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on Experimental Economics |
| By: | Gari Walkowitz; Clemens Oberhammer; Heike Hennig-Schmidt |
| Abstract: | We report a new method for Experimenting over a Long Distance (ELD) allowing to simultaneously run decentralized interactive experiments in geographically separated subject pools. We apply ELD to an intercultural trust experiment with participants from Argentina, China and Germany. |
| Keywords: | interactive intercultural experiments, investment game, trust |
| JEL: | C72 C81 C91 F00 O57 |
| Date: | 2004–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse17_2004&r=exp |
| By: | Heike Hennig-Schmidt; Zhu-Yu Li; Chaoliang Yang |
| Abstract: | When using the strategy method in ultimatum bargaining, many researchers ask responders for the minimal acceptable offer only implicitly assuming strategies to be monotone. Recent research has shown, however, that subjects decline disadvantageous and advantageous proposals. We report on an ultimatum game video experiment where more than 50 percent of the responders rejected advantageous offers. Proposers and responders acted together in groups of three people each and were video taped during decision making. The videotapes then were content analyzed. Our experimental design provides the unique opportunity to learn from participants’ spontaneous discussions about their motivations for rejecting advantageous offers. Main motives are social concern, non-expectancy of high offers, emotional, ethical, and moral reasons, group-specific decision rules and aversion against unpleasant numbers. |
| Keywords: | ultimatum game, video experiments, strategy method, content analysis, non-monotone strategies, social preferences |
| JEL: | C78 C81 C91 C92 F00 O53 O57 |
| Date: | 2004–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse22_2004&r=exp |
| By: | Thorsten Chmura; Thomas Pitz |
| Abstract: | This paper reports laboratory experiments and simulations on a minority game. The minority game is the most important example for a classic non-zerosum- game. The game can be applied on different situations with social and economic contests. We chose an elementary traffic scenario, in which subjects had to choose between a road A and a road B. Nine subjects participated in each session. Subjects played 100 rounds and had to choose between one of the roads. The road which the minority of players chose got positive payoffs. We constructed an extended reinforcement model which fits the empirical data. |
| Date: | 2004–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse23_2004&r=exp |
| By: | Thorsten Chmura; Thomas Pitz |
| Abstract: | The paper reports simulations applied on two similar congestion games: the first is the classical minority game. The second one is a asymmetric variation of the minority game with linear payoff functions. For each game simulation results based on an extended reinforcement algorithm are compared with real experimental statistics. It is shown that the extension of the reinforcement model is essential for fitting the experimental data and estimating the players behaviour. |
| Keywords: | congestion game, minority game, laboratory experiments, reinforcement algorithm, payoff sum model |
| JEL: | C91 C92 C15 R4 |
| Date: | 2004–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse24_2004&r=exp |
| By: | Dorothea K. Herreiner; Clemens Puppe |
| Abstract: | In the recent experimental literature several social preference models have been suggested that address observed behavior not reducible to the pursuit of self-interest. Inequality aversion is one such model where preferences are distributional. Frequently, envy is suggested as the underlying rationale for inequality aversion. Envy is a central criterion in the theoretical literature on fair division, whose definition (Foley 1967) differs from the more casual use of the word in the experimental literature. We present and discuss results from free-form bargaining experiments on fair division problems where the role of envy in Foley’s sense can be analyzed and compared to social preferences. We find that envy freeness does matter as a secondary criterion. |
| Keywords: | Fairness, Envy Freeness, Social Preferences, Bargaining |
| JEL: | A13 C78 C91 D63 |
| Date: | 2004–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse28_2004&r=exp |
| By: | Dorothea K. Herreiner; Clemens Puppe |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we report on a series of free-form bargaining experiments in which two players have to distribute four indivisible goods among themselves. In one treatment the monetary payoffs associated with each bundle of goods are common knowledge; in a second treatment only the ordinal ranking of the bundles is given. We find that in both cases, the following qualitative rule yields a good explanation of individual behavior: First determine the most equal distribution, then find a Pareto improvement provided that this does not create “too much” inequality. In the ordinal treatment, individuals apparently use the ranks in the respective preference orderings over bundles as a substitute for the unknown monetary value. Interestingly, we find much less Pareto-damaging behavior due to inequality aversion in the ordinal treatment. |
| Date: | 2004–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse29_2004&r=exp |
| By: | Holm, Håkan (Department of Economics, Lund University) |
| Abstract: | People may be better at recognizing lies than truths or better at recognizing truths than lies. Such detection biases are analyzed theoretically and experimentally. The detection bias shrinks the equilibrium set to a unique non-pooling equilibrium, in which, the better a player is to detect lies the more often will the opponent player lie. In the experiment, subjects were telling the truth too often according to standard predictions. Other findings were a significant positive correlation between self-rated bluffing ability and actual bluffing performance. Furthermore, the subjects were more prone to lie to a woman than to a man. |
| Keywords: | Bluffing; Game theory; Truth detection; Lie detection; Experiment |
| JEL: | C72 C91 D82 |
| Date: | 2004–12–22 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2004_030&r=exp |