nep-exp New Economics Papers
on Experimental Economics
Issue of 2006‒05‒06
five papers chosen by
Daniel Houser
George Mason University
  1. Individual Behavior and Beliefs in Experimental Parimutuel Betting Markets By Frederic Koessler; Ch. Noussair; A. Ziegelmeyer
  2. Rewarding Honest Taxpayers? Evidence on the Impact of Rewards from Field Experiments By Lars P. Feld; Bruno S. Frey; Benno Torgler
  3. Women's Leadership and Policy Decisions: Evidence from a Nationwide Randomized Experiment in India By Raghabendra Chattopadhyay; Esther Duflo
  4. How to Allocate R&D (and Other) Subsidies: An Experimentally Tested Policy Recommendation By Thomas Giebe; Tim Grebe; Elmar Wolfstetter
  5. Who is “Behavioral”? Cognitive Ability and Anomalous Preferences By Daniel J. Benjamin; Sebastian A. Brown; Jesse M. Shapiro
  1. By: Frederic Koessler (THEMA, Université de Cergy-Pontoise); Ch. Noussair; A. Ziegelmeyer
    Date: 2005
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ema:worpap:2005-08&r=exp
  2. By: Lars P. Feld; Bruno S. Frey; Benno Torgler
    Abstract: This paper analyzes the impact of rewards on tax compliance as an additional instrument to take into account. While social psychologists and neuroscientists have emphasized the importance of rewards, the tax compliance literature has strongly disregarded the possibilities of rewards. The use of field experiments presents an alternative “carrot” strategy for tax policy. Design mechanisms to conduct a field experiments focusing on the impact of rewards on tax compliance are discussed.
    Keywords: positive rewards; tax compliance; tax evasion; field experiments
    JEL: H26 H41 C90 D63
    Date: 2006–04
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cra:wpaper:2006-16&r=exp
  3. By: Raghabendra Chattopadhyay (Indian Institute of Management, Calcutta); Esther Duflo (Department of Economics, MIT)
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bos:iedwpr:dp-114&r=exp
  4. By: Thomas Giebe (Institut für Wirtschaftstheorie I, Humboldt.Universität zu Berlin Spandauer Str. 1, 10099 Berlin, Germany Email: giebe@wiwi.hu.berlin.de); Tim Grebe (Institut für Wirtschaftstheorie I, Humboldt.Universität zu Berlin Spandauer Str. 1, 10099 Berlin, Germany Email: grebe @wiwi.hu.berlin.de); Elmar Wolfstetter (Institut für Wirtschaftstheorie I, Humboldt.Universität zu Berlin Spandauer Str. 1, 10099 Berlin, Germany Email: wolfstetter@wiwi.hu.berlin.de)
    Abstract: This paper evaluates how R&D subsidies to the business sector are typically awarded. We identify two sources of ine_ciency: the selection based on a ranking of individual projects, rather than complete allocations, and the failure to induce competition among applicants in order to extract and use information about the necessary funding. In order to correct these ine_- ciencies we propose mechanisms that include some form of an auction in which applicants bid for subsidies. Our proposals are tested in a simulation and in controlled lab experiments. The results suggest that adopting our proposals may considerably improve the allocation.
    Keywords: Research, Subsidies, Experimental Economics
    JEL: D44 D45 H25 O32 O38
    Date: 2005–10
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:trf:wpaper:108&r=exp
  5. By: Daniel J. Benjamin; Sebastian A. Brown; Jesse M. Shapiro
    Date: 2006–05–02
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levarc:122247000000001334&r=exp
This nep-exp issue is ©2006 by Daniel Houser. It is provided as is without any express or implied warranty. It may be freely redistributed in whole or in part for any purpose. If distributed in part, please include this notice.
General information on the NEP project can be found at http://nep.repec.org. For comments please write to the director of NEP, Marco Novarese at <director@nep.repec.org>. Put “NEP” in the subject, otherwise your mail may be rejected.
NEP’s infrastructure is sponsored by the School of Economics and Finance of Massey University in New Zealand.
This page is being maintained by Thomas Krichel. It was last updated on 2023‒07‒08 at 13:48.