nep-exp New Economics Papers
on Experimental Economics
Issue of 2008‒04‒15
25 papers chosen by
Daniel Houser
George Mason University

  1. Incentive Design and Trust: Comparing the Effects of Tournament and Team-Based Incentives on Trust By Oxoby, Robert J.; Friedrich, Colette
  2. Framing and Free Riding: Emotional Responses and Punishment in Social Dilemma Games By Robin P. Cubitt; Michalis Drouvelis; Simon Gächter
  3. Distributive fairness in an intercultural ultimatum game By Sebastian Goerg; Werner Güth; Gari Walkowitz; Torsten Weiland
  4. Searching for a better deal – On the influence of group decision making, time pressure and gender in a search experiment By Marcela Ibanez; Simon Czermak; Matthias Sutter
  5. Belief Formation: An Experiment With Outside Observers By Kyle Hyndman; Wolf Ehrblatt; Erkut Ozbay; Andrew Schotter
  6. Incentive Design and Trust: Comparing the Effects of Tournament and Team-Based Incentives on Trust By Robert Oxoby; Colette Friedrich
  7. Transitivity in Health Utility Measurement: An Experimental Analysis By Ulrich Schmidt; Michael Stolpe
  8. Risky Decisions in the Large and in the Small: Theory and Experiment By James C. Cox; Vjollca Sadiraj
  9. The Efficiency of Direct Public Involvement in Environmental Policymaking: An Experimental Test By Christopher Bruce; Jeremy Clark
  10. Fines, Leniency, Rewards and Organized Crime: Evidence from Antitrust Experiments By Bigoni, Maria; Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof; Le Coq, Chloe; Spagnolo, Giancarlo
  11. Network Structure in a Link-formation Game: An Experimental Study By Alexander Elbittar; Rodrigo Harrison; Roberto Muñoz
  12. Understanding Perpetual R&D Races By Yves Breitmoser; Jonathan H.W. Tan; Daniel John Zizzo
  13. The Descriptive and Predictive Adequacy of Theories of Decision Making Under Uncertainty/Ambiguity By John D Hey; Gianna Lotito; Anna Maffioletti
  14. Performance Pay, Sorting and Social Motivation By Eriksson, Tor; Villeval, Marie-Claire
  15. The Effect of Intragroup Communication on Preference Shifts in Groups By Brady, Michael P.; Wu, Steven Y.
  16. Competition Between Auctions By Ernan Haruvy; Peter T. L. Popkowski Leszczyc; Octavian Carare; James C. Cox; Eric A. Greenleaf; Wolfgang Jank; Sandy Jap; Young-Hoon Park; Michael H. Rothkopf
  17. On The Preferences of Principals and Agents By Marco Castillo; Ragan Petrie; Maximo Torero
  18. Stochastic Expected Utility and Prospect Theory in a Horse Race: A Finite Mixture Approach By Adrian Bruhin
  19. Information and Learning in Oligopoly: an Experiment By Maria Bigoni
  20. Information and Beliefs in a Repeated Normal-form Game By Dietmar Fehr; Dorothea Kübler; David Danz
  21. Gender Differences in Seeking Challenges: The Role of Institutions By Muriel Niederle; Alexandra H. Yestrumskas
  22. Predicting the Presidential Election Cycle in US Stock Prices: Guinea Pigs versus the Pros By Manfred Gärtner
  23. How Costly is Diversity? Affirmative Action in Light of Gender Differences in Competitiveness By Muriel Niederle; Carmit Segal; Lise Vesterlund
  24. Nucleus accumbens activation mediates the influence of reward cues on financial risk-taking By Knutson, Brian; Wimmer, G. Elliott; Kuhnen, Camelia; Winkielman, Piotr
  25. Neuroeconomics: A Critique of 'Neuroeconomics: A Critical Reconsideration' By Stanton, Angela A.

  1. By: Oxoby, Robert J. (University of Calgary); Friedrich, Colette (MIT)
    Abstract: We explore the extent to which the structure of incentives affects trust. We hypothesize that the degree to which different incentive mechanisms emphasize competition (via the perceived intentions of others) and entitlements (via the perceived property rights) will affect individuals’ subsequent behavior. In our experiment, bargaining pairs earned endowments through either tournaments or team-based incentives. Participants engaged in a subsequent trust game in which the sender had access to the total endowment generated by the pair. We find that the structure of the incentive mechanisms has asymmetric effects on observed trust in which participants’ relative performance framed trusting behavior.
