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on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Sam Ganzfried |
| Abstract: | We present a new solution concept called evolutionarily stable Stackelberg equilibrium (SESS). We study the Stackelberg evolutionary game setting in which there is a single leading player and a symmetric population of followers. The leader selects an optimal mixed strategy, anticipating that the follower population plays an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) in the induced subgame and may satisfy additional ecological conditions. We consider both leader-optimal and follower-optimal selection among ESSs, which arise as special cases of our framework. Prior approaches to Stackelberg evolutionary games either define the follower response via evolutionary dynamics or assume rational best-response behavior, without explicitly enforcing stability against invasion by mutations. We present algorithms for computing SESS in discrete and continuous games, and validate the latter empirically. Our model applies naturally to biological settings; for example, in cancer treatment the leader represents the physician and the followers correspond to competing cancer cell phenotypes. |
| Date: | 2026–03 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2603.18385 |
| By: | Anke Becker; Christina Borner; Thomas Dohmen; Armin Falk; David B. Huffman; Uwe Sunde |
| Abstract: | A growing body of empirical research has developed measures of economic preferences related to risk taking and intertemporal choice. This research has documented pronounced heterogeneity in preferences across and within societies, and also provided evidence that these differences are culturally transmitted. This chapter discusses existing data sets that allow for a comparable measurement across the globe, takes stock of commonalities and differences in approaches, and presents an extended synthetic cross-country data set that combines information from existing data sets. The analysis then establishes various empirical regularities, such as broadly similar patterns of heterogeneity across the globe, revealed by the different datasets, but also some systematic divergences by measurement approach, and substantial correlations of economic preferences with country-aggregate and individual-level outcomes and traits. We also briefly discuss international data sets measuring social preferences, and end with an outlook on avenues for future research. |
| Keywords: | willingness to take risks, patience |
| JEL: | D1 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_12589 |
| By: | Yijia Chen |
| Abstract: | The proliferation of diverse, high-leverage trading instruments in modern financial markets presents a complex, "noisy" environment, leading to a critical question: which trading strategies are evolutionarily viable? To investigate this, we construct a large-scale agent-based model, "MAS-Utopia, " comprising 10, 000 agents with five distinct archetypes. This society is immersed in five years of high-frequency data under a counterfactual baseline: zero transaction friction and a robust Unconditional Basic Income (UBI) safety net. The simulation reveals a powerful evolutionary convergence. Strategies that attempt to fight the market's current - namely Mean-Reversion ("buy-the-dip") - prove structurally fragile. In contrast, the Trend-Following archetype, which adapts to the market's flow, emerges as the dominant phenotype. Translating this finding, we architect an LLM-driven system that emulates this successful logic. Our findings offer profound implications, echoing the ancient wisdom of "Be Water": for investors, it demonstrates that survival is achieved not by rigid opposition, but by disciplined alignment with the prevailing current; for markets, it critiques tools that encourage contrarian gambling; for society, it underscores the stabilizing power of economic safety nets. |
| Date: | 2026–03 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2603.29593 |