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on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Vikash Kumar Dubey; Suman Chakraborty; Arunava Patra; Sagar Chakraborty |
| Abstract: | Evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is the defining concept of evolutionary game theory. It has a fairly unanimously accepted definition for the case of symmetric games which are played in a homogeneous population where all individuals are in same role. However, in asymmetric games, which are played in a population with multiple subpopulations (each of which has individuals in one particular role), situation is not as clear. Various generalizations of ESS defined for such cases differ in how they correspond to fixed points of replicator equation which models evolutionary dynamics of frequencies of strategies in the population. Moreover, some of the definitions may even be equivalent, and hence, redundant in the scheme of things. Along with reporting some new results, this paper is partly indented as a contextual mini-review of some of the most important definitions of ESS in asymmetric games. We present the definitions coherently and scrutinize them closely while establishing equivalences -- some of them hitherto unreported -- between them wherever possible. Since it is desirable that a definition of ESS should correspond to asymptotically stable fixed points of replicator dynamics, we bring forward the connections between various definitions and their dynamical stabilities. Furthermore, we find the use of principle of relative entropy to gain information-theoretic insights into the concept of ESS in asymmetric games, thereby establishing a three-fold connection between game theory, dynamical system theory, and information theory in this context. We discuss our conclusions also in the backdrop of asymmetric hypermatrix games where more than two individuals interact simultaneously in the course of getting payoffs. |
| Date: | 2024–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2409.19320 |
| By: | Adam Zylbersztejn (Université Lyon 2, Université Jean Monnet Saint-Etienne, Emlyon Business School, GATE, CNRS, 69007, Lyon, France; research fellow at Vistula University Warsaw (AFiBV), Warsaw, Poland); Zakaria Babutsidze (SKEMA Business School, Université Côte d’Azur (GREDEG), Nice, France); Nobuyuki Hanaki (Institute of Social and Economic Research, the University of Osaka, Japan, and University of Limassol, Cyprus); Astrid Hopfensitz (Emlyon Business School, Université Lyon 2, Université Jean Monnet Saint-Etienne, GATE, CNRS, 69007, Lyon, France) |
| Abstract: | In social interactions, humans care about knowing their partner’s face. Some experiments report that facial information facilitates trustworthiness detection, while others find it does not. We add to this literature by exploring heterogeneity in the demand for, and in the usefulness of, facial information. The incentivized experimental task consists in predicting strangers’ trustworthiness from neutral portrait pictures. Using data from a three-stage laboratory experiment (N = 357) including two independent sets of stimuli coupled with two distinct sources of predictions, we document substantial heterogeneity in facial informativeness. However, we find that trustworthiness detection from facial information is not an ability. Nonetheless, individuals assign excessive value to receiving facial information about others. |
| Keywords: | trustworthiness, inference, facial information, individual heterogeneity, hidden action game, economic experiment |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gat:wpaper:2527 |
| By: | Jan Majewski; Francesca Giardini |
| Abstract: | Gossip has been shown to be a relatively efficient solution to problems of cooperation in reputation-based systems of exchange, but many studies don't conceptualize gossiping in a realistic way, often assuming near-perfect information or broadcast-like dynamics of its spread. To solve this problem, we developed an agent-based model that pairs realistic gossip processes with different variants of Trust Game. The results show that cooperators suffer when local interactions govern spread of gossip, because they cannot discriminate against defectors. Realistic gossiping increases the overall amount of resources, but is more likely to promote defection. Moreover, even partner selection through dynamic networks can lead to high payoff inequalities among agent types. Cooperators face a choice between outcompeting defectors and overall growth. By blending direct and indirect reciprocity with reputations we show that gossiping increases the efficiency of cooperation by an order of magnitude. |
| Date: | 2025–11 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2511.20248 |
| By: | Irving Argaez Corona (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Béatrice Boulu-Reshef (THEMA - Théorie économique, modélisation et applications - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - CY - CY Cergy Paris Université); Jean-Christophe Vergnaud (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne) |
| Abstract: | The relationship between dishonesty and social closeness has garnered increasing attention from scholars. While the literature has long evidenced that social closeness increases cooperation, recent work suggests it may also enable cheating behaviour through in-group justification. We study this relationship in an online Die-under-the-cup task (DUTC), asking whether misreporting outcomes increases when participants are paired with socially close rather than socially distant counterparts. We recruited 288 participants and implemented two treatments that made social closeness salient along socioeconomic status (T1) and political alignment (T2). We modelled closeness objectively (living in localities with comparable socioeconomic levels and administered by the same political party), as well as subjectively (self-reported personal income and political preferences matching locality averages). Across pooled and treatment-specific analyses, we find little evidence that social closeness systematically increases misreporting in the DUTC, as differences in reported payoffs are small and sensitive to specification. While objective distance shows weak and non-robust associations with behaviour, subjective measures of closeness are consistently non-significant. Furthermore, we also examine whether being observed by a socially close counterpart amplifies misreports and do not detect a reliable effect, aside from isolated, non-generalisable patterns. Our results suggest that any relationship between social closeness and cheating behaviour in the DUTC is limited and contextdependent. Our findings underscore the importance of multi-method measurement when evaluating how social closeness relates to strategic decision-making. |
| Abstract: | La relation entre malhonnêteté et proximité sociale suscite un intérêt croissant parmi les chercheurs. Si la littérature montre depuis longtemps que la proximité sociale favorise la coopération, des travaux récents suggèrent qu'elle peut également faciliter des comportements non éthiques via des formes de justification intra-groupe. Nous étudions cette relation à l'aide d'une tâche virtuelle de « Die-under-the-cup, DUTC », en nous demandant si la triche augmente lorsque les participants sont appariés à des homologues socialement proches plutôt que socialement éloignés. Nous avons recruté 288 participants et mis en place deux traitements rendant saillante la proximité sociale selon le statut socio-économique (T1) et l'alignement politique (T2). Nous avons modélisé la proximité de manière objective (résider dans des localités de niveau socio-économique comparable et administrées par le même parti politique), ainsi que de manière subjective (revenu personnel autodéclaré et préférences politiques en adéquation avec les moyennes de la localité). Dans l'ensemble des analyses, qu'elles soient regroupées ou spécifiques à chaque traitement, nous trouvons peu d'éléments indiquant que la proximité sociale augmente systématiquement la tricherie : les différences de gains déclarés sont faibles et sensibles aux spécifications retenues. Alors que la distance objective présente des associations faibles et peu robustes avec le comportement, les mesures subjectives de proximité ne sont jamais significatives. Nous examinons également si le fait d'être observé par un pair socialement proche amplifie la tricherie et ne détectons pas d'effet robuste, hormis quelques schémas isolés et non généralisables. Nos résultats suggèrent que la relation entre proximité sociale et comportement malhonnête dans la DUTC est limitée et dépend fortement du contexte. Ils soulignent l'importance de recourir à des mesures multiméthodes pour évaluer la manière dont la proximité sociale se rattache à la prise de décision stratégique. |
| Keywords: | Socioeconomic status, Political preferences, observability, Social closeness, Cheating behavior |
| Date: | 2024–11–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-05386224 |
| By: | Sam Ganzfried |
| Abstract: | We present an algorithm for computing all evolutionarily stable strategies in nondegenerate normal-form games with three or more players. |
| Date: | 2025–11 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2511.20859 |