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on Experimental Economics |
| By: | Muriel Niederle; Alvin E. Roth; M. Utku Ãœnver |
| Abstract: | Markets sometimes unravel, with offers becoming inefficiently early. Often this is attributed to competition arising from an imbalance of demand and supply, typically excess demand for workers. However this presents a puzzle, since unraveling can only occur when firms are willing to make early offers and workers are willing to accept them. We present a model and experiment in which workers' quality becomes known only in the late part of the market. However, in equilibrium, matching can occur (inefficiently) early only when there is comparable demand and supply: a surplus of applicants, but a shortage of high quality applicants. |
| JEL: | C78 C9 C92 |
| Date: | 2009–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:15006&r=exp |
| By: | Steven D. Levitt; John A. List |
| Abstract: | The “Hawthorne effect,†a concept familiar to all students of social science, has had a profound influence both on the direction and design of research over the past 75 years. The Hawthorne effect is named after a landmark set of studies conducted at the Hawthorne plant in the 1920s. The first and most influential of these studies is known as the “Illumination Experiment.†Both academics and popular writers commonly summarize the results as showing that every change in light, even those that made the room dimmer, had the effect of increasing productivity. The data from the illumination experiments, however, were never formally analyzed and were thought to have been destroyed. Our research has uncovered these data. We find that existing descriptions of supposedly remarkable data patterns prove to be entirely fictional. There are, however, hints of more subtle manifestations of a Hawthorne effect in the original data. |
| JEL: | A0 C91 C92 C93 L22 |
| Date: | 2009–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:15016&r=exp |
| By: | Martin J Osborne; Ariel Rubinstein |
| Date: | 2009–05–21 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levrem:814577000000000225&r=exp |
| By: | David M. McEvoy |
| Abstract: | Most coalitions that form to increase contributions to a public good do not require full participation by all users of the public good, and therefore create incentives for free riding. If given the opportunity to opt out of a voluntary coalition, in theory, agents should try to be among the first to do so, forcing the remaining undecided agents to bear the cost of participating in the coalition. This study tests the predicted sequence of participation decisions in voluntary coalitions using real-time threshold public goods experiments. We find that subjects’ behavior is more consistent with the theoretical predictions when the difference in payoffs between coalition members and free-riding non-members is relatively large. Key Words: voluntary coalitions, voluntary agreements, public goods experiments, free riding |
| JEL: | H41 C92 C72 Q50 |
| Date: | 2009 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:apl:wpaper:09-14&r=exp |
| By: | Attila Ambrus (Department of Economics, Harvard University); Ben Greiner (School of Economics, University of New South Wales); Parag Pathak (Department of Economics, MIT) |
| Abstract: | We revisit the phenomenon that group decisions differ systematically from decisions of individuals. Our experiment solicits individual and group decisions from the same subjects in two settings, gift-exchange games and lottery choices. With no deliberation and voting, the group decision is determined by the median individual decision, without a shift. With deliberation but no imposed decision rule, the individual one po- sition towards the selfish direction also becomes influential. In lottery choices we find no group shift relative to the median. We demonstrate that the standard practice of comparing means of group and individual decisions would incorrectly identify a level shift. |
| Keywords: | Decision making, lottery, risky choices |
| Date: | 2009–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ads:wpaper:0091&r=exp |
| By: | Boone, J.; Müller, W.; Suetens, S. (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research) |
| Abstract: | We report experimental results on exclusive dealing inspired by the literature on "naked exclusion". Our key findings are: First, exclusion of a more efficient entrant is a widespread phenomenon in lab markets. Second, allowing incumbents to discriminate between buyers increases exclusion rates compared to the non-discriminatory case only when payments to buyers can be offered sequentially and secretly. Third, allowing discrimination does not lead to significant decreases in costs of exclusion. Accounting for the observation that buyers are more likely to accept an exclusive deal the higher is the payment, substantially improves the fit between theoretical predictions and observed behavior. |
| Keywords: | exclusive dealing;entry deterrence;foreclosure;contracts;externalities;coordination;experiments. |
| JEL: | C91 L12 L42 |
| Date: | 2009 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200930&r=exp |
| By: | Boone, Jan; Müller, Wieland; Suetens, Sigrid |
| Abstract: | We report experimental results on exclusive dealing inspired by the literature on "naked exclusion.'' Our key findings are: First, exclusion of a more efficient entrant is a widespread phenomenon in lab markets. Second, allowing incumbents to discriminate between buyers increases exclusion rates compared to the non-discriminatory case only when payments to buyers can be offered sequentially and secretly. Third, allowing discrimination does not lead to significant decreases in costs of exclusion. Accounting for the observation that buyers are more likely to accept an exclusive deal the higher is the payment, substantially improves the fit between theoretical predictions and observed behavior. |
| Keywords: | coordination; entry deterrence; exclusive dealing; experiments; externalities; foreclosure |
| JEL: | C91 L12 L42 |
| Date: | 2009–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:7303&r=exp |