nep-evo New Economics Papers
on Evolutionary Economics
Issue of 2025–10–20
six papers chosen by
Matthew Baker, City University of New York


  1. Misspecified learning and evolutionary stability By Kevin He; Jonathan Libgober
  2. On the Persistence of Persistence: Lessons from Long-term Trends in African Institutions By Marvin Suesse; Morten Jerven
  3. Group Formation through Game Theory and Agent-Based Modeling: Spatial Cohesion, Heterogeneity, and Resource Pooling By Chenlan Wang; Jimin Han; Diana Jue-Rajasingh
  4. Historical Government: Origins, Evolution and Varieties By Leander Heldring
  5. Mechanisms Are What You Need: A Sociological Theory Based on Adaptation, Evolution, and Human Behavior By Liu, Yan
  6. Adaptive Learning in Spatial Agent-Based Models for Climate Risk Assessment: A Geospatial Framework with Evolutionary Economic Agents By Yara Mohajerani

  1. By: Kevin He; Jonathan Libgober
    Abstract: We extend the indirect evolutionary approach to the selection of (possibly misspecified) models. Agents with different models match in pairs to play a stage game, where models define feasible beliefs about game parameters and about others' strategies. In equilibrium, each agent adopts the feasible belief that best fits their data and plays optimally given their beliefs. We define the stability of the resident model by comparing its equilibrium payoff with that of the entrant model, and provide conditions under which the correctly specified resident model can only be destabilized by misspecified entrant models that contain multiple feasible beliefs (that is, entrant models that permit inference). We also show that entrants may do well in their matches against the residents only when the entrant population is large, due to the endogeneity of misspecified beliefs. Applications include the selection of demand-elasticity misperception in Cournot duopoly and the emergence of analogy-based reasoning in centipede games.
    Date: 2025–09
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2509.16067
  2. By: Marvin Suesse (Department of Economics, Trinity College Dublin); Morten Jerven (Norwegian University of Life Sciences)
    Abstract: An influential strand of literature within economics and economic history called ‘persistence studies’ argues that low material living standards in African countries today were determined by institutional choices made in the past. However, the lack of consistent annual data on GDP per capita or institutional variables has meant that this literature has been largely silent as to whether their proposed relationships hold throughout the period it studies. This has made persistence studies vulnerable to criticisms of making leaps of faith or contributing to a ‘compression of history’. Here, we draw on a data set of tax revenues for African polities for the period 1900-2015, with which we proxy the institutional capacity of a state. We then test whether some of the most influential determinants stressed in the persistence literature exert a consistent effect on our measure of institutions. Our findings suggest that the effect of population density and colonizer identity on institutions is not persistent. We find mixed results for precolonial centralization and ethnic fractionalization, while results for slave exports and settler mortality are more in accordance with theory. Overall, our results support the view that historical persistence should be measured, not simply assumed.
    Keywords: Persistence; Institutions; Africa; Settler mortality; Slave trades; Fiscal capacity
    JEL: O11 O55 N17 H30
    Date: 2025–10
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tcd:tcduee:tep1225
  3. By: Chenlan Wang; Jimin Han; Diana Jue-Rajasingh
    Abstract: This paper develops a game-theoretic model and an agent-based model to study group formation driven by resource pooling, spatial cohesion, and heterogeneity. We focus on cross-sector partnerships (CSPs) involving public, private, and nonprofit organizations, each contributing distinct resources. Group formation occurs as agents strategically optimize their choices in response to others within a competitive setting. We prove the existence of stable group equilibria and simulate formation dynamics under varying spatial and resource conditions. The results show that limited individual resources lead to groups that form mainly among nearby actors, while abundant resources allow groups to move across larger distances. Increased resource heterogeneity and spatial proximity promote the formation of larger and more diverse groups. These findings reveal key trade-offs shaping group size and composition, guiding strategies for effective cross-sector collaborations and multi-agent systems.
    Date: 2025–09
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2509.18551
  4. By: Leander Heldring
    Abstract: This chapter reviews the origins, evolution, and modern forms of government, and proposes a research agenda. It contends that rather than being a homogeneous form of patrimonialism, early government was diverse and, at times, fostered order and prosperity. Its subsequent development did not follow an ‘evolutionary’ path to rational-legal government but was characterized by innovation and frequent collapse. Successful modern states do not all look alike, but follow several different models, as historical states have done.
    JEL: D74 H10 N20 N40 O43 P16
    Date: 2025–10
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:34370
  5. By: Liu, Yan
    Abstract: This study posits that macro-social structures are not determined by macro-level laws but emerge from interactions among micro-level biological and psychological foundations of individuals. To this end, we first construct a novel micro-foundational model: the "Model of Cognition and Practice Governed by the Desire Mechanism." Drawing on methodologies from computer science, we introduce analytical frameworks of "Variation and Evolution" and "System Adaptation" to facilitate the study of systemic macro-level manifestations and their underlying causes. Building on this foundation, we demonstrate how macro-level regularities, including those empirical patterns accurately identified by Marxism, emerge and evolve from micro-level mechanisms. Ultimately, this research develops theoretical tools such as "Social Internal and External Adaptation and Their Co-adaptation" and the "Social Ripple Model, " applying them to interpret several contentious historical issues. This study aims to transcend the traditional dichotomy between reductionism and holism, establishing a mechanistic theoretical framework for sociology that is compatible with contemporary natural sciences.
    Date: 2025–10–08
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:hdb42_v1
  6. By: Yara Mohajerani
    Abstract: Climate risk assessment requires modelling complex interactions between spatially heterogeneous hazards and adaptive economic systems. We present a novel geospatial agent-based model that integrates climate hazard data with evolutionary learning for economic agents. Our framework combines Mesa-based spatial modelling with CLIMADA climate impact assessment, introducing adaptive learning behaviours that allow firms to evolve strategies for budget allocation, pricing, wages, and risk adaptation through fitness-based selection and mutation. We demonstrate the framework using riverine flood projections under RCP8.5 until 2100, showing that evolutionary adaptation enables firms to converge with baseline (no hazard) production levels after decades of disruption due to climate stress. Our results reveal systemic risks where even agents that are not directly exposed to floods face impacts through supply chain disruptions, with the end-of-century average price of goods 5.6% higher under RCP8.5 compared to the baseline. This open-source framework provides financial institutions and companies with tools to quantify both direct and cascading climate risks while evaluating cost-effective adaptation strategies.
    Date: 2025–09
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2509.18633

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