    Keywords: trust, incentives, experiments, tournaments
    JEL: J31 J33 C92 D63
    Date: 2008–03
  2. By: Robin P. Cubitt (University of Nottingham); Michalis Drouvelis (University of Nottingham); Simon Gächter (University of Nottingham)
    Abstract: In this paper, we report an experimental investigation of the effect of framing on social preferences, as revealed in a one-shot linear public goods game. We use two indicators to measure social preferences: self-reported emotional responses; and, as a behavioural indicator of disapproval, punishment. Our findings are that, for a given pattern of contributions, neither punishment nor emotion depends on the Give versus Take framing that we manipulate. To this extent, they suggest that the social preferences we observe are robust to framing effects.
    Keywords: framing effects, punishment, emotions, public goods experiments
    JEL: C92 D01 H41
    Date: 2008–03
  3. By: Sebastian Goerg (BonnEconLab, University of Bonn); Werner Güth (Max Planck Institute of Economics); Gari Walkowitz; Torsten Weiland (Max Planck Institute of Economics)
    Abstract: Does geographic or (perceived) social distance between subjects signi?cantly affect proposer and responder behavior in ultimatum bargaining? To answer this question, subjects once play an ultimatum game with three players (proposer, responder, and dummy player) and asymmetric information (only the proposer knows what can be distributed). Treatments differ in their geographical scope in that they involve either one or three subject pools which, in the latter case, structurally differ in their between-subject pool heterogeneity. Observed choice behavior corroborates several stylized facts of this class of ultimatum games which are primarily explained by strategic play and other-regarding preferences. While the extent of self-interested allocation behavior in proposers signi?cantly varies across sites, neither proposers nor responders meaningfully condition their choices on their co-players' provenance or affiliation. Altogether, we do not discern articulate discriminative behavior based on geographic or social distance.
    Keywords: Equity, fairness, social preferences, ultimatum bargaining, redistribution, cross-national experiment
    JEL: C70 C91 D63
    Date: 2008–03–27
  4. By: Marcela Ibanez; Simon Czermak; Matthias Sutter
    Abstract: We study behavior in a search experiment where sellers receive randomized bids from a computer. At any time, sellers can accept the highest standing bid or ask for another bid at positive costs. We find that sellers stop searching earlier than theoretically optimal. Inducing a mild form of time pressure strengthens this finding in the early periods. There are marked gender differences. Men search significantly shorter than women. If subjects search in groups of two subjects, there is no difference to individual search, but teams of two women search much longer than men and recall more frequently.
    Keywords: Search experiment, Time, Group decision, Gender differences
    JEL: C91 C92 D83
  5. By: Kyle Hyndman (SMU); Wolf Ehrblatt (NYU); Erkut Ozbay (Maryland); Andrew Schotter (NYU)
    Abstract: In this paper we investigate the necessary ingredients for an accurate model of belief formation. Using experimental data from a previous experiment, we bring in a new group of subjects whose job it is to predict the action choices of the subjects from the previous experiment. While the rules we consider are all, strictly speaking, adaptive (being based on past observables), some of the variables we uncover represent fairly sophisticated behaviour. Going from less to more sophisticated, we find that the following are important components of the belief formation process: the history of play, payoffs (whether real or ``imagined" in the sense of \citet{CH99}) of the player whose actions our subjects are predicting and the payoffs of the other player. The paper also documents the presence of subject-specific heterogeneity in both initial beliefs and, to varying degrees, almost all of the variables found to influence beliefs.
    Keywords: Game Theory, Belief Formation, Learning.
    JEL: C70 C91 D83 D84
    Date: 2008–04
  6. By: Robert Oxoby; Colette Friedrich
    Abstract: We explore the extent to which the structure of incentives affects trust. We hypothesize that the degree to which different incentive mechanisms emphasize competition (via the perceived intentions of others) and entitlements (via the perceived property rights) will affect individuals' subsequent behavior. In our experiment, bargaining pairs earned endowments through either tournaments or team-based incentives. Participants engaged in a subsequent trust game in which the sender had access to the total endowment generated by the pair. We find that the structure of the incentive mechanisms has asymmetric effects on observed trust in which participants' relative performance framed trusting behavior.
