nep-exp 2006-08-19 papers

on Experimental Economics

Issue of 2006‒08‒19
two papers chosen by
Daniel Houser
George Mason University

Asymmetric Information about Rivals’ Types in Standard Auctions: An Experiment By James Andreoni; Yeon-Koo Che; Jinwoo Kim
Two Comments on the Principle of Revealed Preference By Ariel Rubinstein; Yuval Salant

Asymmetric Information about Rivals’ Types in Standard Auctions: An Experiment

By: James Andreoni; Yeon-Koo Che; Jinwoo Kim

Date: 2006–08–11

URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000293&r=exp
Two Comments on the Principle of Revealed Preference

By: Ariel Rubinstein; Yuval Salant

Date: 2006–08–10

URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000272&r=exp

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By:	James Andreoni; Yeon-Koo Che; Jinwoo Kim
Date:	2006–08–11
URL:	http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000293&r=exp

By:	Ariel Rubinstein; Yuval Salant
Date:	2006–08–10
URL:	http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000272&r=exp