nep-exp New Economics Papers
on Experimental Economics
Issue of 2006‒11‒12
six papers chosen by
Daniel Houser
George Mason University

  1. Gender and Corruption: Insights from an Experimental Analysis By Vivi Alatas; Lisa Cameron; Ananish Chaudhuri; Nisvan Erkal; Lata Gangadharan
  2. Subject Pool Effects in a Corruption Experiment: A Comparison of Indonesian Public Servants and Indonesian Students By Vivi Alatas; Lisa Cameron; Ananish Chaudhuri; Nisvan Erkal; Lata Gangadharan
  3. An Experimental Examination of Competitor-Based Price Matching Guarantees By Datta, Shakun; Offenberg, Jennifer
  4. Giving Little by Little By Jack Ochs; John Duffy; Lise Vesterlund
  5. Cooperative Behavior and Social Interaction By Jack Ochs; John Duffy
  6. The Impact of the Number of Performance Measures and Incentive Framing on Performance in a Multidimensional Task Environment By P. VAN DE WEGHE; W. BRUGGEMAN

  1. By: Vivi Alatas; Lisa Cameron; Ananish Chaudhuri; Nisvan Erkal; Lata Gangadharan
    Abstract: In recent years, a substantial body of work has emerged in the social sciences exploring differences in the behavior of men and women in various contexts. This paper contributes to this literature by investigating gender differences in attitudes towards corruption. It departs from the previous literature on gender and corruption by using experimental methodology. Attitudes towards corruption play a critical role in the persistence of corruption. Based on experimental data collected in Australia (Melbourne), India (Delhi), Indonesia (Jakarta) and Singapore, we show that while women in Australia are less tolerant of corruption than men in Australia, there are no significant gender differences in attitudes towards corruption in India, Indonesia and Singapore. Hence, our findings suggest that the gender differences found in the previous studies may not be nearly as universal as stated and may be more culture-specific. We also explore behavioral differences by gender across countries and find that there are larger variations in women’s attitudes towards corruption than in men’s across the countries in our sample.
    Keywords: Gender, Corruption, Experiments, Punishment, Multicultural Analysis
    JEL: C91 J16 K42 O12
    Date: 2006
  2. By: Vivi Alatas; Lisa Cameron; Ananish Chaudhuri; Nisvan Erkal; Lata Gangadharan
    Abstract: We report results from a corruption experiment with Indonesian public servants and Indonesian students. Our results suggest that although both subject pools show a high level of concern with the extent of corruption in Indonesia, the Indonesian public servant subjects have a significantly lower tolerance of corruption than the Indonesian students. We find no evidence that this is due to a selection effect. The reasons given by the public servants for either engaging in or not engaging in corruption suggest that the differences in behavior across the subject pools are driven by their different real life experiences. For example, when abstaining from corruption public servants more often cite the need to reduce the social costs of corruption as a reason for their actions, and when engaging in corruption they cite low government salaries or a belief that corruption is a necessary evil in the current environment. In contrast, students give more simplistic moral reasons. We conclude by arguing that experiments such as the one considered in this paper can be used to measure forward-looking attitudinal change in society and that results obtained from different subject pools can complement each other in the determination of such attitudinal changes.
    Keywords: Corruption, Experiments, Subject Pool Effects
    JEL: C91 D73 O12 K42
    Date: 2006
  3. By: Datta, Shakun; Offenberg, Jennifer
    Abstract: We use experimental methods to demonstrate the anti-competitive potential of price matching guarantees in both symmetric and asymmetric cost duopolies. Our findings establish that when costs are symmetric, price-matching guarantees significantly increase market prices. In markets with cost asymmetries, guaranteed prices remain high relative to prices without the use of guarantees, but the overall ability of price guarantees to act as a collusion facilitating device becomes contingent on the relative cost difference. Lesser use of guarantees, combined with lower average prices and slower convergence to the collusive level, suggest that the mere presence of cost asymmetries may curtail collusive behavior.
    Keywords: Price Matching; Price Guarantees; Laboratory; Collusion
    JEL: D43 L13 L4
    Date: 2003–08–01
  4. By: Jack Ochs; John Duffy; Lise Vesterlund
    Date: 2006–01
  5. By: Jack Ochs; John Duffy
    Date: 2006–01
    Abstract: This paper reports on the results of a 2x2 experiment, examining the impact of multiple performance measures (PM) and incentive framing on performance in a multidimensional environment. A comparison is made between the performance of people working under one PM and those working under three PM. Additionally, the performance of participants working under a bonus scheme is compared with a penalty-framed incentive scheme. The results indicate that it is better to use multiple PM, because it inspires higher effort intensity and better effort allocation. Furthermore, it is better to frame incentives as a penalty scheme, instead of as a bonus scheme, because loss aversion has a higher performance impact than perceived fairness. However, the difference between bonus and penalty schemes is not larger with multiple versus a single PM, because loss aversion under multiple PM is higher for bonuses than for penalties. Consequently, no additive effects were identified.
    Date: 2006–08

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