    JEL: J31 J33 C92 D63
    Date: 2008–01–27
  7. By: Ulrich Schmidt; Michael Stolpe
    Abstract: Several experimental studies observed substantial violations of transitivity in decisions between risky lotteries over monetary outcomes. The goal of our experiment is to test whether these violations also affect the evaluation of health states. A particular feature of our experimental design is that it takes into account the possible role of decision errors in generating violations of transitivity. Since we find neither substantial nor systematic deviations from transitive choice behaviour, we can conclude that previously reported violations do not seem to bias health utility measurement.
    Keywords: Transitivity, Health utility, Errors
    JEL: D81 I10 C91
    Date: 2008–03
  8. By: James C. Cox; Vjollca Sadiraj
    Abstract: null
    Date: 2008–01
  9. By: Christopher Bruce; Jeremy Clark
    Abstract: We use laboratory experiments to test whether a number of axiomatic models of bargaining can predict the behavior of the parties to environmental decision making. In recognition of the multi-dimensional aspect of most public land use conflicts, we ask pairs of subjects to negotiate over two goods, without the possibility of cash side payments. We thus provide one of the first experimental tests of a prediction associated with the Edgeworth Box: that parties with an initial endowment that is Pareto inefficient will make trades until they reach a Pareto efficient allocation. We further test whether parties in particular reach the Nash bargain when it coincides with or conflicts with outcomes that maximise the parties’ joint payoffs and with outcomes at which the parties’ receive equal payoffs. Finally, the effect of providing parties with full or partial information regarding payoffs is also examined.
    JEL: C90 D74 H44 Q58
    Date: 2008–01–19
  10. By: Bigoni, Maria (IMT-Lucca); Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof (IFN); Le Coq, Chloe (SITE); Spagnolo, Giancarlo (Tor Vergata university, SITE, and CEPR)
    Abstract: Leniency policies and rewards for whistleblowers are being introduced in ever more fields of law enforcement, though their deterrence effects are often hard to observe, and the likely effect of changes in the specific features of these schemes can only be observed experimentally. This paper reports results from an experiment designed to examine the effects of fines, leniency programs, and reward schemes for whistleblowers on firms' decision to form cartels (cartel deterrence) and on their price choices. Our subjects play a repeated Bertrand price game with differentiated goods and uncertain duration, and we run several treatments different in the probability of cartels being caught, the level of fine, the possibility of self-reporting (and not paying a fine), the existence of a reward for reporting. We find that fines following successful investigations but without leniency have a deterrence effect (reduce the number of cartels formed) but also a pro-collusive effect (increase collusive prices in surviving cartels). Leniency programs might not be more efficient than standard antitrust enforcement, since in our experiment they do deter a significantly higher fraction of cartels from forming, but they also induce even higher prices in those cartels that are not reported, pushing average market price significantly up relative to treatments without antitrust enforcement. With rewards for whistle blowing, instead, cartels are systematically reported, which completely disrupts subjects' ability to form cartels and sustain high prices, and almost complete deterrence is achieved. We also analyze post-conviction behavior, finding that there is a strong expost deterrence (desistance) effect. Moreover post-conviction prices are on average lower than before even though the average prices within cartels are the same. Finally, we find a strong cultural effect comparing treatments in Stockholm with those in Rome, suggesting that optimal law enforcement institutions differ with culture.
    Keywords: Anti-trust; Collusion; Experiment; Leniency
    JEL: K21 L13 L41
    Date: 2008–03–27
  11. By: Alexander Elbittar; Rodrigo Harrison (Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile.); Roberto Muñoz
    Abstract: Network formation is frequently modeled using link-formation games and typically present a multiplicity of Nash equilibria. Cooperative refinements - such as strong or coalitional proof Nash equilibria - have been the standard tool used for equilibrium selection in these games. Non-cooperative refinements derived from the theory of global games have shown also that, for a class of payo¤ functions, multiplicity of equilibria disappears when the game is perturbed by introducing small amounts of incomplete information. We conducted a laboratory study evaluating the predictive power of each of these refinements in an illustrative link-formation game. Compared with cooperative game solutions, the global game approach did significantly better at predicting the strategies played by individuals in the experiment.
    Keywords: Networks, Global Games, Cooperative Games, Equilibrium Selection, Experimental economics.
