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on Experimental Economics |
| By: | Martinsson, Peter (Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University); Villegas-Palacio, Clara (Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University) |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates whether disclosure crowds out pro-social behavior using a public goods experiment. In a between-subject design, we investigate different degrees of disclosure. We find a small positive but insignificant effect of disclosure treatments on contributions to the public good. Thus, our empirical findings are consistent with crowding theory.<p> |
| Keywords: | Disclosure; image motivation; public goods experiment |
| JEL: | C91 H41 |
| Date: | 2010–05–18 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:gunwpe:0446&r=exp |
| By: | Timothy Shields (The George L. Argyros School of Business and Economics, Chapman University) |
| Abstract: | This work experimentally examines forecasting and trading behavior. Subjects play the role of both analyst and shareholder over the course of experiments consisting of a series of repeated games with or absent con icts of interest. In a stylized trading setting, I test whether standard equilibrium, normative behavior, or limited strategic reasoning best predicts behavior. In the presence of con icts of interest a substantial proportion of subjects' behavior appears non-skeptical in the role of shareholder, though the same subject is deceptive in the role of analyst. Absent con icts of interest, subjects behavior in the role of shareholder is nearer a best response to the same subject's behavior as analyst. The results are consistent with limited strategic reasoning and suggest that simply disclosing con icts of interest does not evoke skepticism of forecasting, nor does the elimination of con icts of interest in itself induce honesty. |
| Keywords: | Experimental finance, under-reaction, overreaction, behavior, price inertia, risk aversion |
| Date: | 2010–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:chu:wpaper:10-06&r=exp |
| By: | Shaul Almakias (Finance Ministry, Israel); Avi Weiss (Bar-Ilan University) |
| Abstract: | In this paper we import a mainstream psycholgical theory, known as attachment theory, into economics and show the implications of this theory for economic behavior by individuals in the ultimatum bargaining game. Attachment theory examines the psychological tendency to seek proximity to another person, to feel secure when that person is present, and to feel anxious when that person is absent. An individual's attachment style can be classified along two-dimensional axes, one representing attachment "avoidance" and one representing attachment "anxiety". Avoidant people generally feel discomfort when being close to others, have trouble trusting people and distance themselves from intimate or revealing situations. Anxious people have a fear of abandonment and of not being loved. Utilizing attachment theory, we evaluate the connection between attachment types and economic decision making, and find that in an Ultimatum Game both proposers' and responders' behavior can be explained by their attachment styles, as explained by the theory. We believe this theory has implications for economic behavior in different settings, such as negotiations, in general, and more specifically, may help explain behavior, and perhaps even anomalies, in other experimental settings. |
| Keywords: | Attachment Theory, Experimental Economics, Behavioral Economics, Ultimatum Game, Psychology and Economics |
| JEL: | C91 C78 |
| Date: | 2010–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:biu:wpaper:2010-01&r=exp |
| By: | Tonin, Mirco; Vlassopoulos, Michael |
| Abstract: | This paper presents results from a modified dictator experiment aimed at distinguishing and quantifying the two intrinsic motivations for giving: warm glow and pure altruism. In particular, we implemented a within-subject experimental design with three treatments: (i) one, where the recipient is the experimenters, which measures altruistic feelings towards the experimenters (T1), (ii) the Crumpler and Grossman (2008) design in which the recipient is a charity, and the dictator's donation crowds out one-for-one a donation by the experimenters, which aims at measuring warm glow giving (T2), (iii) a third one, with a charity recipient and no crowding out, which elicits both types of altruism (T3). We use T1 to assess to what extent altruistic feelings towards the experimenters are a potential confound for measuring warm glow in T2. We find giving in T1 not to be significantly different from T2, suggesting that the Crumpler and Grossman test is an upper bound estimate of warm glow giving. We provide a lower bound estimate based on the behavior of subjects whose estimate of warm glow giving in T2 is not confounded, that is, those who do not display altruistic feelings towards the experimenters in T1. We use these two estimates to decompose giving in T3 into warm glow and pure altruism and find them to be almost equally important. We also propose a new method of detecting warm glow motivation based on the idea that in a random-lottery incentive (RLI) scheme, such as the one employed here, warm glow benefits accumulate and may lead to satiation, whereas purely altruistic motivation does not. <br><br> Keynames; Dictator game, Warm glow, Pure altruism, Charitable giving <br><br> JEL Classification: C91, D03, D64 |
| Date: | 2010–05–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:stn:sotoec:1008&r=exp |
| By: | Bradley J. Ruffle (Ben-Gurion University); Avi Weiss (Bar-Ilan University); Amir Etziony (Hewlett-Packard Israel) |
