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on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Galor, Oded |
| Abstract: | This essay frames the evolution of human cooperation as a two-layer process. A foundational layer, rooted in subsistence and ecological pressures, shaped cooperative dispositions unevenly, whereas an expansionary layer, rooted in conflict, political stratification, and shared infrastructure, generated largescale, institutionalized cooperation. The first evolutionary layer unfolded over the grand arc of human evolution, reinforcing the capacity for small-scale cooperation in hunter-gatherer societies while favoring traits complementary to cooperation only in some sedentary societies. The second evolutionary layer emerged as rising population density heightened external threats, fostered coercive centralized authority, and raised the returns to public infrastructure. In environments where cooperative traits had already evolved, warfare, extraction, and infrastructure provision reinforced these predispositions, scaling them into durable collective institutions. Yet in regions where such cultural foundations were absent, large-scale collective action was more challenging, and conflict was often destabilizing, magnifying division and political fragility. Recognizing the profound global heterogeneity in this foundational layer of cooperative behavior is essential for identifying the origins of large-scale cooperation and the conditions under which conflict enhanced this capacity. |
| Keywords: | Cultural Evolution, Unified Growth Theory, Future-oriented mindset, Cooperation, Malthusian epoch, The Journey of Humanity |
| JEL: | O10 O40 Z10 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:glodps:1714 |
| By: | Zebiao Li; Rui Liu; Chengyi Tu |
| Abstract: | The governance of common-pool resources-resource systems characterized by high subtractability of yield and difficulty of exclusion-constitutes one of the most persistent and intricate challenges in the fields of economics, ecology, and applied mathematics. This comprehensive review delineates the historical and theoretical evolution of the mathematical frameworks developed to analyze, predict, and manage these systems. We trace the intellectual trajectory from the early, deterministic bioeconomic models of the mid-20th century, which established the fundamental tension between individual profit maximization and collective efficiency, to the contemporary era of complex coupled human-environment system models. Our analysis systematically dissects the formalization of the "Tragedy of the Commons" through the lens of classical cooperative and non-cooperative game theory, examining how the N-person Prisoner's Dilemma and Nash Equilibrium concepts provided the initial, albeit pessimistic, predictive baseline. We subsequently explore the "Ostrom Turn, " which necessitated the integration of institutional realism-specifically monitoring, graduated sanctions, and communication-into formal game-theoretic structures. The review further investigates the relaxation of rationality assumptions via evolutionary game theory and behavioral economics, highlighting the destabilizing roles of prospect theory and hyperbolic discounting. Finally, we synthesize recent advances in stochastic differential equations and agent-based computational economics, which capture the critical roles of spatial heterogeneity, noise-induced regime shifts, and early warning signals of collapse. By unifying these diverse mathematical threads, this review elucidates the shifting paradigm from static optimization to dynamic resilience in the management of the commons. |
| Date: | 2026–02 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2602.03129 |
| By: | Bailey, J.M. |
| Abstract: | Global fertility rates are currently converging toward unprecedented lows, with digitally mature nations exhibiting Total Fertility Rates (TFR) far below the replacement threshold. While standard economic models attribute this decline to the quality-quantity trade-off, they fail to explain why fertility remains suppressed despite significant pro-natalist financial interventions. This paper proposes a novel theoretical framework—the Compression Wave—to explain this demographic-evolutionary paradox. Synthesizing longitudinal demographic data with cultural evolutionary theory, I argue that digital maturity acts as an environmental mismatch that hijacks evolved status-seeking heuristics. Drawing on Richerson and Boyd’s Big Mistake hypothesis and Henrich’s Collective Brain, I demonstrate how the shift from vertical (parent-to-child) to oblique and horizontal (teacher- and peer-driven) cultural transmission creates a Status Trap. In this trap, individuals are evolutionarily seduced into a runaway positional arms race for digital prestige, modeling their lives after childless teachers rather than fertile parents. This process results in the systematic unlearning of the domestic social operating system—the specific cultural heuristics required for low-friction child-rearing. The paper concludes by proposing a Reflexive Turn, suggesting that the same digital maturity that induced the collapse—specifically via Large Language Models (LLMs)—may offer the only viable mechanism for re-synthesizing the lost cultural buffers necessary for demographic sustainability. |
| Date: | 2026–02–13 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:df9rv_v1 |