    JEL: C70 C92 D20 D44 D82
    Date: 2008
  12. By: Yves Breitmoser (Institute of Microeconomics, European University Viadrina); Jonathan H.W. Tan (Nottingham University Business School, University of Nottingham); Daniel John Zizzo (School of Economics, University of East Anglia)
    Abstract: This paper presents an experimental study of dynamic indefinite horizon R&D races with uncertainty and multiple prizes. The theoretical predictions are highly sensitive: small parameter changes determine whether technological competition is sustained, or converges into a market structure with an entrenched leadership and lower aggregate R&D. The subjects’ strategies are far less sensitive. In most treatments, the R&D races tend to converge to entrenched leadership. Investment is highest when rivals are close. This stylized fact, and so the usefulness of neck-to-neck competition in general, is largely unrelated to rivalry concerns but can be explained using a quantal response extension of Markov perfection.
    Keywords: R&D race; innovation; dynamics; experiment.
    JEL: C72 C91 O31
    Date: 2008–03
  13. By: John D Hey; Gianna Lotito; Anna Maffioletti
    Abstract: In this paper we examine the performance of theories of decision making under uncertainty/ambiguity from the perspective of their descriptive and predictive power, taking into account the relative parsimony of the various theories. To this end, we employ an innovative experimental design which enables us to reproduce ambiguity in the laboratory in a transparent and non-probabilistic way. We find that judging theories on the basis of their theoretical appeal, or on their ability to do well in testing contexts, is not the same as judging them on the basis of their explanatory and predictive power. We also find that the more elegant theoretical models do not perform as well as simple rules of thumb.
    Keywords: Ambiguity, Bingo Blower, Choquet Expected Utility, Decision Field Theory, Decision Making, Expected Utility, Hurwicz Criterion, (Gilboa and Schmeidler) MaxMin EU, (Gilboa and Schmeidler) MaxMax EU, (Ghirardato) Alpha-Model, MaxMin, MaxMax, Minimum Regret, Prospect Theory, Uncertainty.
    JEL: D81 C91
    Date: 2008–04
  14. By: Eriksson, Tor (Department of Economics, Aarhus School of Business); Villeval, Marie-Claire (Department of Economics, Aarhus School of Business)
    Abstract: Variable pay creates a link between pay and performance but may also help firms in attracting more productive employees. Our experiment investigates the impact of performance pay on both incentives and sorting and analyzes the influence of repeated interactions between firms and employees on these effects. We show that (i) the opportunity to switch from a fixed wage to variable pay scheme increases the average effort level and its variance; (ii) high skill employees concentrate under the variable pay scheme; (iii) however, in repeated interactions, efficiency wages reduce the attraction of performance pay. Social motivation and reputation influence both the provision of incentives and their sorting effect.
    Keywords: Performance pay; incentives; sorting; social motivation; experiment
    JEL: C91 J31 J33 M52
    Date: 2008–04–04
  15. By: Brady, Michael P. (U.S. Department of Agriculture); Wu, Steven Y. (Ohio State University)
    Abstract: We use a laboratory gift-exchange game to examine decisions made by groups under three different procedures that dictate how group members interact and reach decisions in comparison to individuals acting alone. We find that group decisions do deviate from those of individuals, but the direction and magnitude of gift exchange depend critically on the procedure. This suggests that no general statements can be made concerning the propensity of groups to exhibit reciprocal or other-regarding behavior relative to individuals. The rules governing how group members can express their preferences and expectations to other group members are critical for determining group outcomes.
    Keywords: group behavior, teams, decision making, social preferences
    JEL: C91 C92
    Date: 2008–04
  16. By: Ernan Haruvy; Peter T. L. Popkowski Leszczyc; Octavian Carare; James C. Cox; Eric A. Greenleaf; Wolfgang Jank; Sandy Jap; Young-Hoon Park; Michael H. Rothkopf
    Abstract: Even though auctions are capturing an increasing share of commerce, they are typically treated in the theoretical economics literature as isolated. That is, an auction is typically treated as a single seller facing multiple buyers or as a single buyer facing multiple sellers. In this paper, we review the state of the art of competition between auctions. We consider three different types of competition: competition between auctions, competition between formats, and competition between auctioneers vying for auction traffic. We highlight the newest experimental, statistical and analytical methods in the analysis of competition between auctions.
