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on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Prosanta Mandal; Arunava Patra; Sagar Chakraborty |
| Abstract: | Repeated interactions are ubiquitous and known to promote social behaviour. While research often focuses on cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma, experimental evidence suggests repeated interactions also foster fairness. This study addresses a gap in the literature by theoretically modelling the evolution of fairness within a repeated mini-ultimatum game. Specifically, we construct a repeated-game framework where offerers and accepters interact using reactive strategies. We then investigate whether fair reactive strategy pairs are resilient against unfair mutants in a two-species population. By analyzing short-term evolutionary stability via the concept of two-species evolutionary stable strategy, we identify a critical effective game length: below this value, fairness is promoted by offerers and accepters who comply with their partner's past actions. Above this critical value, fairness is maintained by `complier' offerers and fair accepters. We also show that specific reactive strategies effectively facilitate the emergence and sustenance of fairness in long-term mutation-selection dynamics. To this end, we develop a two-population stochastic dynamics model -- a generalization of classical adaptive dynamics -- that accounts for finite population sizes and non-local mutants in the reactive strategy space. |
| Date: | 2026–04 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2604.03625 |
| By: | Smaldino, Paul E. |
| Abstract: | Evolution requires variation, transmission, and selection. Formal theorizing on cultural evolution has largely focused on transmission processes. Though the boundary between transmission and selection can be blurry at times, I focus on selection and introduce a taxonomy of cultural selection processes. These can be sorted into two broad classes: source selection and content selection, each with several subcategories. This framework identifies cultural attraction, often discussed as distinct from selection, as form of transformative selection, offering a more integrative and consilient view of how cultural variation is selectively transmitted. More generally, this taxonomy provides a unifying language for discussing cultural evolution and highlights important but underdeveloped research areas for theoretical investigation. |
| Date: | 2026–04–02 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:z2m5e_v3 |
| By: | Nicolas Camilotto (Université Côte d'Azur, CNRS, GREDEG, France) |
| Abstract: | This paper provides a life-cycle analysis of the Trust Game, using its trajectory as a lens to clarify the boundaries between experimental and behavioral economics. We first trace its 1995 creation by Berg et al. as a challenge to calculative trust paradigms. A bibliometric study then maps its diffusion, revealing two divergent paths in economics: one, rooted in experimental economics, prioritizes measurement; the other, in behavioral economics, theory-testing. These paths differ in methods and validity standards, constituting an epistemic divide that illuminates the fields’ evolving relationship. |
| Keywords: | trust; trust game; experimental economics; behavioral economics |
| JEL: | B2 B4 C9 |
| Date: | 2026–03 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gre:wpaper:2026-11 |