| Abstract: | A network market is a market in which the benefit each consumer derives from a good is an increasing function of the number of consumers who own the same or similar goods. A major obstacle that plagues the introduction of a network good is the ability to reach critical mass, namely, the minimum number of buyers required to render purchase worthwhile. This can be likened to a coordination game with multiple Pareto-ranked equilibria. We introduce an experimental paradigm to study consumers' ability to coordinate on purchasing the network good. Our results highlight the central importance of the level of the critical mass. |
| Keywords: | Experimental economics, network goods, coordination game, critical mass |
| JEL: | C92 L19 |
| Date: | 2010–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:biu:wpaper:2010-03&r=exp |
| By: | Schade, Christian; Schroeder, Andreas; Krause, Kai Oliver |
| Abstract: | We analyze the effects of prior gain and loss experiences on individualsâ behavior in two coordination games: battle of the sexes and simultaneous market entry. We propose subjectively transformed games that integrate elements of prospect theory, aggregation of prior and subsequent payoffs, and social projection. Mathematical predictions of behavior are derived based on equilibrium selection concepts. Malesâ behavior in our experimental studies is largely consistent with our predictions. However, the behavior of many female respondents appears to be rather consistent with interpreting the initial random lottery outcomes used to manipulate prior experiences as a signal for the playersâ abilities to compete. This could be related to femalesâ known uneasiness of competing against counterparts that might be male and thus, a generally higher salience of rivalry in our incentivized experiments. Females also chose to play far more mixed strategies than males indicating some uncertainty about what type of behavior is appropriate. |
| Keywords: | Prospect Game Theory, Prior Outcomes, Coordination, Equilibrium Selection, Economic Experiment, Agribusiness, Agricultural and Food Policy, Financial Economics, Institutional and Behavioral Economics, Research Methods/ Statistical Methods, Risk and Uncertainty, |
| Date: | 2010–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:huscpw:59524&r=exp |
| By: | Alexander Smith |
| Abstract: | This paper examines how group composition affects conditional cooperation in a repeated voluntary contribution mechanism linear public good game. Identity was created using a team-building activity and subjects were assigned to groups of six consisting of a varying number of subjects from two teams. Contributions to the public good were decreasing in polarization within the group and were higher among majority members than minority members. Also, the relationships between contributions and beliefs about the contributions of others indicate that conditional cooperation was stronger among subjects from the same team than among subjects from different teams. |
| JEL: | C7 C9 H4 |
| Date: | 2010–01–19 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:clg:wpaper:2010-11&r=exp |
| By: | Balafoutas, Loukas (University of Innsbruck); Sutter, Matthias (University of Innsbruck, University of Gothenburg and IZA Bonn) |
| Abstract: | Recent research has shown that women shy away from competition more often than men. We evaluate experimentally three alternative policy interventions to promote women in competitions: Quotas, Preferential Treatment, and Repetition of the Competition unless a critical number of female winners is reached. We find that Quotas and Preferential Treatment encourage women to compete significantly more often than in a control treatment, while efficiency in selecting the best candidates as winners is not worse. The level of cooperation in a post-competition teamwork task is even higher with successful policy interventions. Hence, policy measures promoting women can have a double dividend.<p> |
| Keywords: | Competition; gender gap; experiment; affirmative action; teamwork; coordination |
| JEL: | C91 |
| Date: | 2010–05–18 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:gunwpe:0450&r=exp |
| By: | Patel, Amrish (Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University); Cartwright, Edward (Department of Economics, Keynes College, University of Kent); Mark, Van Vugt (Department of Work and Organizational Psychology, VU University Amsterdam) |
| Abstract: | Individuals often have legitimate but publicly unobservable reasons for not partaking in cooperative social endeavours. This means others who lack legitimate reasons may then have the opportunity to behave uncooperatively, i.e. free-ride, and be indistinguishable from those with legitimate reasons. Free-riders have a degree of anonymity. In the context of a public good game we consider the e¤ect of free-rider anonymity on the ability of voluntary punishment to sustain cooperative social norms. Despite only inducing a weak form of free-rider anonymity, punishment falls and cannot sustain cooperation.<p> |
| Keywords: | Anonymity; free-riding; public goods experiment; punishment |
| JEL: | C92 D82 H41 |
| Date: | 2010–05–19 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:gunwpe:0451&r=exp |
| By: | Christoph Engel (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods); Bettina Rockenbach (University of Erfurt and Center for empirical research in economics and behavioral science (CEREB)) |
| Abstract: | Public good provision is often local and also affects bystanders. Is provision harder if contributions harm bystanders, and is provision easier if outsiders gain a windfall profit? In an experiment we observe that both positive and negative externalities reduce provision levels whenever actors risk falling back behind bystanders. The mere presence of unaffected bystanders already dampens contributions. The explanation of observed behavior seems to be the interaction of conditional cooperation and concerns for comparative performance. Individual payoff comparisons to the other actors as well as to individual bystanders drive contributions down, as do unfavorable comparisons at the group level. |
