|
on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Chu, Angus C.; Wang, Xilin |
| Abstract: | This study develops a Malthusian growth model with early state formation and interstate competition. It explores how states' tax capacity and provision of productive public goods shape population dynamics and interstate competition. Each state has an optimal tax rate, increasing in the elasticity of agricultural output with respect to public goods. Without interstate competition, population either converges to a Malthusian trap or grows steadily depending on this elasticity. With interstate competition, states either coexist or only one survives. Population of any surviving state first rises and then falls with its tax rate, capturing the rise and fall of the state. |
| Keywords: | Public goods; interstate competition; Malthusian growth theory |
| JEL: | E60 H20 H56 O43 |
| Date: | 2025–11 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:126926 |
| By: | Fryderyk Falniowski; El\.zbieta Pli\'s |
| Abstract: | We examine the impact of a change in diversity introduced by a new product on the evolution of an economic system. Modeling Schumpeterian competition as a population game with a unique, attracting, evolutionarily stable state (the Schumpeterian state), in which both innovators and imitators coexist, we examine how the Schumpeterian state evolves depending on the properties of the new product developed by innovators. This way, we demonstrate that the change in diversity is one of the spiritus movens of innovation, influencing the process of creative destruction. |
| Date: | 2025–12 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2512.17365 |