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on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Suman Chakraborty; Vikash Kumar Dubey; Vaibhav Madhok; Sagar Chakraborty |
| Abstract: | The idea of evolutionarily stable state (ESS) of a population is a cornerstone of evolutionary game theory; moreover, it coincides with the game-theoretic concept of Nash equilibrium. Such a state corresponds to a strategy adopted by the population such that a rare mutant strategy cannot invade the population. In parallel, the dynamical formulation of evolutionary game theory -- particularly through replicator dynamics embodying the tenet of survival of the fittest -- provides a framework for modelling frequency-dependent selection over time. While it is well known that an ESS corresponds to stable fixed point in replicator dynamics, the evolutionary game-theoretic characterization of limit cycles is unknown. Here we fill this lacuna by defining oscillatory ESS (OESS) which we prove to be a stable limit cycle. We also show when an OESS is unique and if there are multiple OESSes, then what their locations are in the phase space. |
| Date: | 2026–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2601.01996 |
| By: | Paula E. Gobbi; Anne Hannusch; Pauline Rossi |
| Abstract: | Much of the observed cross-country variation in fertility aligns with the predictions of classic theories of the fertility transition: countries with higher levels of human capital, higher GDP per capita, or lower mortality rates tend to exhibit lower fertility. However, when examining changes within countries over the past 60 years, larger fertility declines are only weakly associated with greater improvements in human capital, per capita GDP, or survival rates. To understand why, we focus on the role of family institutions, particularly marriage and inheritance customs. We argue that, together with the diffusion of cultural norms, they help explain variations in the timing, speed and magnitude of the fertility decline. We propose a stylized model integrating economic, health, institutional and cultural factors to study how these factors interact to shape fertility transition paths. We find that family institutions can mediate the effect of economic development by constraining fertility responses. |
| Keywords: | fertility, demographic transition, marriage, polygamy, inheritance |
| JEL: | J10 J11 J12 J13 N30 O10 O20 |
| Date: | 2026–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2025_726 |
| By: | Galor, Oded |
| Abstract: | What ignited humanity's momentous ascent from millennia of stagnation to an era of sustained economic growth? And what are the roots of the vast disparities in the wealth of nations? These enduring mysteries, which have preoccupied scholars across generations, lie at the core of Unified Growth Theory. This encompassing framework captures the evolution of societies over the entire course of human history and identifies the universal wheels of change that governed humanity's long journey, propelled the growth process, and shaped inequality across the globe. The theory uncovers the forces underlying the dramatic transformation in living standards over the past two centuries, emerging from an economic ice age of near stagnation, while highlighting the enduring historical roots of the immense divergence in the prosperity of nations. It suggests that forces set in motion in the distant past played a pivotal role in shaping development across the globe and remain essential for the design of effective policies that foster economic progress and mitigate inequality in the wealth of nations. |
| Keywords: | Growth, Inequality, Unified Growth Theory, Human Capital, Demographic Transition, Malthusian epoch |
| JEL: | I25 J10 O10 O40 Z10 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:glodps:1704 |