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on Experimental Economics |
| By: | Sebastian J. Goerg; Thorsten Chmura; Reinhard Selten |
| Abstract: | In this paper we introduce four new learning models: impulse balance learning, impulse matching learning, action-sampling learning, and payoff-sampling learning. With this models and together with the models of self- tuning EWA learning and reinforcement learning, we conduct simulations over 12 different 2×2 games and compare the results with experimental data obtained by Selten & Chmura (2008). Our results are two-fold: While the simulations, especially those with action-sampling learning and impulse matching learning successfully replicate the experimental data on the aggregate, they fail in describing the individual behavior. A simple inertia rule beats the learning models in describing individuals behavior. |
| Keywords: | Learning, Action-sampling, Payo?-sampling, Impulse balance, Impulse matching, Reinforcement, self-tuning EWA, 2×2 games, Experimental data |
| JEL: | C72 C91 C92 |
| Date: | 2008–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse18_2008&r=exp |
| By: | Werner Güth (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena, Germany); Hartmut Kliemt (Frankfurt School of Finance & Management, Frankfurt am Main, Germany); M. Vittoria Levatia (Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Metodi Matematici, University of Bari, Italy) |
| Abstract: | Human decision making is a process guided by different and partly competing motivations that can each dominate behavior and lead to different effects depending on strength and circumstances. "Over-stylizing" neglects such competing concerns and context-dependence, although it facilitates the emergence of elaborate general theories. We illustrate by examples from social dilemma experiments and inequality aversion theories that sweeping empirical claims should be avoided. |
| Keywords: | Context-dependent preferences, Experimental economics, Equity theories. |
| JEL: | A11 D63 D70 |
| Date: | 2008–12–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2008-092&r=exp |
| By: | Freeman, Richard B.; Gelber, Alexander M. |
| Abstract: | This paper examines behavior in a tournament in which we vary the tournament prize structure and the information available about participants' skill at the task of solving mazes. The number of solved mazes is lowest when payments are independent of performance; higher when a single, large prize is given; and highest when multiple, differentiated prizes are given. This result is strongest when we inform participants about the number of mazes they and others solved in a pre-tournament round. Some participants reported that they solved more mazes than they actually solved, and this misreporting also peaked with multiple differentiated prizes. |
| Keywords: | Tournaments; Wage Structure |
| JEL: | J22 D01 J33 |
| Date: | 2008–12–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:12156&r=exp |
| By: | Dimitri Dubois (LAMETA (UMR CNRS 5474), Université Montpellier 1, avenue de la mer, site Richter, C.S. 79606, 34960 Montpellier cédex 2, France.); Marc Willinger (LAMETA (UMR CNRS 5474), Université Montpellier 1, avenue de la mer, site Richter, C.S. 79606, 34960 Montpellier cédex 2, France.); Phu Nguyen-Van (THEMA-CNRS, Université de Cergy-Pontoise, 33 Boulevard du Port, F-95011 Cergy-Pontoise Cedex, France.) |
| Abstract: | We compare the experimental results of three stag-hunt games. In contrast to Battalio et al. (2001), our design keeps the riskiness ratio of the payoff-dominant and the risk-dominant strategies at a constant level as the optimisation premium is increased. We define the riskiness ratio as the relative payoff range of the two strategies. We find that decreasing the riskiness ratio while keeping the optimization premium constant increases sharply the frequency of the risk-dominant strategy. On the other hand an increase of the optimization premium with a constant riskiness ratio has no effect on the choice frequencies. Finally, we confirm the dynamic properties found by Battalio et al. that increasing the optimization premium favours best-response and sensitivity to the history of play. |
| Keywords: | Coordination game; Game theory; Experimental economics. |
| JEL: | C72 C92 D81 |
| Date: | 2008–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dpc:wpaper:0209&r=exp |
| By: | Tobias Brünner (Institut zur Erforschung der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung, Albert-Ludwigs-Universität); Rene Levinsky (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena, Germany) |
| Abstract: | The unmediated call auction is a useful trading mechanism to aggregate dispersed information. Its ability to incorporate information of a single informed insider, however, is less well understood. We analyse this question by presenting a simple call auction game where both auction prices and limit prices of uninformed traders re?ect potential insider information. The predictions of the model are tested in the laboratory. While an insider improves the call auction outcomes in terms of increasing trading volume, uninformed traders fail to incorporate the (potential) insider information in their limit prices. We also derive an equilibrium relationship between auction returns and transaction costs similar to the relations that can be found in market microstructure models of continuous markets and which are commonly applied to estimate transaction costs. The experiment provides a good environment to assess the usefulness of this method to estimate transaction costs. |
| Keywords: | call auction, asymmetric information, experiment, market microstructure |
| JEL: | C92 G14 D82 |
| Date: | 2008–12–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2008-090&r=exp |
| By: | Colombo, Sergio; Hanley, Nick; Louviere, Jordan |
| Abstract: | Stated choice models based on the random utility framework are becoming increasingly popular in the applied economics literature. The need to account for respondents' preference heterogeneity in such models has motivated researchers in agricultural, environmental, health and transport economics to apply random parameter logit and latent class models. In most of the published literature these models incorporate heterogeneity in preferences through the systematic component of utility. An alternative approach is to investigate heterogeneity through the random component of utility, and covariance heterogeneity models are one means of doing this. In this paper we compare these alternative ways of incorporating preference heterogeneity in stated choice models and evaluate how the selection of approach affects welfare estimates in a given empirical application. We find that a Latent Class approach fits our data best but all the models perform well in terms of out-of-sample predictions. Finally, we discuss what criteria a researcher can use to decide which approach is most appropriate for a given data set. |
| Keywords: | choice experiments; covariance heterogeneity model; agri-environmental policy; landscape values; latent class model; preference heterogeneity; random parameter logit model; error component models; welfare measure s |
| Date: | 2008–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:stl:stledp:2008-28&r=exp |