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on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Alberto Baccini |
| Abstract: | This article challenges the conventional reading of Francis Ysidro Edgeworth by reconstructing his intellectual project of unifying the moral sciences through mathematics. The contribution he made in the first phase of his writing, culminating in \textit{Mathematical Psychics}, aimed to reconfigure utilitarianism as an exact science, grounding it in psychophysics and evolutionary biology. In order to solve the utilitarian problem of maximizing pleasure for a given set of sentient beings, he modeled individuals as ``quasi-Fechnerian'' functions, which incorporated their capacity for pleasure as determined by their place in the evolutionary order. The problem of maximization is solved by distributing means according to the individuals' capacity for pleasure. His radical anti-egalitarian conclusions did not stem from an abstract principle of justice, but from the necessity to maximize welfare among naturally unequal beings. This logic was applied not only to sentients of different evolutionary orders, such as Mr. Pongo, a famous gorilla, and humans, but also to human races, sexes, and classes. The system, in essence, uses the apparent neutrality of science to naturalize and justify pre-existing social hierarchies. This analysis reveals that the subsequent surgical removal of his utilitarianism by economists, starting with Schumpeter, while making his tools palatable, eviscerates his overarching philosophical system. |
| Date: | 2025–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2510.20854 |
| By: | Lin, Ziruo |
| Abstract: | This essay compares the influence of Confucianism in China and the Protestant ethic in Europe on both formal and informal institutions, examining their role in shaping divergent economic trajectories. Drawing on historical and institutional analysis, this essay integrates insights from economic history, sociology, and political theory. The findings contribute to debates on the cultural origins of the Great Divergence and offer broader insights into how culture interacts with governance structures and economic incentives over the long run. Understanding these historical dynamics is valuable not only for explaining the Great Divergence but also for interpreting contemporary patterns of development, governance, and social trust. In an era where policymakers and international organizations grapple with institutional reform, corruption, and cultural barriers to economic growth, the study highlights the importance of aligning institutional design with prevailing social norms to foster sustainable, inclusive development. |
| Keywords: | Confuscanism; the Protestant ethic; ideology; economy |
| JEL: | J1 |
| Date: | 2025–10–14 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:129934 |
| By: | Jason Fletcher; Hamid Noghanibehambari |
| Abstract: | Several competing theories in a number of disciplines point to a possible influence of fertility history on health and mortality. However, the direction of effects is theoretically a-priori unknown and the empirical evidence is also inconclusive. This paper examines the effects of fertility during midlife on later-life longevity using Social Security Administration death records linked with the full-count 1940 census. We tackle endogeneity and selection concerns in the longevity-fertility association by implementing an instrumental variable based on the sex composition of first two children. Our findings indicate that having an extra child is linked to a decrease in women’s longevity by approximately 5 months. Men, on the other hand, experience smaller and insignificant reductions in longevity of about 3.3 months. This divergence in effects suggests that biological factors may play a small role in the relationship between fertility and later-life longevity. |
| JEL: | I1 J13 N0 |
| Date: | 2025–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:34378 |
| By: | Zhou, Haiwen |
| Abstract: | How geography affects the choice of institutions is studied in a theoretical model. In this model, nations are located around a circle. Rulers compete through choosing tax rates, the level of military spending, and the degree of formality of institutions. Geographic condition is captured by population density. It is shown that societies with higher population densities choose lower tax rates, establish more formal institutions, and give government officials lower levels of autonomies than those with lower population densities do. A higher level of external threats induces a ruler to choose a higher level of autonomy for officials. The model is illustrated by comparing institutions of agricultural and nomadic regimes in ancient China. |
| Keywords: | Geography and institutions, political economy, agricultural society, nomadic society, rule-based governance |
| JEL: | N45 O53 P50 |
| Date: | 2025–10–18 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:126510 |
| By: | Hideo Konishi (Department of Economics, Boston College); Michel Le Breton (Toulouse School of Economics, Toulouse Capitole University); Shlomo Weber (Southern Methodist University) |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we define additive dyadic social interactions games (ADG), in which each player cares not only about the selected action, but also about interactions with other players, especially those who choose the same action. This class of games includes alliance formation games, network games, and discrete choice problems with network externalities. While it is known that games in the ADG class admit a pure strategy Nash equilibrium that is a maximizer of the game's potential, the potential approach does not always apply if all coalitional deviations are allowed. We then introduce a novel notion of a strong landscape equilibrium, which relies on a limited scope of coalitional deviations. We show the existence of a strong landscape equilibrium for a class of basic additive dyadic social interactions games (BADG), even though a strong Nash equilibrium may fail to exist. Somewhat surprisingly, a potential-maximizing strong landscape equilibrium is not always a strong Nash equilibrium even if the set of the latter is nonempty. We also provide applications and extensions of our results. |
| Keywords: | Social Interactions Game, Potential Function, Coalition Formation, Strong Nash Equilibrium, Strong Landscape Equilibrium |
| JEL: | C71 C72 C78 |
| Date: | 2025–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kyo:wpaper:1120 |