| Keywords: | Public Good, Externality, Conditional Cooperation, Inequity Aversion |
| JEL: | C91 C92 D43 D62 H23 H41 L13 |
| Date: | 2010–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2009_29&r=exp |
| By: | Vranceanu, Radu (ESSEC Business School); Sutan, Angela (ESC Dijon Bourgogne); Dubart, Delphine (ESSEC Business School) |
| Abstract: | In this paper we show that if a very small, exogenously given probability of terminating the exchange is introduced in an elementary investment game, reciprocators play more often the defection strategy. Everything happens as if they "hide behind probabilities" in order to break the trust relationship. Investors do no not seem able to internalize the reciprocators' change in behavior. This could explain why trades involving an exogenous risk of value destruction, such as financial transactions, provide an unfavorable environment for trust-building |
| Keywords: | Experimental Economics; Financial Transactions; Investment Game; Objective Risk; Trust |
| JEL: | C90 D81 G00 |
| Date: | 2010–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ebg:essewp:dr-10007&r=exp |
| By: | Sandri, Serena; Schade, Christian; Musshoff, Oliver; Odening, Martin |
| Abstract: | Disinvestment, in the sense of project termination and liquidation of assets including the cession of a venture, is an important realm of entrepreneurial decision-making. This study presents the results of an experimental investigation modeling the choice to disinvest as a dynamic problem of optimal stopping in which the patterns of decisions are analyzed with entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs. Our experimental results reject the standard net present value approach as an account of observed behavior. Instead, most individuals seem to understand the value of waiting. Their choices are weakly related to the disinvestment triggers derived from a formal optimal stopping benchmark consistent with real options reasoning. We also observe a pronounced âpsychological inertiaâ, i.e., most individuals hold on to a losing project for even longer than real options reasoning would predict. The study provides evidence for entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs being quite similar in their behavior. |
| Keywords: | Real-Options, Disinvestment, Exit Behavior, Experimental Economics, Agribusiness, Agricultural and Food Policy, Agricultural Finance, Institutional and Behavioral Economics, |
| Date: | 2010–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:huscpw:59518&r=exp |
| By: | Choi, S.; Lee, J. |
| Abstract: | We study experimentally how the network structure and length of pre-play communication affect behavior and outcome in a multi-player coordination game with conflicting preferences. Network structure matters but the interaction between network and time effects is more subtle. Under each time treatment, substantial variations are observed in both the rate of coordination and distribution of coordinated outcomes across networks. But, increasing the communication length improves both efficiency and equity of coordination. In all treatments, coordination is mostly explained by convergence in communication. We also identify behaviors that explain variations in the distribution of coordinated outcomes both within and across networks. |
| Date: | 2009–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ner:ucllon:http://eprints.ucl.ac.uk/18895/&r=exp |
| By: | Christine Binzel; Dietmar Fehr |
| Abstract: | While social relationships play an important role for individuals to cope with missing market institutions, they also limit individuals' range of trading partners. This paper aims at understanding the determinants of trust at various social distances when information asymmetries are present. Among participants from an informal housing area in Cairo we find that the increase in trust following a reduction in social distance comes from the fact that trustors are much more inclined to follow their beliefs when interacting with their friend. When interacting with an ex-ante unknown agent instead, the decision to trust is mainly driven by social preferences. Nevertheless, trustors underestimate their friend's intrinsic motivation to cooperate, leading to a loss in social welfare. We relate this to the agents' inability to signal their trustworthiness in an environment characterized by strong social norms. |
| Keywords: | trust, hidden action, social distance, solidarity, reciprocity, economic development |
| JEL: | C72 C93 D82 O12 |
| Date: | 2010–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hum:wpaper:sfb649dp2010-028&r=exp |
| By: | Costa-Gomes, M.A.; Huck, S.; Weizsäcker, G. |
| Abstract: | In many economic contexts, an elusive variable of interest is the agent's expectation about relevant events, e.g. about other agents' behavior. Recent experimental studies as well as surveys have asked participants to state their beliefs explicitly, but little is known about the causal relation between beliefs and other behavioral variables. This paper discusses the possibility of creating exogenous instrumental variables for belief statements, by shifting the probabilities of the relevant events. We conduct trust game experiments where the amount sent back by the second player (trustee) is exogenously varied by a random process, in a way that informs only the first player (trustor) about the realized variation. The procedure allows detecting causal links from beliefs to actions under plausible assumptions. The IV estimates indicate a signi ficant causal effect, comparable to the connection between beliefs and actions that is suggested by OLS analyses. |
| Date: | 2010–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ner:ucllon:http://eprints.ucl.ac.uk/19473/&r=exp |