nep-exp New Economics Papers
on Experimental Economics
Issue of 2005‒08‒28
six papers chosen by
Daniel Houser
George Mason University

  1. Actions and beliefs: estimating distribution-based preferences using a large scale experiment with probability questions on expectations By Bellamare,Charles; Kroeger,Sabine; Soest,Arthur van
  2. An Experimental Test of Advice and Social Learning By Boðaçhan Çelen; Shachar Kariv; Andrew Schotter
  3. Sequential Equilibrium in Monotone Games: Theory-Based Analysis of Experimental Data By Syngjoo Choi; Douglas Gale; Shachar Kariv
  4. Noise sensitivity and chaos in social choice theory By Gil Kalai
  5. Distinguishing Social Preferences from Preferences for Altruism By Raymond Fisman; Shachar Kariv; Daniel Markovits
  6. Information in Mechanism Design By Dirk Bergemann; Juuso Valimaki

  1. By: Bellamare,Charles; Kroeger,Sabine; Soest,Arthur van (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research)
    Abstract: We combine the choice data of proposers and responders in the ultimatum game, their expectations elicited in the form of subjective probability questions, and the choice data of proposers ("dictator") in a dictator game to estimate a structural model of decision making under uncertainty. We use a large and representative sample of subjects drawn from the Dutch population. Our results indicate that there is considerable heterogeneity in preferences for equity in the population. Changes in preferences have an important impact on decisions of dictators in the dictator game and responders in the ultimatum game, but a smaller impact on decisions of proposer's in the ultimatum game, a result due to proposers subjective expectations about responders' decisions. The model which uses subjective data on expectations has better predictive power and lower noise level than a model which assumes that players have rational expectations.
    Keywords: ultimatum game;inquity aversion;subjective expectations
    JEL: C93 D63 D84
    Date: 2005
  2. By: Boðaçhan Çelen; Shachar Kariv; Andrew Schotter
    Date: 2005–08–19
  3. By: Syngjoo Choi; Douglas Gale; Shachar Kariv
    Date: 2005–08–19
  4. By: Gil Kalai
    Date: 2005–08–19
  5. By: Raymond Fisman; Shachar Kariv; Daniel Markovits
    Date: 2005–08–19
  6. By: Dirk Bergemann (Cowles Foundation, Yale University); Juuso Valimaki (Dept. of Economics, Helsinki School of Economics, University of Southampton)
    Abstract: We survey the recent literature on the role of information for mechanism design. We specifically consider the role of endogeneity of and robustness to private information in mechanism design. We view information acquisition of and robustness to private information as two distinct but related aspects of information management important in many design settings. We review the existing literature and point out directions for additional future work.
    Keywords: Mechanism Design, Information Acquisition, Ex Post Equilibrium, Robust Mechanism Design, Interdependent Values, Information Management
    JEL: C79 D82
    Date: 2005–08

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