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on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Martinez-Felip, Daniel; Schilizzi, Steven G.M.; Nguyen, Chi; Pannell, David |
| Abstract: | The resolution of collective-action problems often depends on social norms and pressure to conform to group behaviour, yet individuals typically differ in how strongly they perceive and internalise these norms. While existing models of norm change and social tipping often assume homogeneous and static normative expectations, recent evidence suggests substantial heterogeneity in the perceived norm strength. We study how different compositions of such heterogeneity within a community shape the emergence and internalisation of cooperative behaviour. We develop a spatial agent-based model in which agents follow a conditional-cooperation norm but differ in norm strength, characterised as either tight or loose. Agents interact locally and update their cooperation thresholds endogenously through a combination of payoff-driven learning and social learning from experiencing group behaviour. Our results show that introducing a moderate share of loose-norm individuals into otherwise tight-dominated communities can facilitate the emergence of cooperative tipping points by enabling cooperation to seed and spread locally, even when agents place zero weight on social-relative-to-financial learning. However, whether cooperation becomes internalised and persists depends critically on the relative weight given to social and financial learning. A higher weight on social learning amplifies local behavioural feedbacks, sharpens tipping-point dynamics, and allows agents with tight social norms to internalise cooperation such that it can be sustained with fewer cooperating group members. Once cooperation spreads, conformity pressure stabilises cooperative behaviour among loose-social-norm agents. Taken together, our findings highlight the importance of community composition and norm-strength heterogeneity for collective-action dynamics, and show how heterogeneity in perceived norm strength can generate abrupt and persistent transitions in cooperative behaviour. |
| Date: | 2026–03–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:4tfvj_v1 |
| By: | Benjamin Enke; Thomas Graeber; Ryan Oprea; Jeffrey Yang |
| Abstract: | We report the results of over 30 experiments to study the elasticity of economic decisions with respect to fundamentals. Our experiments cover a broad range of domains, from choice and valuation to belief formation, from strategic games to generic optimization problems, involving investment, savings, effort supply, product demand, taxes, externalities, fairness, beauty contests, search, policy evaluation, forecasting and inference. We identify two general patterns. First, behavioral attenuation: in 93% of our experiments, the elasticity of decisions to variation in fundamentals decreases in subjects’ cognitive uncertainty about their best decision. Second, diminishing sensitivity: the elasticity of decisions decreases in the distance of the fundamental from ‘simple points’ at which the best decision is transparent, and this decrease in elasticities is again mirrored by an increase in cognitive uncertainty. These results suggest that cognitive uncertainty systematically predicts an attenuation of economic elasticities, and that there is less (or no) uncertainty and attenuation when problems are cognitively easy. We argue that attenuation links several known decision anomalies, and study its limits. |
| Keywords: | Behavioral attenuation, diminishing sensitivity, cognitive uncertainty, experiments |
| Date: | 2026–02 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zur:econwp:487 |
| By: | Stefano Grassi |
| Abstract: | This paper develops a dynamical theory of adaptive coordination in multi-agent systems. Rather than analyzing coordination through equilibrium optimization or agent-centric learning alone, the framework models agents, incentives, and environment as a recursively closed feedback architecture. A persistent environment stores accumulated coordination signals, a distributed incentive field transmits those signals locally, and adaptive agents update in response. Coordination is thus treated as a structural property of coupled dynamics rather than as the solution to a centralized objective. The paper establishes three structural results. First, under dissipativity assumptions, the induced closed-loop system admits a bounded forward-invariant region, ensuring viability without requiring global optimality. Second, when incentive signals depend non-trivially on persistent environmental memory, the resulting dynamics generically cannot be reduced to a static global objective defined solely over the agent state space. Third, persistent environmental state induces history sensitivity unless the system is globally contracting. A minimal linear specification illustrates how coupling, persistence, and dissipation govern local stability and oscillatory regimes through spectral conditions on the Jacobian. The results establish structural conditions under which intelligent coordination dynamics emerge from incentive-mediated adaptive interaction within a persistent environment, without presuming welfare maximization, rational expectations, or centralized design. |
| Date: | 2026–03 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2603.11560 |