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on Experimental Economics |
| By: | Andreas Blume; John Duffy; April Mitchell Franco |
| Abstract: | . . . |
| Date: | 2008–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pit:wpaper:382&r=exp |
| By: | Angelo Antoci; Paolo Russu; Luca Zarri |
| Abstract: | Experimental evidence indicates that free riders and strongly reciprocal papers coexist in the public goods game framework. By means of an evolutionary analysis, we provide an endogenization of this behavioral regularity. |
| Keywords: | Free Riding, Cooperation, Strong Reciprocity, Public Goods Game, Evolutionary Game Theory. |
| JEL: | B41 C73 D74 Z13 |
| Date: | 2009–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ver:wpaper:54&r=exp |
| By: | Angelo Antoci; Paolo Russu; Luca Zarri |
| Abstract: | An oft-cited and robust result from Public Goods Game experiments is that, when subjects start playing, the aggregate level of contributions is significantly different from zero. At the same time, a sizeable proportion of players free ride from the outset. Behavioural economics has persuasively shown that these laboratory findings are compatible with the presence of motivationally heterogeneous agents, displaying both standard, self-centred preferences and non-standard, interdependent preferences. However, at the theoretical level, economists would prefer to account for motivational heterogeneity endogenously, instead of simply assuming it from the outset. Our work provides such endogenisation, by assuming that social evolution is driven by material payoffs only. By separately focusing on different types of ‘experimentally salient’ pro-social players (such as Reciprocators, Strong Reciprocators and Altruists), we are able to shed light – to our knowledge, for the first time, within the public good framework – on the evolutionary stability of two-type populations consisting of positive proportions of both ‘nice’ and ‘mean’ guys. |
| Keywords: | Free Riding; Strong Reciprocity; Altruism; Nonstrategic Punishment; Public Goods Game; Evolutionary Game Theory. |
| JEL: | C7 D6 H8 Z1 |
| Date: | 2009–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ver:wpaper:55&r=exp |
| By: | Holgar Müller (Faculty of Economics and Management, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg); Eike Benjamin Kroll (Faculty of Economics and Management, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg); Bodo Vogt (Faculty of Economics and Management, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg) |
| Abstract: | This study investigates context effects in general and the compromise effect in particular. It is argued that earlier research in this area lacks realism which is a major drawback to research conclusions and stated management implications. The importance of this issue is stressed by previous research showing that behavioral anomalies found in hypothetical experimental settings tend to be significantly reduced when real payoff mechanisms are introduced. Therefore, to validate the compromise effect, an enhanced experimental design is presented with participants making choices in the laboratory that are binding. We find that the compromise effect holds for real purchase decisions, and therefore is validated and not an artificial effect in surveys on hypothetical buying decisions. While conclusions and implications for marketing managers derived in previous work assume that context effects hold for real market decisions, the results created by this enhanced design close this gap in marketing literature. |
| Keywords: | choice in context, compromise effect, irrelevant alternatives, hypothetical bias, experimental design |
| Date: | 2009–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mag:wpaper:09009&r=exp |
| By: | Bruce Ian Carlin; David T. Robinson |
| Abstract: | Psychologists study regret primarily by measuring subjects' attitudes in laboratory experiments. This does not shed light on how expected regret affects economic actions in market settings. To address this, we use proprietary data from a blackjack table in Las Vegas to analyze how expected regret affects peoples''decisions during gambles. Even among a group of people who choose to participate in a risk-taking activity, we find strong evidence of an economically significant omission bias: players incur substantial losses by playing too conservatively. This behavior is prevalent even among large stakes gamblers, and becomes more severe following previous aggressive play, suggesting a rebound effect after aggressive play. |
| Date: | 2009–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:14955&r=exp |
| By: | Eike B. Kroll (Faculty of Economics and Management, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg); Bodo Vogt (Faculty of Economics and Management, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg) |
| Abstract: | The St. Petersburg is one of the oldest violations of expected utility theory. Thus far, explanations of the paradox aim at small probabili- ties being perceived as zero and the boundedness of utility. This paper provides experimental results showing that neither risk attitudes nor perception of small probabilities explain the paradox. We nd that even in situations where subjects are risk-seeking, the St. Petersburg Paradox exists. This indicates that the paradox lies at the very core of human decision-making processes and cannot be explained by the parameters discussed in previous research so far. |
| Date: | 2009–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mag:wpaper:09004&r=exp |
| By: | Timo Heinrich; Thomas Riechmann; Joachim Weimann (Faculty of Economics and Management, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg) |
| Abstract: | We use modified dictator games in which the productivity of taking or giving is varied. Subjects have to decide which of the different games will be payoff relevant in the end. We can show that the behavior of dictators does not depend on the productivity of their gifts, but that their behavior is strongly influenced by the right to choose the relevant game. If the recipients have the right to choose, the dictators become more generous. |
| Date: | 2009–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mag:wpaper:09008&r=exp |
| By: | M. Vittoria Levati; Ro’i Zultan |
| Abstract: | This paper provides a new way to identify conditional cooperation in a real-time version of the standard voluntary contribution mechanism. Our approach avoids most drawbacks of the traditional procedures because it relies on endogenous cycle lengths, which are defined by the number of contributors a player waits before committing to a further contribution. Based on hypothetical distributions of randomly generated contribution sequences, we provide strong evidence for conditionally cooperative behavior. Moreover, notwithstanding a decline in contributions, conditional cooperation is found to be stable over time. |
