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on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Angeles, Luis; Elizalde, Aldo |
| Abstract: | This paper studies the determinants of intensive kinship norms in human societies throughout the world. We expand the existing literature by considering three separate determinants of kinship intensity: the natural environment, religion, and state rule. Our novel methodology takes advantage of recent datasets, linking the location of human societies from the Ethnographic Atlas to geospatial data on the territorial span of states throughout human history. For religion, we find that Islam has an effect of similar magnitude but opposite direction to Christianity. For state rule, we find that only states with high levels of institutional development lead to less intensive kinship norms. |
| Keywords: | kinship norms, natural environment, religion, Islam, Christianity, state rule, institutional development |
| JEL: | Z13 Z12 N40 O17 D02 Q56 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:qucehw:341402 |
| By: | Peter Huybers; Marco Tabellini; Charles A. Taylor; Francesco Toti |
| Abstract: | What factors drove human migration before modern states, markets, and borders? We develop a sorting framework in which climate-specific subsistence knowledge depreciates with ecological distance. To test this, we use ancient DNA identity-by-descent segments to construct bilateral migration flows across Western Eurasia over the last 10, 000 years. We document three main findings. First, migration flows decline with differences in growing degree days, precipitation, and soil characteristics between origins and destinations. Second, the binding factor varies across subsistence systems: farmers exhibit strong thermal and soil matching, while pastoralists match most strongly on precipitation. Third, periods of warming increase farmer expansion while cooling increases pastoral expansion in patterns that recover known archaeological migration episodes. Migration also acts as a margin of climate adaptation: populations exposed to temperature change move to destinations that partly offset the shift. |
| JEL: | N01 N50 O13 Q54 Z13 |
| Date: | 2026–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:35371 |
| By: | Nicolas Camilotto (GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis (1965 - 2019) - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UniCA - Université Côte d'Azur, UniCA - Université Côte d'Azur) |
| Keywords: | Trust, Trust Game |
| Date: | 2026–05–26 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05659421 |
| By: | Kasberger, Bernhard; Martin, Simon; Normann, Hans-Theo; Werner, Tobias |
| Abstract: | Reinforcement learning algorithms play an increasingly important role in economic situations. These situations are often strategic, and the artificial intelligence may or may not be cooperative. We compare human and algorithmic cooperation rates in the infinitely repeated two-player prisoner's dilemma and study which strategies they choose to cooperate and punish deviations. Through a sequence of computational Q-learning and human-player experiments, we find that our Q-learning algorithms tend to cooperate less than humans, particularly when cooperation is risky or not incentive-compatible. Algorithms often use different strategies than humans, leading to distinct on- and off-path behavior. |
| Keywords: | Artificial intelligence, cooperation, Q-learning, repeated prisoner's dilemma |
| JEL: | C72 C73 C92 D83 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:dicedp:341427 |