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on Experimental Economics |
| By: | Potters,Jan; Suetens,Sigrid (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research) |
| Abstract: | Results are reported of a laboratory experiment aimed at examining whether strategic substitutability and strategic complementarity have an impact on the tendency to cooperate in two-player dominancesolvable games with a Pareto-inefficient Nash equilibrium. We find that there is significantly more cooperation when actions exhibit strategic complementarities than in case of strategic substitutes. |
| Keywords: | experiments;cooperation;strategic substitutes and complements;externalities |
| JEL: | C7 C9 L1 |
| Date: | 2006 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200648&r=exp |
| By: | Luigi Mittone; Matteo Ploner |
| Abstract: | Deviations from standard game theoretical predictions have been repeatedly observed in basic Dictator Games. Different interpretations have been provided to these deviations. On the one hand, empirical (among others, Forsythe et al., 1994) and theoretical works (among others, Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) have adopted the explanation based on other-regarding concerns. On the other hand, potential weaknesses in standard design of the game have been stressed. Evidence collected shows that when controlling for reputation considerations (Hoffman et al., 1996) and for legitimacy of assets (Cherry et al., 2002) behavior observed in the experiments is very close to that predicted by standard game theory. Results from our experiment suggest that the relevance of these two factors in explaining observed behavior may be overestimated by previous contributions. Relevant deviations from selfish equilibrium are registered in a condition of full-anonymity when assets to be shared are earned by the dictators and, simultaneously, recipients are allowed to work without being rewarded for their effort. |
| Date: | 2006 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:trn:utwpce:0602&r=exp |
| By: | Volodymyr Bilotkach |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the issue of tax evasion by enterprises through underreporting activity. We develop a view of this phenomenon as an equilibrium of the game between a businessman and an imperfectly monitored supervising official, in which a businessman can hide part of his profit and offer bribe to official. We determine conditions under which such tax evasion and bribery become wide-spread in the society, resulting in shadow economy. The game is put into an experimental setting in Kiev, Ukraine, with the emphasis of spreading of the tax evasion and bribery activity in the laboratory setting. We find that once it becomes known that substantial share of subjects playing the role of supervising officials agree to accept bribes from subjects playing the role of businessmen, the latter offer bribes more aggressively. Yet, this in turn does not affect the behavior of subjects playing the role of supervising officials. |
| JEL: | H32 D73 H26 C91 |
| Date: | 2006–06–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:liu:liucej:26&r=exp |