nep-exp New Economics Papers
on Experimental Economics
Issue of 2006‒02‒05
four papers chosen by
Daniel Houser
George Mason University

  1. Emotions, Morality and Public Goods: The WTA-WTP Disparity Revisited By Biel, Anders; Johansson-Stenman, Olof; Nilsson, Andreas
  2. Value of time, schedule delay and reliability - estimates based on choice behaviour of Dutch commuters facing congestion By Barry Ubbels; Yin-Yen Tseng; Erik T. Verhoef
  3. Giving in Dictator Games: Regard for Others or Regard by Others? By Alexander K. Koch; Hans-Theo Normann
  4. They Come to Play: Supply Effects in an Economic Experiment By Jeffrey Carpenter; Allison Liati; Brian Vickery

  1. By: Biel, Anders (Department of Psychology, Göteborg University); Johansson-Stenman, Olof (Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University); Nilsson, Andreas (Department of Psychology, Göteborg University)
    Abstract: Empirical evidence suggests that people’s maximum willingness to pay for having a good is often substantially lower than their minimum willingness to accept not having it, and that this discrepancy tends to be especially large when valuing public goods. This paper hypothesizes that differences in emotions (e.g. regret) and moral perceptions can account for much of this discrepancy for public goods. A simple, real-money dichotomous-choice experiment is set up to test these hypotheses, which are largely supported. <p>
    Keywords: Willingness to pay; Willingness to accept gap; Endowment effect; Emotions; Ethics; Experiments
    JEL: C91 H41
    Date: 2006–01–25
  2. By: Barry Ubbels; Yin-Yen Tseng; Erik T. Verhoef
    Abstract: This paper presents the results of a large stated choice experiment among Dutch commuters facing congestion. The experiment consisted of a fractional factorial design with 15 different attributes, three alternatives were car specific and the other was always public transport. Various model specifications have been estimated on the collected choice data allowing us to analyse choice behaviour of road users and determine their values of time, schedule delay (both late and early) and reliability (or uncertainty). In this paper we present the estimates of the best-fitting discrete choice models and interpret the results.
    Date: 2005–08
  3. By: Alexander K. Koch (Department of Economics, Royal Holloway, University of London); Hans-Theo Normann (Department of Economics, Royal Holloway, University of London)
    Abstract: Recent bargaining experiments demonstrated an impact of anonymity and incomplete information on subjects' behavior. This has rekindled the question whether “fair” behavior is inspired by regard for others or is explained by external forces. To test for the importance of external pressure we compare a standard double blind dictator game to a treatment which provides no information about the source of dictator offers, and where recipients do not even know that they participate in an experiment. We find no differences between treatments. This suggests that those dictators who give are purely internally motivated, as asserted by models of other-regarding preferences.
    Keywords: dictator games, altruism, social preferences
    JEL: A13 C91 D64
    Date: 2005–08
  4. By: Jeffrey Carpenter; Allison Liati; Brian Vickery
    Abstract: Our experiment challenges the standard, social preference, interpretation of choices in the double blind dictator game. In our bilateral treatment both groups are endowed with $20, any fraction of which can be passed to a randomly determined player in the other group. Because both groups have $20 to start, neither inequality aversion nor altruism should motivate people to give. Despite this, the allocations in this treatment are identical to our replication of the standard double blind game implying that altruism might be the wrong interpretation of giving. Instead, we hypothesize that giving might be driven by participants coming to the lab ready “to play.” The fact that there is a strong correlation between participant responses to an attention deficit, hyperactivity disorder questionnaire and both the rate and level of giving provides direct support for this hypothesis. We also show that having players earn their endowments attenuates the bias.
    Keywords: experiment, social preference, altruism, dictator game, impulsivity, demand effect
    JEL: C91
    Date: 2006–02

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