nep-exp New Economics Papers
on Experimental Economics
Issue of 2005‒05‒14
one paper chosen by
Daniel Houser
George Mason University

  1. Multi-Unit Auctions: A Comparison of Static and Dynamic Mechanisms By Alejandro Manelli; Martin Sefton; Benjamin Wilner

  1. By: Alejandro Manelli (W. P. Carey School of Business Department of Economics); Martin Sefton (University of Newcastle); Benjamin Wilner (LECG/Navigant Consulting)
    Abstract: We compare, experimentally, the Vickrey auction and an ascending-price auction recently introduced by Ausubel (1997). We evaluate the relative performance of both auctions in terms of efficiency and revenue in multi-unit environments where valuations either have a common-value component or are private information. We find that the Ausubel auction is less prone to overbidding and may yield higher revenue than the Vickrey auction. The gain in revenue seems to be coupled with a loss of efficiency.

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