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on Experimental Economics |
| By: | James Andreoni |
| Date: | 2005–03–18 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levrem:666156000000000679&r=exp |
| By: | Dorothea Alewell; Wiebke Kuklys; Colette Friedrich; Werner Güth |
| Abstract: | A firm with stochastic demand can rely on hired hands when demand is low and rent additional labour when demand is higher. For high demand this implies the co-employment of hired hands, paid directly by the firm, and of rented hands who are paid by a rental agency. This may cause severe problems if wages differ systematically between hired and rented hands. Will rented hands accept lower wages than hired hands? Or will rented hands demand higher wages as a compensation for flexibility? Fairness norms might play an important role in wage-setting decisions. We will explore theoretically and experimentally possible fairness considerations of the involved parties. |
| Keywords: | Principal-agent problem, rented labour, fairness, wage discrimination, outsourcing |
| JEL: | C7 C91 D23 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:esi:discus:2005-08&r=exp |
| By: | Toshiji Kawagoe; Hirokazu Takizawa |
| Abstract: | We conduct experiments of a cheap-talk game with incomplete information in which one sender type has an incentive to misrepresent her type. Although that Sender type mostly lies in the experiments, the Receiver tends to believe the Sender's messages. This confirms "truth bias" reported in communication theory in a oneshot, anonymous environment without nonverbal cues. These results cannot be explained by existing refinement theories, while a bounded rationality model explains them under certain conditions. We claim that the theory for the evolution of language should address why truthful communication survives in the environment in which lying succeeds. |
| Date: | 2005–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eti:dpaper:05018&r=exp |
| By: | Johansson-Stenman, Olof (Department of Economics, School of Economics and Commercial Law, Göteborg University); Mahmud, Minhaj (Department of Economics, School of Economics and Commercial Law, Göteborg University); Martinsson, Peter (Department of Economics, School of Economics and Commercial Law, Göteborg University) |
| Abstract: | Levels of trust are measured by asking standard survey questions on trust and by observing the behaviour in a trust game using a random sample in rural Bangladesh. Follow-up questions and correlations between the sent amount in the trust game and stated expectations reveal that the amount sent in the trust game is a weak measure of trust. The fear of future punishment, either within or after this life, for not being sufficiently generous to others, was the most frequently stated motive behind the respondents’ behaviour, highlighting the potential importance of motives that cannot be inferred directly from people’s behaviour. <p> |
| Keywords: | Trust; trust game; social capital; field experiment; Bangladesh |
| JEL: | C93 Z13 |
| Date: | 2005–03–31 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:gunwpe:0166&r=exp |
| By: | Johansson-Stenman, Olof (Department of Economics, School of Economics and Commercial Law, Göteborg University); Mahmud, Minhaj (Department of Economics, School of Economics and Commercial Law, Göteborg University); Martinsson, Peter (Department of Economics, School of Economics and Commercial Law, Göteborg University) |
| Abstract: | Trust is measured using both survey questions and a standard trust experiment using a random sample of individuals in rural Bangladesh. We found no significant effect of the social distance between Hindus and Muslims in the trust experiment in terms of fractions sent or returned, but the responses to the survey questions indicate significant differences: Hindus, the minority, trust other people less in general, and Hindus trust Muslims more than the other way around. <p> |
| Keywords: | social capital; trust; social distance; religion; trust game; field experiment; Bangladesh |
| JEL: | C93 Z13 |
| Date: | 2005–03–31 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:gunwpe:0167&r=exp |
| By: | Février Philippe; Linnemer Laurent; Visser Michael |
| Abstract: | This paper reports the results from an experiment on two-unit sequential auctions with and without a buyer’s option (which gives the winner of the first auction the right to buy the second unit at the winning price). The demand for the two items is either decreasing, flat, or increasing. The 4 main auction institutions (first-price, Dutch, second-price, English) are studied. We find that observed bidding behavior is close to Nash equilibrium bidding in the auctions for the second unit, but there are substantial deviations in the auctions for the first unit. Despite these deviations, the buyer’s option is correctly used in most cases. The revenue-ranking of the 4 auction institutions is the same as in single-unit experiments. Finally, successive prices are declining when the buyer’s option is available. The last 2 results are used to compare real-life auctions and to discuss the findings in related field-data studies. |
| Keywords: | experimental economics, sequential auctions, buyer's option |
| JEL: | C91 D44 |
| Date: | 2004–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lea:leawpi:0410&r=exp |
| By: | Lisa R. Anderson (Department of Economics, College of William and Mary); Jeffrey R. Gerlach (Department of Economics, College of William and Mary); Francis J. DiTraglia (Department of Economics, College of William and Mary) |
| Abstract: | In the first experimental test of the January effect, we find an economically large and statistically significant result in two very different auction environments. After controlling for variables that could influence subjectsÕ bids such as differences in private values, cumulative earnings, and learning effects, the prices in the January markets were systematically higher than those in December. The results suggest that psychological factors may contribute to the well-documented January effect in empirical stock market data, a conclusion that clearly violates the efficient markets hypothesis. |
| Date: | 2005–03–28 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cwm:wpaper:15&r=exp |
| By: | Isabelle Brocas; Juan D. Carillo |
| Abstract: | We analyze an agency model where one individual decides how much evidence he collects. We assume that he has free access to information, but all the news acquired become automatically public. Conditional on the information disclosed, a second individual with conflicting preferences undertakes an action that a ects the payo of both agents. In this game of incomplete but symmetric information, we show that the first individual obtains rents due to his superior ability to decide whether to collect or forego evidence, i.e., due to his control in the generation of (public) information. We provide an analytical characterization of these rents, that we label “rents of public ignorance”. They can be interpreted as, for example, the degree of influence that a chairman can exert on a committee due exclusively to his capacity to decide whether to keep discussions alive or terminate them and call a vote. Last, we show that similar insights are obtained if the agent decides first how much private information he collects and then how much of this information he transmits to the other agent. |
| Keywords: | principal-agent, incomplete and symmetric information, learning, experimentation, optimal stopping rule, informational rents, information control, public ignorance |
| Date: | 2005–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:scp:wpaper:05-9&r=exp |