    Keywords: auctions, bidding, competition, auction formats, auction houses
    Date: 2008–01
  17. By: Marco Castillo; Ragan Petrie; Maximo Torero
    Abstract: One of the reasons why market economies are able to thrive is that they exploit the willingness of entrepreneurs to take risks that laborers might prefer to avoid. Markets work because they remunerate good judgement and punish mistakes. Indeed, modern contract theory is based on the assumption that principals are less risk averse than agents. We investigate if the risk preferences of entrepreneurs are different from those of laborers by implementing experiments with a random sample of the population in a fast-growing, small-manufacturing, economic cluster. As assumed by theory, we find that entrepreneurs are more likely to take risks than hired managers. These results are robust to the inclusion of a series of controls. This lends support to the idea that risk preferences are an important determinant of selection into occupations. Finally, our lotteries are good predictors of financial decisions, thus giving support to the external validity of our risk measures and experimental methods.
    Date: 2007–12
  18. By: Adrian Bruhin (Socioeconomic Institute, University of Zurich)
    Abstract: This study compares the performance of Prospect Theory versus Stochastic Expected Utility Theory at fitting data on decision making under risk. Both theories incorporate well-known deviations from Expected Utility Maximization such as the Allais paradox or the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes. Stochastic Expected Utility Theory parsimoniously extends the standard microeconomic model, whereas Prospect Theory, the benchmark for aggregate choice so far, is based on psychological findings. First, the two theories' fit to representative choice is assessed for two experimental data sets, one Swiss and one Chinese. In a second step, finite mixture regressions reveal a consistent mix of two different behavioral types suggesting that researchers may take individual heterogeneity into account in order to avoid aggregation bias.
    Keywords: stochastic expected etility theory, prospect theory, finite mixture models
    JEL: D81 C49
    Date: 2008–03
  19. By: Maria Bigoni (University of Padova)
    Abstract: I report results of an experiment designed to study the relation between the process of information search and learning in a Cournot oligopoly, with limited a priori information. Different theories of learning have been applied to this setting, each yielding a specific market outcome in the long run, and postulating specific informational requirements. By allowing players to choose the information they wish to acquire, and controlling for these choices, I study the features of the learning model actually followed by the subjects, and the relation between the information they gather and the market behavior they adopt. According to my results, learning appears to be a composite process, in which different components coexist. Belief learning seems to be the leading element, as subjects try to form expectations about their opponents' future actions and to best reply to them. When subjects also look at the strategies individually adopted by their competitors, though, they tend to imitate the most successful behavior, which makes markets more competitive. Finally, reinforcement learning also plays a nonnegligible role, as subjects tend to favor strategies that have yielded higher profits in the past. I show that these different elements may be usefully incorporated into a more sophisticated learning model, shaped after self tuning EWA learning model.
    Keywords: Information, Learning, Imitation, Collusion
    JEL: L13 C92 C72
    Date: 2008–03
  20. By: Dietmar Fehr; Dorothea Kübler; David Danz
    Abstract: We study beliefs and choices in a repeated normal-form game. In addition to a baseline treatment with common knowledge of the game structure and feedback about choices in the previous period, we run treatments (i) without feedback about previous play, (ii) with no infor- mation about the opponent?s payo¤s and (iii) with random matching. Using Stahl and Wilson's (1995) model of limited strategic reasoning, we classify behavior with regard to its strategic sophistication and consider its development over time. We use belief statements to track the consistency of subjects' actions and beliefs as well as the accuracy of their beliefs (relative to the opponent's true choice) over time. In the baseline treatment we observe more sophisticated play as well as more consistent and more accurate beliefs over time. We isolate feedback as the main driving force of such learning. In contrast, information about the opponent's payoffs has almost no effect on the learning path. While it has an impact on the average choice and belief structure aggregated over all periods, it does not alter the choices and the belief accuracy in their development over time.
    Keywords: experiments, beliefs, strategic uncertainty, learning
    JEL: C72 C92 D84
    Date: 2008–03
  21. By: Muriel Niederle; Alexandra H. Yestrumskas
    Abstract: We examine whether women and men of the same ability differ in their decisions to seek challenges. In the laboratory, we create an environment in which we can measure a participants performance level (high or low), where a high performance level participant has on average higher earnings from solving a hard rather than an easy task, and vice versa. After we identify each participant's performance level, they choose the difficulty level (easy or hard) for the next two tasks (only one of which will be chosen for payment). Although there are no gender differences in performance, or beliefs about relative performance, men choose the hard task about 50 percent more frequently than women, independent of performance level. Gender differences in preferences for characteristics of the tasks cannot account for this gender gap. When we allow for a flexible choice high performing women choose the hard task significantly more often, at a rate now similar to the decision of men. Such a flexible choice makes challenging choices easier when participants are either risk averse, or uncertain about their ability. Our results highlight the role of institution design in affecting choices of women and men, and the resulting gender differences in representation in challenging tasks.
