2005-07-11 papers

on Experimental Economics

Issue of 2005–07–11
one paper chosen by
Daniel Houser, George Mason University

Endogenous timing in duopoly: experimental evidence By Fonseca,Miguel A.; Mueller,Wieland; Normann,Hans-Theo

Endogenous timing in duopoly: experimental evidence

By:	Fonseca,Miguel A.; Mueller,Wieland; Normann,Hans-Theo (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research)
Abstract:	In this paper we experimentally investigate the extended game with observable delay of Hamilton and Slutsky (Games Econ. Beh., 1990). Firms bindingly announce a production period (one out of two periods) and then they produce in the announced sequence. Theory predicts simultaneous production in period one but we find that a substantial proportion of subjects choose the second period.
JEL:	C72 C92 D43
Date:	2005
URL:	https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200577

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