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on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Augustin Bergeron; Jean-Paul Carvalho; Joseph Henrich; Nathan Nunn; Jonathan L. Weigel |
| Abstract: | This chapter examines the consequences of zero-sum environments for cultural change, innovation, and long-term economic growth. We introduce innovation into the framework developed by Bergeron et al. (forthcoming), in which zero-sum environments give rise to demotivating beliefs. Although demotivating beliefs improve static efficiency by limiting excessive competition in zero-sum environments, we show that they can also impede long-term growth. Because demotivating beliefs suppress effort, they can also reduce learning-by-doing and other production spillovers. Hence, they can inhibit innovation and act as a cultural evolutionary kludge. We apply the model to explain the cultural changes associated with Western Europe's economic rise after 1500. |
| JEL: | N10 O10 Q55 |
| Date: | 2026–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:35813 |
| By: | Trung V. Vu |
| Abstract: | This study investigates the role of long-term population relatedness in shaping global variation in state capacity. It argues that longer periods of ancestral separation are associated with greater divergence in intergenerationally transmitted civic norms governing voluntary compliance with state institutions. Ancestral distance may also hinder the international diffusion of effective state institutions, contributing to persistent cross-country differences in state capacity. The empirical analysis shows that countries with greater ancestral distance from the global frontier of effective state institutions exhibit lower state capacity. Dyadic regressions further indicate that ancestral distance is associated with greater divergence in state capacity. To examine a potential cultural foundation of this relationship, I exploit variation in cultural backgrounds among second-generation immigrants residing in the same country. I find that immigrant populations with greater ancestral distance exhibit larger differences in self-reported attitudes towards voluntary tax compliance. Taken together, the findings suggest that ancestral distance is an important historical predictor of cross-country disparities in state capacity, consistent with a role for divergence in civic norms and barriers to institutional diffusion. |
| Keywords: | ancestral distance, long-term relatedness, state capacity, civic culture |
| JEL: | H11 H77 O11 O19 P51 |
| Date: | 2026–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:een:camaaa:2026-84 |
| By: | Diane Coffey; Michael Geruso; Dean Spears; Sangita Vyas |
| Abstract: | Many population projections used by international and government agencies assume that, in today's low-fertility societies, future fertility rates will stop declining and roughly stabilize. This paper assesses the evidence for an equilibrium point or rebound from low levels. We show that there is no robust evidence for a systematic fertility rebound, or for a stable equilibrium point at any fertility level conventionally assumed. Instead, where and when fertility has fallen low, it has tended to keep falling. This is true across a range of data sources, time periods, and fertility measures: United Nations data on period total fertility rates for all country-years from 1950 to 2023; Human Fertility Database data on completed fertility for cohorts born between 1935 and 1975 in 31 countries; and fertility rates in subnational geographies in Japan, India, and the United States. We reconcile these results with a prior literature that documented fertility reversals among some low-fertility countries in the early 2000s. Our findings provide an empirical basis for re-examining the equilibrium and rebound assumptions embedded in widely used population projections. |
| JEL: | C53 J11 J13 |
| Date: | 2026–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:35824 |
| By: | Støstad, Morten Nyborg (Dept. of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration) |
| Abstract: | This paper introduces a theory of popular support for inequality reduction based on rational self-interest. In a controlled experiment across 40 countries and 92, 696 respondents, I isolate altruistic transfers from self-preserving transfers made to avoid perceived negative consequences of inequality. Many non-altruistic individuals transfer to individuals with smaller allocations to protect themselves from harmful consequences, creating selfish equality. Across countries, selfish equality accounts for substantially more cross-country variation in societal redistribution than altruistic giving or any other leading alternative explanation from the literature. The results suggest that redistributive societies are not distinguished by particular fairness views, but by a shared belief that equality is pragmatically beneficial for all citizens. |
| Keywords: | Selfish equality; fairness views |
| JEL: | C91 |
| Date: | 2026–10–02 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:nhheco:2026_015 |