    JEL: C91 J0 J16 J24
    Date: 2008–04
  22. By: Manfred Gärtner
    Abstract: The notion that US stock prices follow a pattern that is synchronized with the rhythm of presidential elections has been a topic among financial investors for a long time. Academic work exists that supports this idea, quantifies the pattern, and has demonstrated its robustness over several decades and across parties in power. This paper takes the existence and robustness of this presidential election cycle for granted and asks whether individuals exploit it when asked to predict stock prices. It considers and contrasts two types of such forecasts: Those made by professionals included in the Livingston survey; and those made by students in a laboratory experiment. One key result is that neither group fares particularly well, though participants in the lab experiment clearly outperformed the professionals.
    Keywords: Livingston survey, experiment, expectations, forecast, presidential election cycle, stock prices
    JEL: C91 D84 G12 G14
    Date: 2008–03
  23. By: Muriel Niederle; Carmit Segal; Lise Vesterlund
    Abstract: Recent research documents that while men are eager to compete, women often shy away from competitive environments. A consequence is that few women enter and win competitions. Using experimental methods we examine how affirmative action affects competitive entry. We find that when women are guaranteed equal representation among winners, more women and fewer men enter competitions, and the response exceeds that predicted by changes in the probability of winning. An explanation for this response is that under affirmative action the probability of winning depends not only on one's rank relative to other group members, but also on one's rank within gender. Both beliefs on rank and attitudes towards competition change when moving to a more gender-specific competition. The changes in competitive entry have important implications when assessing the costs of affirmative action. Based on ex-ante tournament entry affirmative action is predicted to lower the performance requirement for women and thus result in reverse discrimination towards men. Interestingly this need not be the outcome when competitive entry is not payoff maximizing. The response in entry implies that it may not be necessary to lower the performance requirement for women to achieve a more diverse set of winners.
    JEL: C91 J16 J24
    Date: 2008–04
  24. By: Knutson, Brian; Wimmer, G. Elliott; Kuhnen, Camelia; Winkielman, Piotr
    Abstract: In functional magnetic resonance imaging (FMRI) research, nucleus accumbens (NAcc) activation spontaneously increases prior to financial risk taking. Since anticipation of diverse rewards can increase NAcc activation, even incidental reward cues may influence financial risk-taking. Using event-related FMRI, we predicted and found that anticipation of viewing rewarding stimuli (erotic pictures for 15 heterosexual males) increased financial risk taking, and that this effect was partially mediated by increases in NAcc activation. These results are consistent with the notion that incidental reward cues influence financial risk taking by altering anticipatory affect, and so identify a neuropsychological mechanism that may underlie effective emotional appeals in financial, marketing, and political domains.
    Keywords: neuroeconomics; neurofinance; brain; financial risk taking; risk preferences; decision making; nucleus accumbens; striatum; reward cues; FMRI; brain imaging
    JEL: D81 G11 C91
    Date: 2008–03
  25. By: Stanton, Angela A.
    Abstract: Some economists believe that the work of neuroeconomists threatens the theory of economics. Glenn Harrison’s paper “Neuroeconomics: A Critical Reconsideration” attempts to set the score, though the points he makes are hidden behind the fumes of his anger (Glenn W. Harrison 2008). The field of neuroeconomics is barely into its teenage years; and it is trying to do what? Redesign the field of economics developed over a hundred years? No, that is not what neuroeconomics is trying to do, in spite of all the efforts of some economists trying to place it into that shoebox. Neuroeconomics is a Mendelian-Economics of sort; it is a science that is able to generate data by fixing the environment to some degree and looking to see each individual’s choices from the initiation of the decision-making process to its outcome. Standard economics (SE), on the other hand, looks at the average of the outputs of many individuals and proposes how the human chose those outcomes. The two fields, neuroeconomics and SE, are evaluating two sides of the same coin; one with and the other without ceteris paribus; they are not necessarily in conflict with one another.
    Keywords: A debate over the field of Neuroeconomics
    JEL: C90 D01 B41
    Date: 2008–03–25

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