nep-exp New Economics Papers
on Experimental Economics
Issue of 2005‒10‒15
ten papers chosen by
Daniel Houser
George Mason University

  1. Beauty, gender and stereotypes : evidence from laboratory experiments By Andreoni,J.; Petrie,R.
  2. Trust, reciprocity, and contract enforcement : experiments on satisfaction guaranteed By Andreoni,J.
  3. Crowding Out in Blood Donation: Was Titmuss Right? By Mellström, Carl; Johannesson, Magnus
  4. Do Social PreferencesIncrease Productivity? Field experimental evidence from fishermen in Toyoma Bay By Jeffrey Carpenter; Erika Seki
  5. Bounding the Impact of Market Experience on Rationality: Evidence from a Field Experiment with Imperfect Compliance By List, John; Millimet, Daniel
  6. Asymmetric information about rivals' types in standard auctions : an experiment By Andreoni,J.; Che,Y.-K.; Kim,J.
  7. The Market: Catalyst for Rationality and Filter of Irrationality By List, John; Millimet, Daniel
  8. Revealing preferences for fairness in ultimatum bargaining By Andreoni,J.; Castillo,M.; Petrie,R.
  9. The Uncontrolled Social Utility Hypothesis Revisited By Schmidt, Carsten; Zultan, Ro´i
  10. Monitoring sickness insurance claimants: evidence from a social experiment By Hesselius, Patrik; Johansson, Per; Larsson, Laura

  1. By: Andreoni,J.; Petrie,R. (University of Wisconsin-Madison, Social Systems Research Institute)
    Date: 2004
  2. By: Andreoni,J. (University of Wisconsin-Madison, Social Systems Research Institute)
    Date: 2005
  3. By: Mellström, Carl (Department of Economics, School of Economics and Commercial Law, Göteborg University); Johannesson, Magnus (Department of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics)
    Abstract: In his seminal 1970 book, The Gift Relationship, Richard Titmuss argued that monetary compensation for donating blood might crowd out the supply of blood donors. To test this claim we carry out a field experiment with three different treatments. In the first treatment subjects are given the opportunity to become blood donors without any compensation. In the second treatment subjects receive a payment of SEK 50 (¡Ö $7) for becoming blood donors, and in the third treatment subjects can choose between a SEK 50 payment and donating SEK 50 to charity. The results differ markedly between men and women. For men the supply of blood donors is not significantly different among the three experimental groups. For women there is a significant crowding out effect. The supply of blood donors decreases by almost half when a monetary payment is introduced. There is also a significant effect of allowing individuals to donate the payment to charity, and this effect fully counteracts the crowding out effect. <p>
    Keywords: Crowding out; monetary incentives; field experiments; altruism
    JEL: C93 D64 I18 Z13
    Date: 2005–10–06
  4. By: Jeffrey Carpenter; Erika Seki
    Abstract: We provide a reason for the wider economics profession to take social preferences, a concern for the outcomes achieved by other reference agents, seriously. Although, we show that student measures of social preference elicited in an experiment have little external validity when compared to measures obtained from a field experiment with a population of participants who face a social dilemma in their daily lives (i.e. team production), we do find strong links between the social preferences of our field participants and their productivity at work. We also find that the stock of social preferences evolves endogeously with respect to how widely team production is utilized.
    Keywords: Field experiment, social preference, income pooling, productivity
    JEL: C93 D21 D24 H41 J24 M52 M54 Z13
    Date: 2005
  5. By: List, John (U of Chicago); Millimet, Daniel (SMU)
    Abstract: While laboratory experiments documenting some level of irrational behavior are now commonplace, explorations into whether such irrationalities exist in the field are rare. Equally as scarce are studies that explore the influence of market experience on the level and evolution of irrationality. Using field data gathered from more than 380 subjects of age 6-18, we investigate these issues using Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference experiments. To circumvent the endogeneity of market experience, we exogenously induce such experience through the design of a field experiment. Compliance with the experiment was not perfect, however. We are, nevertheless, able to bound the average treatment effect using the sharp bounds derived in Balke and Pearl [Journal of the American Economic Association, 1997, 92, 1171-1776]. Empirical results indicate that deviations from rational behavior exist in the field, but that market experience is a significant contributor to the development of rational choice.
    Keywords: rationality, market learning, field experiment, imperfect compliance, treatment effects, nonparametric bounds, instrumental variables, intent-to-treat
    JEL: C14 C93
    Date: 2005–10
  6. By: Andreoni,J.; Che,Y.-K.; Kim,J. (University of Wisconsin-Madison, Social Systems Research Institute)
    Date: 2006
  7. By: List, John (U of Chicago); Millimet, Daniel (SMU)
    Abstract: Assumptions of individual rationality and preference stability provide the foundation for a convenient and tractable modeling approach. While both of these assumptions have come under scrutiny in distinct literatures, the two lines of research remain disjointed. This study begins by explicitly linking the two literatures while providing insights into perhaps the central issue facing behavioral economics today: to what extent does market experience mitigate various forms of individual irrationality? We find considerable evidence that the market is a catalyst for rationality. The study then focuses on aggregate market outcomes by examining empirically whether individual rationality is a prerequisite for market efficiency. Using field data gathered from more than 380 subjects of age 6-18 in multi-lateral bargaining markets at a shopping mall, we find that the market is a filter of irrationality—even when markets are populated solely by irrational buyers, aggregate market outcomes quickly converge to neoclassical predictions.
    Keywords: rationality, market learning, field experiment, competitive market theory
    JEL: C93 D4
    Date: 2005–10
  8. By: Andreoni,J.; Castillo,M.; Petrie,R. (University of Wisconsin-Madison, Social Systems Research Institute)
    Date: 2004
  9. By: Schmidt, Carsten (Sonderforschungsbereich 504); Zultan, Ro´i (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Center for Rationality and School of Education)
    Abstract: The experiment disentangles communication and social effect in face−to−face communication. The results question the previous interpretation of communication effects in ultimatum bargaining, and suggest that separate processes, both of a strategic and of an affective−social nature induce cooperative outcomes.
    Date: 2005–07–04
  10. By: Hesselius, Patrik (IFAU - Institute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation); Johansson, Per (IFAU - Institute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation); Larsson, Laura (IFAU - Institute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation)
    Abstract: The paper exploits a unique social experiment carried out in 1988 in Sweden to identify the effect of monitoring on sickness absence. The treatment consists of postponing the first formal point of monitoring during a sickness absence spell, a requirement for a doctor’s certificate, from day eight to day fifteen. The experiment was conducted in two geographical areas, and the treatment group was randomized by birth date. The results show strong effects on sickness absence duration from extending the waiting period in both areas. On average, the durations increased by 6.6 percent. No effect on incidence of sickness absence is found. A heterogeneity analysis reveals that monitoring affects men more than women.
    Keywords: Absenteeism; sickness insurance; monitoring; social experiment
    JEL: H55 I18 J22 J28
    Date: 2005–06–19

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