nep-exp New Economics Papers
on Experimental Economics
Issue of 2006‒12‒22
six papers chosen by
Daniel Houser
George Mason University
  1. The Swing Voter’s Curse in the laboratory By Battaglini, Marco; Morton, Rebecca; Palfrey, Thomas R.
  2. Information Cascades: Evidence from An Experiment with Financial Market Professionals By Jonathan E. Alevy; Michael S. Haigh; John List
  3. The compromise game: Two-sided adverse selection in the laboratory By Carrillo, Juan D.; Palfrey, Thomas R.
  4. Efficiency, equity, and timing of voting mechanisms By Battaglini, Marco; Morton, Rebecca; Palfrey, Thomas R.
  5. Heterogeneous quantal response equilibrium and cognitive hierarchies By Camerer, Colin F.; Palfrey, Thomas R.; Rogers, Brian W.
  6. Political reputations and campaign promises By Aragones, Enriqueta; Palfrey, Thomas R.; Postlewaite, Andrew
  1. By: Battaglini, Marco; Morton, Rebecca; Palfrey, Thomas R.
    Date: 2006–12
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:clt:sswopa:1263&r=exp
  2. By: Jonathan E. Alevy; Michael S. Haigh; John List
    Abstract: Previous empirical studies of information cascades use either naturally occurring data or laboratory experiments with student subjects. We combine attractive elements from each of these lines of research by observing market professionals from the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) in a controlled environment. As a baseline, we compare their behavior to student choices in similar treatments. We further examine whether, and to what extent, cascade formation is influenced by both private signal strength and the quality of previous public signals, as well as decision heuristics that differ from Bayesian rationality. Analysis of over 1,500 individual decisions suggests that CBOT professionals are better able to discern the quality of public signals than their student counterparts. This leads to much different cascade formation. Further, while the behavior of students is consistent with the notion that losses loom larger than gains, market professionals are unaffected by the domain of earnings. These results are important in both a positive and normative sense.
    JEL: G11 G14 G28
    Date: 2006–12
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:12767&r=exp
  3. By: Carrillo, Juan D.; Palfrey, Thomas R.
    Date: 2006–12
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:clt:sswopa:1259&r=exp
  4. By: Battaglini, Marco; Morton, Rebecca; Palfrey, Thomas R.
    Date: 2006–12
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:clt:sswopa:1262&r=exp
  5. By: Camerer, Colin F.; Palfrey, Thomas R.; Rogers, Brian W.
    Date: 2006–12
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:clt:sswopa:1260&r=exp
  6. By: Aragones, Enriqueta; Palfrey, Thomas R.; Postlewaite, Andrew
    Date: 2006–12
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:clt:sswopa:1258&r=exp
This nep-exp issue is ©2006 by Daniel Houser. It is provided as is without any express or implied warranty. It may be freely redistributed in whole or in part for any purpose. If distributed in part, please include this notice.
General information on the NEP project can be found at http://nep.repec.org. For comments please write to the director of NEP, Marco Novarese at <director@nep.repec.org>. Put “NEP” in the subject, otherwise your mail may be rejected.
NEP’s infrastructure is sponsored by the School of Economics and Finance of Massey University in New Zealand.
This page is being maintained by Thomas Krichel. It was last updated on 2023‒07‒08 at 13:47.