voting on taxes is prone to bias and that easy-to-interpret facts are needed to de-bias voters. |
| JEL: | C92 H22 D72 |
| Date: | 2010–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:vie:viennp:1010&r=exp |
| By: | Klaus Abbink; Ronald Bosman; Ronald Heijmans; Frans van Winden |
| Abstract: | This experimental study investigates the behaviour of banks in a large value payment system. More specifically, we look at 1) the reactions of banks to disruptions in the payment system, 2) the way in which the history of disruptions affects the behaviour of banks (path dependency) and 3) the effect of more concentration in the payment system (heterogeneous market versus a homogeneous market). The game used in this experiment is a stylized version of a model of Bech and Garrett (2006) in which each bank can choose between paying in the morning (efficient) or in the afternoon (inefficient). The results show that there is significant path dependency in terms of disruption history. Also the chance of disruption influences the behaviour of the participants. Once the system is moving towards the inefficient equilibrium, it does not easily move back to the efficient one. Furthermore, there is a clear leadership effect in the heterogeneous market. |
| Keywords: | payment systems; financial stability; experiment; decision making |
| JEL: | C92 D70 D78 |
| Date: | 2010–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dnb:dnbwpp:263&r=exp |
| By: | Manuela Angelucci; Vincenzo Di Maro |
| Abstract: | This note defines what spillover effects are, why it is important to measure them, and how to design a field experiment that will enable researchers to measure the average effects of the treatment in the presence of spillover effects on subjects both eligible and ineligible for the program. In addition, it discusses how to use nonexperimental methods for estimating spillover effects when the experimental design is not a viable option. Several practical examples are provided to show how spillover effects can be estimated. Evaluations that account for spillover effects should be designed in such a way that they explain both the cause of these effects and who is affected by them. Failure to have such an evaluation design can result in wrong policy recommendations and in the neglect of important mechanisms through which the program operates. To estimate the direct and indirect effect of a program, one has to use control groups that are not affected by the program either directly or indirectly. This often means selecting the control groups from different geographic units (e.g. the village or school). In order to understand the mechanisms that cause spillover effects one has to think about competing explanations and collect data on relevant outcomes. In many cases, unveiling the mechanisms behind the spillover effects results in a better understanding of how the program works in general. |
| Keywords: | Impact Evaluation, Spillover Effects, Field Experiments, Data Collection, Indirect Treatment Effect, Program Mechanisms |
| JEL: | C93 C81 D62 |
| Date: | 2010–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:idb:spdwps:1003&r=exp |
| By: | De Pauw, A. (Vlerick Leuven Gent Management School) |
| Abstract: | This study investigates how negotiators’ relational orientation, operationalised by their Relational Self-Construal (RSC), and their relationship strength affect negotiation outcomes in dyadic negotiations. To measure this effect, participants are purposely assigned to dyads, according to their levels of relational orientation (high, low or mixed), and report on their relationship strength. They perform a simulated price negotiation exercise, with a buyer and seller condition, resulting in individual and joint economic outcomes and subjective value outcomes. Results demonstrate a main effect of negotiators’ relational orientation on subjective value outcomes. Negotiators from congruent dyads with low relational orientation, obtain lower subjective value negotiation outcomes, than negotiators from dyads with incongruent levels of relational orientation. No significant effect of negotiators’ relational orientation on economic negotiation outcomes can be established. Relational orientation of negotiators and the strength of their relationship does not interact in a significant way. Thus, whether negotiatiors are friends or strangers does not influence the effect of their relational orientation on negotiation outcomes. |
| Keywords: | relational orientation, relationship strength, negotiating dyads, negotiation outcomes |
| Date: | 2010–10–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:vlg:vlgwps:2010-12&r=exp |
| By: | Gaker, David; Zheng, Yanding; Walker, Joan |
| Abstract: | A major aspect of transportation planning is understanding behavior: how to predict it and how to influence it over the long term. Behavioral models in transportation are predominantly rooted in the classic microeconomic paradigm of rationality. However, there is a long history in behavioral economics of raising serious questions about rationality. Behavioral economics has made inroads in transportation in the areas of survey design, prospect theory, and attitudinal variables. Further infusion into transportation could lead to significant benefits in terms of increased ability to both predict and influence behavior. The aim of this research is to investigate the transferability of findings in behavioral economics to transportation, with a focus on lessons regarding personalized information and social influences. We designed and conducted three computer experiments using UC Berkeley students: one on personalized-information and route choice, one on social influences and auto ownership, and one combining information and social influences and pedestrian safety. Our findings suggest high transferability of lessons from behavioral economics and great potential for influencing transport behavior. We found that person- and trip-specific information regarding greenhouse gas emissions has significant potential for increasing sustainable behavior, and we are able to quantify this Value of GREEN at around $0.24/pound of greenhouse gas avoided. Congruent with lessons from behavioral economics, we found that information on peer compliance of pedestrian laws had a stronger influence on pedestrian safety behavior than information on the law, citation rates, or accident statistics. We also found that social influences positively impact the decision to buy a hybrid car over a conventional car or forgo a car altogether. |
| Date: | 2010–08–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cdl:uctcwp:1595380&r=exp |
