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on Experimental Economics |
| By: | Ralph-C Bayer (School of Economics, University of Adelaide); Elke Renner (School of Economics, University of Nottingham); Rupert Sausgruber (Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen) |
| Abstract: | We use a limited information environment to mimic the state of confusion in an experimental, repeated public goods game. The results show that reinforcement learning leads to dynamics similar to those observed in standard public goods games. However, closer inspection shows that individual decay of contributions in standard public goods games cannot be fully explained by reinforcement learning. According to our estimates, learning only accounts for 41 percent of the decay in contributions in standard public goods games. The contribution dynamics of subjects, who are identi?ed as conditional cooperators, di®er strongly from the learning dynamics, while a learning model estimated from the limited information treatment tracks behavior for subjects, who cannot be classi?ed as conditional cooperators, reasonably well. |
| Keywords: | public goods experiments, learning, limited information, confusion, conditional cooperation |
| JEL: | C90 D83 H41 |
| Date: | 2009–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cdx:dpaper:2009-18&r=exp |
| By: | Volodymyr Lugovskyy; Daniela Puzzello; Steven Tucker (University of Canterbury) |
| Abstract: | We report the results of an experiment designed to study the role of institutional structure in the formation of bubbles and crashes in laboratory asset markets. In a setting employing double auctions and call markets as trading institutions, bubbles and crashes are a quite robust phenomenon. The only factor appearing to reduce bubbles is experience across markets. In this study, we employ the tâtonnement trading institution, which has not been previously explored in laboratory asset markets. The results show that bubbles are eliminated, suggesting that the trading institution plays a crucial role in the formation of bubbles. |
| Keywords: | Bubbles; Trading Institutions; Pricing Mechanisms; Tâtonnement |
| JEL: | C91 |
| Date: | 2009–11–20 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cbt:econwp:09/19&r=exp |
| By: | Simon Gaechter (Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx), University of Nottingham); Daniele Nosenzo (Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx), University of Nottingham); Elke Renner (Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx), University of Nottingham); Martin Sefton (Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx), University of Nottingham) |
| Abstract: | We examine the characteristics of effective leaders in a simple leader-follower voluntary contributions game. We focus on two factors: the individual’s cooperativeness and the individual’s beliefs about the cooperativeness of others. We find that groups perform best when led by those who are cooperatively inclined. Partly this reflects a false consensus effect: cooperative leaders are more optimistic than non-cooperators about the cooperativeness of followers. However, cooperative leaders contribute more than non-cooperative leaders even after controlling for optimism. We conclude that differing leader contributions by differing types of leader in large part reflects social motivations. |
| JEL: | A13 C92 |
| Date: | 2009–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cdx:dpaper:2009-19&r=exp |
| By: | Juan-Camilo Cárdenas; Miguel Andrés Espinosa; Sandra Polanía Reyes |
| Abstract: | Altruism, understood as the individual disposition to sacrifice personal income to improve someone else’s income can be a rational choice strategy which responds to different motivations, incentives and institutions, in a consistent way with the donor’s optimization logic. In this article we extend the Andreoni and Miller’s experimental design (2002) using a modified Dictator game and we applied it to 470 students from several universities and different majors, years of study and level of income who can donate part of their income to the Bella Flor Foundation (http://www.bellaflor.org/), a real nonprofit organization founded by a group of college students whose mission is “to promote the integral development of the children from Bella Flor, Paraíso and Mirador neighborhoods through social activities in education, health care, recreation, and exalting human values”. We test the consistency of the player’s decisions with the axioms of revealed preferences, and with the effects of relative prices and income. We also evaluate the violation of consistency of the axioms and estimate the demand functions for altruism towards this charity, with policy implications related to the optimal design for fundraising strategies. Our results confirm that a significant fraction of individuals show consistent decisions, i.e. that donations to these charities behave as “normal goods” in price and income effects and with rather small number of violations of the axioms of revealed preferences. However, the experimental data suggests that revealing the identity of the donor can decrease altruism and induce more violations of the axioms of consistent behavior mentioned. |
| Date: | 2009–11–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:col:000089:006149&r=exp |
| By: | Nicholas E. Burger; Charles D. Kolstad |
| Abstract: | The literature on voluntary provision of public goods includes recent theoretical work on the formation of voluntary coalitions to provide public goods. Theory is ambiguous on the equilibrium coalition size and contribution rates. We examine the emergence of coalitions, their size, and how uncertainty in public goods provision affects contribution levels and coalition size. We find that contributions decrease when public good returns are uncertain but increase when individuals can form a coalition to provide the good. Contrary a core theoretical result, we find that coalition size increases when the public good benefits are higher. Uncertainty has no effect on coalition size. |
| JEL: | C7 C91 C92 H23 H4 H41 Q5 Q54 |
| Date: | 2009–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:15543&r=exp |