nep-exp New Economics Papers
on Experimental Economics
Issue of 2007‒10‒13
five papers chosen by
Daniel Houser
George Mason University

  1. The role of players’ identification in the population on the trusting and the trustworthy behavior an experimental investigation By Dimitri Dubois; Marc Willinger
  2. Cooperation without Punishment By Stefania Ottone; Ferruccio Ponzano
  3. An experimental inquiry into the effect of yardstick competition on corruption By Angelino Viceisza
  4. A market microstructure explanation of IPOs underpricing By Patarick Leoni
  5. A Comment on Ellsberg's two-color experiment,<br />portfolio inertia and ambiguity By Jean-Marc Tallon; Sujoy Mukerji; Norio Takeoka; Youichiro Higashi

  1. By: Dimitri Dubois; Marc Willinger
    Abstract: We study to what extent identification does matter for trustfulness and trustworthiness to emerge in a population of players. Our experimen- tal protocol is designed for isolating the effects of trustees’ identification. Trustees’ identification is a necessary condition for introducing a reputa- tion mechanism. We run three treatments. In each treatment groups 6 players interact repeatedly and randomly and play a 30 periods invest- ment game (Berg & al. 1995). In the first treatment players can’t identify each other, in the second one players can identify each other as trustee and in the third one players identify each other both as trustee and trustor. We show that, according to the expectation, trustees’ identification has a positive effect on reciprocity. However it doesn’t affect the average trust in the population. Trust is significantly higher than in the complete anony- mous treatment only when players identify each other in both roles. We show that this enhance of trust is the result of mutual trust-reciprocity relationships formation.
    Date: 2007–06
  2. By: Stefania Ottone; Ferruccio Ponzano
    Abstract: Our experiment is made by three treatments. The first one reproduces the classical public good game. The second environment represents a perfect competition market where the contribution of a representative player to the private good gives a positive rent if and only if it is not lower than the highest contribution of the other players in the group. In the third treatment we consider a winner-take-all market where we have only a winner per group. The aim is to test whether the level of cooperation is minimum under the hypothesis of perfect competition.
    Date: 2007–10
  3. By: Angelino Viceisza
    Abstract: This study reports theory-testing laboratory experiments on the effect of yardstick competition on corruption. On the incumbent side, yardstick competition acts as a corruption-taming mechanism if the incumbent politician is female. On the voter side, voters focus on the difference between the tax rate in their own jurisdiction and that in another. If the tax rate is deemed unfair compared to the one in another jurisdiction, voters re-elect less. The findings support the claim by Besley and Case (1995) that incumbent behavior and tax setting are tied together through the nexus of yardstick competition. This renders generalizability to these laboratory experiments and addresses some concerns raised by Levitt and List (2007).
    Keywords: Corruption, Yardstick Competition, Political Agency, Asymmetric
    JEL: C92 D72 D73 D82 H73
    Date: 2007–10
  4. By: Patarick Leoni (Economics Department, National University of Ireland, Maynooth)
    Abstract: In a typical IPO game with first-price auctions, we argue that risk-averse investors always underbid in equilibrium because of subjective interpretations of the firm' communication about its actual value and resulting risk aversion about the likelihood of facing investors with higher valuations. We show that the noisier the investors' inferences of the firm' value (in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance) the higher the underbidding level. Our finding is independent of winner's curse effects and possible irrationality, and allows for a testable theory.
    Keywords: IPO underpricing; first-price auction; risk aversion; firm' communication
    JEL: C7 D81 G12 G32
    Date: 2007
  5. By: Jean-Marc Tallon (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - [CNRS : UMR8174] - [Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - Paris I], Ecole d'économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics - [Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - Paris I]); Sujoy Mukerji (Oxford University - [University of Oxford]); Norio Takeoka (Department of economics - [University of Rochester]); Youichiro Higashi (Department of economics - [University of Rochester])
    Abstract: The final step in the proof of Proposition 1 (p.311) of Mukerji and Tallon (2003) may not hold in general<br />because $\varepsilon>0$ in the proof cannot be chosen independently of $w,z$. We point out by a counterexample that the axioms they impose are too weak for Proposition 1. We introduce a modified set of axioms and re-establish the<br />proposition
    Keywords: ambiguity;bid ask spread;Ellsberg paradox
    Date: 2007–07

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