| By: | Carlsson, Fredrik (Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University); Raun Mørkbak, Morten (Institute of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen); Bøye Olsen, Søren (Institute of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen) |
| Abstract: | This paper addresses the issue of ordering effects in choice experiments, and in particular how learning processes potentially affect respondents’ stated preferences in a sequence of choice sets. In a case study concerning food quality attributes of chicken breast filets, we find evidence of ordering effects in a sequence of 16 choice sets, where the last 8 choice sets are identical to the first 8. The overall preference structure is found to differ significantly between the two identical sequences of choice sets, and significant increases in marginal WTP are found for two out of four attributes. We find a reduction in the error variance for the last 8 choice sets relative to the first 8 choice sets. In particular, this difference is ascribed to the first choice set obtaining a significantly higher error variance than all succeeding choice sets, suggesting institutional learning rather than preference learning effects underlying the observed ordering effect. This is further supported by the fact that the differences in WTP become insignificant when removing the first choice set from the analysis. We find no evidence of fatigue, and we argue that our findings cannot be explained by starting point or strategic behavior effects.<p> |
| Keywords: | Choice Experiments; Fatigue; Learning; Ordering Effects; WTP |
| JEL: | C91 |
| Date: | 2010–10–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:gunwpe:0470&r=exp |
| By: | G. A. VERHAERT; D. VAN DEN POEL |
| Abstract: | Since charitable fundraising relies heavily on direct mail, this paper studies how tailoring donation requests along the donor lifecycle could improve campaign success rate. Our field study provides a unique combination of three parameters whose combined interaction has not been studied to this date: donor segment, suggested personalized donation amount and social comparison, resulting in a 3 x 3 x 2 between-subjects design. Taking into account the donor’s zone of acceptable prices, we show that for acquiring and reactivating donors the use of a recently suggested donation amount is most effective, whereas for retaining donors, it is preferred to use an average amount. Our results also demonstrate that social comparison is an excellent acquisition strategy, but that it could be harmful when reactivating lapsed donors. Social comparison was not found to have an effect on the donation behavior of current donors. |
| Keywords: | suggested donation amount, direct mail, social comparison, charitable fundraising, acquisition, retention, reactivation |
| Date: | 2010–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rug:rugwps:10/666&r=exp |
| By: | Silvia Dominguez Martinez (University of Amsterdam); Randolph Sloof (University of Amsterdam); Ferdinand von Siemens (University of Amsterdam, and CESifo) |
| Abstract: | In this laboratory experiment we study the use of strategic ignorance to delegate real authority within a firm. A worker can gather information on investment projects, while a manager makes the implementation decision. The manager can monitor the worker. This allows her to better exploit the information gathered by the worker, but also reduces the worker's incentives to gather information in the first place. Both effects of monitoring are influenced by the interest alignment between manager and worker. Our data confirms the theoretical predictions that optimal monitoring depends non-monotonically on the level of interest alignment. We also find evidence for hidden costs of control and preferences for control, but these have no substantial effects on organizational outcomes. |
| Keywords: | Delegation; Real Authority; Strategic Ignorance |
| JEL: | D20 D40 D63 D82 J30 |
| Date: | 2010–11–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20100101&r=exp |
| By: | Valeria Faralla; Francesca Benuzzi; Paolo Nichelli; Nicola Dimitri |
| Abstract: | According to recent evidence (Frederick, Loewenstein, & O’Donoghue, 2002), the traditional Discounted Utility model (Samuelson, 1937) has a limited ability to describe realistic models of behaviour and indeed there are several documented empirical regularities that seem to contradict this statement both in certainty and uncertainty conditions. This study focused on one of the best documented anomalies: sign effect or gain-loss asymmetry (Frederick et al., 2002; Loewenstein & Prelec, 1992; Read, 2004). Specifically, the study investigated the intertemporal preference for symmetric monetary rewards and punishments in certain conditions, and the no wealth effects hypothesis (Dimitri, 2007) by asking subjects to choose between two positive or two negative euro amounts available at different points in time. The experimental design applied here followed the same behavioural pattern of the neuroeconomics’ study on monetary rewards realized by McClure et al. (2004). The results confirmed a gain-loss asymmetry at least for medium and large euro amount and suggested new directions of research. |
| Keywords: | intertemporal preferences; gains; losses; certainty; sign effect . |
| JEL: | D90 D91 |
| Date: | 2010–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:usi:labsit:029&r=exp |
| By: | Sergio Sousa (University of Nottingham) |
| Abstract: | Using hypothetical lottery choices to measure risk preferences, Frederick (2005) finds that higher cognitive ability is associated with less risk aversion. This paper documents, however, that when using an incentive compatible measure of risk preference, attitudes towards risk are not associated to cognitive ability as measured by Frederick’s (2005) three-item cognitive reflection test. This is a new finding that adds weight to the claim that lack of proper financial incentives can sometimes be a source of bias. In addition, we show that this lack of association between risk preferences and cognitive ability is robust to using a broader measure of cognitive ability that takes into account both verbal and non-verbal reasoning skills. Our results suggest the possibility that whether cognitive ability relates to attitudes towards risk is sensitive to instruments used to measure both of them. |
| Keywords: | cognitive ability, risk preferences, financial incentives, cognitive reflection test |
| JEL: | C91 D01 D80 D00 |
| Date: | 2010–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cdx:dpaper:2010-17&r=exp |