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on Evolutionary Economics |
By: | Pierre Bousseyroux; Gilles Z\'erah; Michael Benzaquen |
Abstract: | Stabilizing cooperation among self-interested individuals presents a fundamental challenge in evolutionary theory and social science. While classical models predict the dominance of defection in social dilemmas, empirical and theoretical studies have identified various mechanisms that promote cooperation, including kin selection, reciprocity, and spatial structure. In this work, we investigate the role of localized imitation in the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation within an optional Public Goods Game (PGG). We introduce a model where individuals belong to distinct groups and adapt their strategies based solely on comparisons within their own group. We identify different dynamical regimes, including stable fixed points, limit cycles, and Rock-Scissors-Paper-type oscillations. Our analysis, grounded in a replicator-type framework, reveals that such group-level imitation can stabilize cooperative behavior, provided that groups are not initially polarized around a single strategy. In other words, restricting imitation to group-level interactions mitigates the destabilizing effects of global competition, providing a potential explanation for the resilience of cooperation in structured populations. |
Date: | 2025–04 |
URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2504.05086 |
By: | Sascha O. Becker; Amma Panin; Steven Pfaff; Jared Rubin |
Abstract: | This chapter examines the role of religion in economic development, both historically and today. Religion’s influence varies globally, with high religiosity in countries like Pakistan and low rates in China. Despite declines in some Western countries, religion remains influential worldwide, with projected growth in Muslim populations due to higher fertility rates. Religion continues to shape societal norms and institutions, such as education and politics, even after its direct influence fades. The chapter explores how religious institutions and norms have impacted economic outcomes, focusing on both persistence and decline. It also examines cultural transmission, institutional entrenchment, networks, and religious competition as mechanisms sustaining religion’s influence. We explore the relationship between religion and secularization, showing that economic development does not always reduce religiosity. Lastly, the chapter highlights gaps in the literature and suggests future research areas on the evolving role of religion in economic development. |
Keywords: | religion, economic development, religiosity, cultural transmission, secularization, historical persistence, religious competition, networks, social norms |
JEL: | D85 I25 J10 N30 O33 O43 P48 Z10 Z12 |
Date: | 2025 |
URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11724 |
By: | Arunava Patra; Joy Das Bairagya; Sagar Chakraborty |
Abstract: | The symbiotic relationship between the frameworks of classical game theory and evolutionary game theory is well-established. However, evolutionary game theorists have mostly tapped into the classical game of complete information where players are completely informed of all other players' payoffs. Of late, there is a surge of interest in eco-evolutionary interactions where the environment's state is changed by the players' actions which, in turn, are influenced by the changing environment. However, in real life, the information about the true environmental state must pass through some noisy channel (like usually imperfect sensory apparatus of the players) before it is perceived by the players: The players naturally are prone to sometimes perceive the true state erroneously. Given the uncertain perceived environment, the players may adopt bet-hedging kind of strategies in which they play different actions in different perceptions. In a population of such ill-informed players, a player would be confused about the information state of her opponent, and an incomplete information situation akin to a Bayesian game surfaces. In short, we contemplate possibility of natural emergence of symbiotic relationship between the frameworks of Bayesian games and eco-evolutionary games when the players are equipped with inefficient sensory apparatus. Herein, we illustrate this connection using a setup of infinitely large, well-mixed population of players equipped with two actions for exploiting a resource (the environment) at two different rates so that the resource state evolves accordingly. The state of the resource impacts every player's decision of playing particular action. We investigate continuous state environment in the presence of a Gaussian noisy channel. Employing the formalism of replicator dynamics, we find that noisy information can be effective in preventing resource from going extinct. |
Date: | 2025–04 |
URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2504.02399 |