nep-exp New Economics Papers
on Experimental Economics
Issue of 2008‒05‒05
four papers chosen by
Daniel Houser
George Mason University

  1. Experimental Economics: A Revolution in Understanding Behaviour By Jim Engle-Warnick; Sonia Laszlo
  2. Looking Awkward When Winning and Foolish When Losing: Inequity Aversion and Performance in the Field By Benno Torgler; Markus Schaffner; Bruno S. Frey; Sascha L. Schmidt
  3. Does a Disadvantaged Candidate Choose an Extremist Position? By Soubeyran, R.
  4. Mechanism Design: How to Implement Social Goals By Maskin, Eric S.

  1. By: Jim Engle-Warnick; Sonia Laszlo
    Abstract: What is the best compensation package to offer employees? How should choice among investments in pension plans be structured? Should a government use auctions to sell natural resources? Is it possible to design a market to reduce non-point source pollution in Quebec’s watersheds? What holds people back from trying technologies that are completely new to them? <br> Over the last two decades a revolution has occurred in the advancement of our ability to answer questions such as these. This revolution is called experimental economics. Experimental economics is the use of a controlled laboratory environment to understand decisions people make. In an economics experiment, people make decisions in a laboratory. They are paid according to the outcome of their decisions, and their decisions are analyzed to determine the effect of an institutional or environmental change that is being tested.<br> Through the analysis of behaviour in controlled economics experiments, much has been learned about behaviour when outcomes are uncertain: for example, new notions about preferences toward risk and consumption over time have been developed. Much has also been learned about how people behave in strategic environments: for example, bidding behaviour in auctions is better understood, and the strategies people use as they learn how to trust each other have been observed. <br> The purpose of this report is to describe the methodology of experimental economics and to detail its major uses. We will focus on the ability to measure behaviours in a wide variety of situations important to organizations. We will show, with examples from our own work, how feedback between the laboratory and the field can result in new understanding of decisions in an effort to affect the cycle of poverty in a developing country in fundamentally new ways. <P> What is the best compensation package to offer employees? How should choice among investments in pension plans be structured? Should a government use auctions to sell natural resources? Is it possible to design a market to reduce non-point source pollution in Quebec’s watersheds? What holds people back from trying technologies that are completely new to them? <br> Over the last two decades a revolution has occurred in the advancement of our ability to answer questions such as these. This revolution is called experimental economics. Experimental economics is the use of a controlled laboratory environment to understand decisions people make. In an economics experiment, people make decisions in a laboratory. They are paid according to the outcome of their decisions, and their decisions are analyzed to determine the effect of an institutional or environmental change that is being tested.<br> Through the analysis of behaviour in controlled economics experiments, much has been learned about behaviour when outcomes are uncertain: for example, new notions about preferences toward risk and consumption over time have been developed. Much has also been learned about how people behave in strategic environments: for example, bidding behaviour in auctions is better understood, and the strategies people use as they learn how to trust each other have been observed. <br> The purpose of this report is to describe the methodology of experimental economics and to detail its major uses. We will focus on the ability to measure behaviours in a wide variety of situations important to organizations. We will show, with examples from our own work, how feedback between the laboratory and the field can result in new understanding of decisions in an effort to affect the cycle of poverty in a developing country in fundamentally new ways.
    Date: 2008–04–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cir:cirbur:2008rb-01&r=exp
  2. By: Benno Torgler; Markus Schaffner; Bruno S. Frey; Sascha L. Schmidt
    Abstract: The experimental literature and studies using survey data have established that people care a great deal about their relative economic position and not solely, as standard economic theory assumes, about their absolute economic position. Individuals are concerned about social comparisons. However, behavioral evidence in the field is rare. This paper provides an empirical analysis testing the model of inequity aversion using two unique panel data sets for basketball and soccer players. We find support that the concept of inequity aversion helps to understand how the relative income situation affects performance in a real competitive environment with real tasks and real incentives.
    Keywords: Inequity aversion; relative income; positional concerns; envy; social comparison; performance; interdependent preferences
    JEL: D00 D60 L83
    Date: 2008–04
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cra:wpaper:2008-11&r=exp
  3. By: Soubeyran, R.
    Abstract: Does a disadvantaged candidate always choose an extremist program? When does a less competent candidate have an incentive to move to extreme positions in order to differentiate himself from the more competent candidate? Recent works answer by the affirmative (Groseclose 1999, Ansolabehere and Snyder 2000, Aragones and Palfrey 2002, 2003). We consider a two candidates electoral competition over public consumption, with a two dimensional policy space and two dimensions of candidates heterogeneity. In this setting, we show that the conclusion depends on candidates relative competences over the two public goods and distinguish between two types of advantages (an absolute advantage and comparative advantage in providing the two public goods). ...French Abstract : Cet article traite de l'entrée dans une industrie dans laquelle les firmes partagent une réputation collective. Premièrement, nous montrons que l'entrée libre n'est pas socialement optimale, il existe un besoin de régulation à travers l'imposition d'un standard minimum de qualité (par exemple). Deuxièmement, nous montrons qu'un standard minimum de qualité peut inciter des firmes à entrer sur le marché. Contrairement à la pensée commune, un standard minimum de qualité ne doit pas être toujours considéré comme une barrière à l'entrée.
    Keywords: CANDIDATE QUALITY; EXTREMISM; PUBLIC GOODS CONSUMPTION
    JEL: C72 D72
    Date: 2008
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:umr:wpaper:200801&r=exp
  4. By: Maskin, Eric S. (Institute for Advanced Studies)
    Abstract: Eric S. Maskin delivered his Prize Lecture on 8 December 2007 at Aula Magna, Stockholm University. He was introduced by Professor Jorgen Weibull, Chairman of the Economics Prize Committee.
    Keywords: Mechanism Design;
    JEL: D02
    Date: 2007–12–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:nobelp:2007_004&r=exp

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