| Date: | 2009–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:huj:dispap:dp511&r=exp |
| By: | Behaghel, Luc (CREST-INSEE); Crépon, Bruno (CREST-INSEE); Gurgand, Marc (CREST-INSEE); Le Barbanchon, Thomas (CREST-INSEE) |
| Abstract: | The randomized trial literature has helped to renew the fields of microeconometric policy evaluation by emphasizing identification issues raised by endogenous program participation. Measurement and attrition issues have perhaps received less attention. This paper analyzes the dramatic impact of sample attrition in a large job search experiment. We take advantage of two independent surveys on the same initial sample of 8, 000 persons. The first one is a long telephone survey that had a strikingly low and unbalanced response rate of about 50%. The second one is a combination of administrative data and a short telephone survey targeted at those leaving the unemployment registers; this enriched data source has a balanced and much higher response rate (about 80%). With naive estimates that neglect non responses, these two sources yield puzzlingly different results. Using the enriched administrative data as benchmark, we find evidence that estimates from the long telephone survey lack external and internal validity. We turn to existing methods to bound the effects in the presence of sample selection; we extend them to the context of randomization with imperfect compliance. The bounds obtained from the two surveys are compatible but those from the long telephone survey are somewhat uninformative. We conclude on the consequences for data collection strategies. |
| Keywords: | randomized evaluation, survey non response, bounds |
| JEL: | C31 C93 J68 |
| Date: | 2009–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp4162&r=exp |
| By: | John Cawley; Joshua A. Price |
| Abstract: | Obesity rates in the U.S. have doubled since 1980. Given the medical, social, and financial costs of obesity, a large percentage of Americans are attempting to lose weight at any given time but the vast majority of weight loss attempts fail. Researchers continue to search for safe and effective methods of weight loss, and this paper examines one promising method - offering financial rewards for weight loss. This paper studies data on 2,407 employees in 17 worksites who participated in a year-long worksite health promotion program that offered financial rewards for weight loss. The intervention varied by employer, in some cases offering steady quarterly rewards for weight loss and in other cases requiring participants to post a bond that would be refunded at year’s end conditional on achieving certain weight loss goals. Still others received no financial incentives at all and serve as a control group. We examine the basic patterns of enrollment, attrition, and weight loss in these three groups. Weight loss is modest. After one year, it averages 1.4 pounds for those paid steady quarterly rewards and 3.6 pounds for those who posted a refundable bond, under the assumption that dropouts experienced no weight loss. Year-end attrition is as high as 76.4%, far higher than that for interventions designed and implemented by researchers. |
| JEL: | D01 I1 J01 |
| Date: | 2009–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:14987&r=exp |
| By: | Dominique Ami (GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - Université de la Méditerranée - Aix-Marseille II - Université Paul Cézanne - Aix-Marseille III - Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales - CNRS : UMR6579); Frédéric Aprahamian (GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - Université de la Méditerranée - Aix-Marseille II - Université Paul Cézanne - Aix-Marseille III - Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales - CNRS : UMR6579); Olivier Chanel (GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - Université de la Méditerranée - Aix-Marseille II - Université Paul Cézanne - Aix-Marseille III - Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales - CNRS : UMR6579); Stephane Luchini (GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - Université de la Méditerranée - Aix-Marseille II - Université Paul Cézanne - Aix-Marseille III - Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales - CNRS : UMR6579) |
| Abstract: | We explore the influence of a neutral cheap talk script in three typical scenarios used in the CV literature devoted to the valuation of air pollution effects. We show that cheap talk has a differentiated effect depending on the scenario implemented. It decreases protest responses with no effect on WTP values in the scenario based on a new drug. When a move to a less polluted city is involved, it has no effect on protest responses but decreases WTP values. Surprisingly, cheap talk increases protest responses but decreases WTP values when new regional air pollution regulations are at stake. |
| Keywords: | Willingness to pay ; contingent valuation ; cheap talk ; context ; field experiment ; air pollution |
| Date: | 2009–05–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00382511_v1&r=exp |
| By: | Marcus Heldmann (Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg); Ralf Morgenstern (Faculty of Economics and Management, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg); Thomas Münte (Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg); Bodo Vogt (Faculty of Economics and Management, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg) |
| Abstract: | This paper focuses on the problem of probability weighing in the evaluation of lotteries. According to Prospect Theory a probability of 0.5 has a weight of smaller than 0.5. We conduct an EEG experiment in which we compare the results of the evaluation of binary lotteries by certainty equivalents with the results of the bisection method. The bisection method gives the amount of money that corresponds to the midpoint of the utilities of the two payoffs in a binary lottery as it has been shown previously. In this method probabilities are not evaluated. We analyzed EEG data focused on whether a probability is evaluated or not. Our data show differences between the two methods connected with the attention towards sure monetary payoffs, but they do not show brain activity connected with a devaluation of the probability of 0.5. |
| Date: | 2009–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mag:wpaper:09003&r=exp |