New Economics Papers
on Experimental Economics
Issue of 2006–08–19
two papers chosen by
Daniel Houser, George Mason University
  1. Asymmetric Information about Rivals’ Types in Standard Auctions: An Experiment By James Andreoni; Yeon-Koo Che; Jinwoo Kim
  2. Two Comments on the Principle of Revealed Preference By Ariel Rubinstein; Yuval Salant
  1. By: James Andreoni; Yeon-Koo Che; Jinwoo Kim
    Date: 2006–08–11
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000293
  2. By: Ariel Rubinstein; Yuval Salant
    Date: 2006–08–10
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000272
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