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on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Oded Galor |
| Abstract: | This essay suggests that the evolution of human cooperation over the course of human history should be viewed as a two-layer process. A foundational layer, rooted in subsistence and ecological pressures, shaped cooperative dispositions unevenly, whereas an expansionary layer, rooted in conflict and stratification, generated large-scale cooperation in societies in which its seeds were formed. The first evolutionary layer unfolded over the grand arc of human evolution, reinforcing the capacity for small-scale cooperation in hunter-gatherer societies while favoring traits complementary to cooperation only in some sedentary societies. The second evolutionary layer emerged as rising population density heightened external threats, fostered coercive centralized authority, and raised the returns to public infrastructure. In environments where cooperative traits had already evolved, warfare, extraction, and infrastructure provision reinforced these predispositions, transforming them into durable collective institutions. Yet in settings where such cultural foundations were absent, large-scale collective action was more challenging, and conflict was often destabilizing, magnifying division and political fragility. Recognizing the profound global heterogeneity in this foundational layer of cooperative behavior is essential for identifying the origins of large-scale cooperation and the conditions under which conflict reinforced cooperative capacity rather than intensifying fragmentation. |
| Keywords: | cultural evolution, unified growth theory, future-oriented mindset, cooperation, malthusian epoch, the journey of humanity |
| JEL: | O10 Z10 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_12494 |
| By: | Dan Adler |
| Abstract: | Complex change is often described as "evolutionary" in economics, policy, and technology, yet most system dynamics models remain constrained to fixed state spaces and equilibrium-seeking behavior. This paper argues that evolutionary dynamics should be treated as a core system-thinking problem rather than as a biological metaphor. We introduce Stability-Driven Assembly (SDA) as a minimal, non-equilibrium framework in which stochastic interactions combined with differential persistence generate endogenous selection without genes, replication, or predefined fitness functions. In SDA, longer-lived patterns accumulate in the population, biasing future interactions and creating feedback between population composition and system dynamics. This feedback yields fitness-proportional sampling as an emergent property, realizing a natural genetic algorithm driven solely by stability. Using SDA, we demonstrate why equilibrium-constrained models, even when simulated numerically, cannot exhibit open-ended evolution: evolutionary systems require population-dependent, non-stationary dynamics in which structure and dynamics co-evolve. We conclude by discussing implications for system dynamics, economics, and policy modeling, and outline how agent-based and AI-enabled approaches may support evolutionary models capable of sustained novelty and structural emergence. |
| Date: | 2026–02 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2602.15957 |
| By: | Pietro Bini; Lin William Cong; Xing Huang; Lawrence J. Jin |
| Abstract: | Do generative AI models, particularly large language models (LLMs), exhibit systematic behavioral biases in economic and financial decisions? If so, how can these biases be mitigated? Drawing on the cognitive psychology and experimental economics literatures, we conduct the most comprehensive set of experiments to date$-$originally designed to document human biases$-$on prominent LLM families across model versions and scales. We document systematic patterns in LLM behavior. In preference-based tasks, responses become more human-like as models become more advanced or larger, while in belief-based tasks, advanced large-scale models frequently generate rational responses. Prompting LLMs to make rational decisions reduces biases. |
| Date: | 2026–02 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2602.09362 |
| By: | Sascha O. Becker |
| Abstract: | This chapter explores the intersection of religion and economics on the 250th anniversary of Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations, first published in 1776. While Smith is often viewed as a secular figure in economics, his work was deeply influenced by the moral philosophy of his time, which was shaped by Christian thought. I discuss how economists think about the religious themes in Smith’s work in the 21st century and review what we know today about the connection between religion and economic outcomes. |
| Keywords: | Adam Smith, religion |
| JEL: | B1 B2 N3 N9 P5 Z12 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_12496 |
| By: | Ferreira, José Luis; Ruiz-Castillo, Javier |
| Abstract: | We study the mode of production of the first populations of Homo erectus about 2.5 million years ago. It is characterized by a dual strategy unprecedented in human history: (i) a division of labor into big game hunting and gathering, and (ii) the sharing of the food obtained from both sources. We view these two characteristics as a form of increasing productivity through individual specialization, and a form of insurance. When big game hunters fail to capture a large piece –a highly frequent event–, they rely on the food collected by gatherers. In turn, a successful hunter who could only consume in situ a portion of a large kill, shares the catch with the rest of the group. We present a simple mathematical model of the situation, consisting of a non-cooperative repeated game whose equilibria exhibit the two innovations just mentioned. A sufficient condition for a sexual division of labor where women gather and men hunt is that men are relatively more productive than women in hunting. We compare this model with a number of alternatives found in the literature, and discuss its main shortcoming: the failure to include a third key feature of the hunting-gathering mode of production, namely, the specific study of intergenerational food transfers that may involve three types of agents –children, adults, and grandparents. |
| Keywords: | Homo Erectus; Hunter-Gatherers; Division Of Labor; Food Sharing; Insurance; Specialization; Non-Cooperative Repeated Games; Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium |
| Date: | 2026–02–24 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cte:werepe:49470 |