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on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Oded Galor |
| Abstract: | This essay suggests that the evolution of human cooperation over the course of human history should be viewed as a two-layer process. A foundational layer, rooted in subsistence and ecological pressures, shaped cooperative dispositions unevenly, whereas an expansionary layer, rooted in conflict and stratification, generated large-scale cooperation in societies in which its seeds were formed. The first evolutionary layer unfolded over the grand arc of human evolution, reinforcing the capacity for small-scale cooperation in hunter-gatherer societies while favoring traits complementary to cooperation only in some sedentary societies. The second evolutionary layer emerged as rising population density heightened external threats, fostered coercive centralized authority, and raised the returns to public infrastructure. In environments where cooperative traits had already evolved, warfare, extraction, and infrastructure provision reinforced these predispositions, transforming them into durable collective institutions. Yet in settings where such cultural foundations were absent, large-scale collective action was more challenging, and conflict was often destabilizing, magnifying division and political fragility. Recognizing the profound global heterogeneity in this foundational layer of cooperative behavior is essential for identifying the origins of large-scale cooperation and the conditions under which conflict reinforced cooperative capacity rather than intensifying fragmentation. |
| Keywords: | Cultural Evolution, Unified Growth Theory, Future-oriented mindset, Cooperation, Malthusian epoch, The Journey of Humanity |
| JEL: | O10 Z10 |
| Date: | 2026–04 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:crm:wpaper:26119 |
| By: | Kanato Nakakuni; Michèle Tertilt; Minchul Yum |
| Abstract: | This chapter examines how social norms shape fer lity behavior. We first present cross-country evidence linking fer lity to norms regarding family size, childcare, gender roles, paren ng, and sexual behavior. We also review empirical studies showing substan al fer lity spillovers within families, workplaces, and social networks. To interpret these pa erns, we present a series of models to clarify the mechanisms through which norms and fer lity decisions interact. We organize the theories by type of norm: norms about ideal family size, norms governing the use of market childcare, gender norms within the household, paren ng norms related to educa onal investment and social comparison, and norms surrounding birth control. We discuss how changes in social norms over me may have contributed to fer lity decline. Finally, we highlight promising direc ons for future research. |
| Keywords: | Fertility, Social Norms, Externality, Pro-natal Policies |
| JEL: | D1 D62 I28 J13 N3 |
| Date: | 2026–05 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2025_747 |
| By: | Paolo Pin; Roberto Rozzi |
| Abstract: | We study the emergence of conformity preferences in an environment in which agents choose effort under heterogeneous, possibly misspecified returns, and social interactions do not directly affect material payoffs. Some agents choose effort by trading off performance and conformity to expected peer behavior. We characterize subjective best responses. For any given beliefs, an optimal and unique level of peer pressure exists and is evolutionarily stable within groups of agents sharing the same misspecification. Such a level is zero for correctly specified agents and may be positive for misspecified ones. When the efficient level of peer pressure is interior, misspecified agents choose effort equal to their true return, resulting in an equilibrium behavior that is both self-confirming and Nash, allowing the persistence of misspecifications. Peer pressure need not generate long-run allocative distortions, but it creates a perceived value of social information. In equilibrium, this value depends only on misspecification, generating scope for informational rents. |
| Date: | 2026–05 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2605.02756 |
| By: | Bertocchi, Graziella; Dimico, Arcangelo; Tedeschi, Gian Luca |
| Abstract: | Using a combination of individual-level, bioclimatic, ethnographic, and archaeological data, we investigate the ancient origins of cross-country variation in preferences for redistribution. Our hypothesis is that contemporary attitudes toward redistribution are shaped by ancestral inequality, which arose as an endogenous adaptation of pre-Neolithic hunter-gatherer societies to seasonal food shortages induced by the seasonality of the wild progenitors of domesticated crops. Employing contemporary survey data and an epidemiological approach, we first show that migrants originating from countries characterized by higher ancestral inequality exhibit lower support for redistribution, and that this relationship is driven by the degree of crop seasonality in the migrants' origin countries. Next, using data on premodern societies, we show that crop seasonality induces food storage practices, which in turn lead to inequality. The positive effect of food storage on inequality is corroborated by data from archaeological sites. Finally, drawing on data from preindustrial polities, we uncover that the mechanism linking food storage to redistributive preferences operates through the positive influence of the former on tolerance for inequality. |
| Keywords: | Preferences for redistribution, seasonal food shortage, crop seasonality, food storage, inequality, tolerance for inequality |
| JEL: | D63 H23 N50 O13 Z10 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:glodps:1757 |