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on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Tontrup, Stephan; Arlen, Jennifer; Sprigman, Christopher Jon |
| Abstract: | People often act prosocially and voluntarily conform to social and legal norms. This has fueled the idea that law can guide behavior through its expressive power. By contrast, we offer a theoretical and experimental framework suggesting that people strategically alter their decision-making environment to shift the norm applicable to their actions to one that is in their self-interest and to the detriment of others. Norm-shifting is one strategy within a broader concept we refer to as Behavioral Self-Management (BSM). To test norm-shifting, we implement a dictator game in which Allocators are offered an effort task before allocating a sum between themselves and a Recipient. Allocators receive the same endowment whether or not they work. We hypothesize that many will undertake the task to shift the applicable fairness norm from equal division to an effort-based norm that justifies their retaining a larger share. Prior evidence shows that costly effort is widely perceived as legitimizing unequal outcomes. We find that many Allocators decide to work, thereby reducing average transfers. Their work choices are strategic: their odds of working are higher the more they expect work to shift the fairness norm in their favor and the more prosocial they are-that is, the higher the moral costs they face for violating the fairness norm. Finally, Allocators who work make transfers that they expect to conform to an effort-based norm in the view of others, to maintain their self- and social-image. Our findings have implications for compliance with the law and with social norms. BSM can enable selfish non-compliance by undermining the social norms that underpin the law or by establishing social norms that provide justification for violation, while avoiding the social disapproval that would otherwise result. |
| Keywords: | Behavioral Self-management, Norm-shifting, Work, Self-and Social Image |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:esprep:335552 |
| By: | Kevin Vallier |
| Abstract: | This paper develops the Theory of Strategic Evolution, a general model for systems in which the population of players, strategies, and institutional rules evolve together. The theory extends replicator dynamics to settings with endogenous players, multi level selection, innovation, constitutional change, and meta governance. The central mathematical object is a Poiesis stack: a hierarchy of strategic layers linked by cross level gain matrices. Under small gain conditions, the system admits a global Lyapunov function and satisfies selection, tracking, and stochastic stability results at every finite depth. We prove that the class is closed under block extension, innovation events, heterogeneous utilities, continuous strategy spaces, and constitutional evolution. The closure theorem shows that no new dynamics arise at higher levels and that unrestricted self modification cannot preserve Lyapunov structure. The theory unifies results from evolutionary game theory, institutional design, innovation dynamics, and constitutional political economy, providing a general mathematical model of long run strategic adaptation. |
| Date: | 2025–12 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2512.07901 |
| By: | Mayada Oudah; John Wooders |
| Abstract: | Facial expressions are central to human interaction, yet their role in strategic decision-making has received limited attention. We investigate how real-time facial communication influences cooperation in repeated social dilemmas. In a laboratory experiment, participants play a repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game under two conditions: in one, they observe their counterpart's facial expressions via gender-neutral avatars, and in the other no facial cues are available. Using state-of-the-art biometric technology to capture and display emotions in real-time, we find that facial communication significantly increases overall cooperation and, notably, promotes cooperation following defection. This restorative effect suggests that facial expressions help participants interpret defections less harshly, fostering forgiveness and the resumption of cooperation. While past actions remain the strongest predictor of behavior, our findings highlight the communicative power of facial expressions in shaping strategic outcomes. These results offer practical insights for designing emotionally responsive virtual agents and digital platforms that sustain cooperation in the absence of physical presence. |
| Date: | 2026–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2601.15211 |
| By: | Massimo Cervesato (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne); Mathieu Guigourez (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne) |
| Abstract: | This paper introduces the Kovenant model, a formal framework for understanding ecological choices as resulting from norm-guided individual commitments that emerge in fragmented collective contexts. Rather than primarily seeking to optimise outcomes or induce cooperation through incentives, the model represents how agents act as if an ecological covenant were in place, thereby reshaping their own decision-making structure. The model captures key behavioural features such as over-investment or crowding-out effects, showing that these are not irrational deviations, but responses to the absence of well-defined shared normative expectations. The Kovenant model offers, thus, theoretical ground for explaining ecological behaviours in emerging social norms. |
| Keywords: | As if reasoning, Common-Pool Resources, Ecological Behaviours, Collective Action, Commitments |
| Date: | 2025–12 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-05450446 |
| By: | Cristian Gil Sánchez (Acción Pública); Allison Benson (Acción Publica); Natalia Perez (Acción Publica) |
| Abstract: | This study examines whether cooperative perceptions, preferences, skills, and behaviors can be shaped through structured, game-based interventions. Using a lab-in-the-field experiment centered on a cooperative card game, we tested whether game play, paired with reflective learning, can foster both the motivation and the ability to cooperate. We find that while belief change was limited by ceiling effects among participants with strong baseline prosocial views, the intervention significantly increased preferences for cooperation, improved cooperative skills, and led to more cooperative behavior, particularly when a game experience is paired with reflective learning. We also observe variation in treatment effects by socioeconomic and demographic characteristics, with impacts being stronger among participants with higher education and income levels, and among those already concerned with inequality and climate change (examples of cooperative social challenges).Our findings highlight the relevance of understanding cooperation as a learnable practice, and points to the importance of combining both action and reflection in the design of cooperation-building tools. |
| Keywords: | Cooperation, perceptions, game-based learning, social experiments, Colombia |
| JEL: | D63 D91 I31 |
| Date: | 2026–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:col:000089:022145 |