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on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Gregory Clark (University of Southern Denmark) |
| Abstract: | A recent article in PNAS “The Inheritance of Social Status in England, 1600-1822” (Clark, 2023) argued that social status in England throughout these years showed a strong and stable pattern of inheritance. This pattern was consistent with the additive genetic inheritance of social abilities, in the presence of strong genetic assortment in these characteristics in parenting. This article has induced criticism that it committed “Hereditarian Fallacies” (Benning et al., 2023, 2024, 2025). Similar criticism also appeared in blog postings by the geneticist Sasha Gusev, and in Lala and Feldman, 2024, and Lala et al., 2025. This paper offers additional evidence for why patterns of status inheritance in England 1600-2022 are consistent with direct genetic inheritance, but not with cultural transmission of status. |
| Keywords: | Intergenerational mobility, status inheritance, cultural transmission |
| Date: | 2025–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hes:wpaper:0285 |
| By: | Arslanoğlu, Selin (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management) |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tiu:tiutis:1b3326be-fe17-4372-9be4-0bf5f747e2ef |
| By: | Steven N. Durlauf; David McMillon; Scott Page |
| Abstract: | We analyze the potential for complexity theory to produce insights that elucidate the evolution of socioeconomic inequality and point toward effective policies. We position complexity theory as a complement to more traditional economic approaches. Economic models of inequality can fall into four broad categories: models based on individual attributes and technologies, social interaction models, intergenerational models of transfer, and models of institutional and social structure. Within each of these categories, complexity theory can enhance traditional theory. It is of particular value in helping to distinguish between bottom-up systemic and top-down structural causes of inequality. Complexity theory can further enrich our understanding of economic inequality by adopting a complex adaptive system of systems approach in which economic, social, political, and psychosocial systems interact with one another and with institutional and social structures to produce robust inequality, particularly on racial lines. |
| JEL: | D01 D3 D5 J7 |
| Date: | 2025–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:34381 |
| By: | Gregory Clark (University of Southern Denmark); Neil Cummins (London School of Economics) |
| Abstract: | What happens across generations to random wealth shocks? Do they endure and even magnify, or do they dissipate? By implication, how much of modern wealth is attributable to events before 1900? This paper uses random shocks to family size in England before 1880, that created wealth shocks for the children, to measure the persistence of random wealth shocks. Fertility for married couples in England before 1880 was not controlled, but was a biological lottery. And for richer families, family size strongly influenced child wealth. This paper finds that such biology-induced wealth shocks had no impact on descendent wealth by three generations later. Since wealth itself persisted strongly across more than five generations this implies that, in the long run, wealth mainly derives from sources other than wealth inheritance itself. The observed link between nineteenth century wealth and modern wealth does not lie in wealth transmission itself. Instead wealth persisted because of the inheritance within families of behaviors and abilities associated with wealth accumulation and wealth retention. |
| Keywords: | Wealth shocks, wealth persistence, wealth inheritance |
| JEL: | D31 E21 G51 N33 |
| Date: | 2025–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hes:wpaper:0284 |
| By: | Bodo Vogt; Paul Bengart; Caroylyn Declerck; Ernst Fehr |
| Abstract: | In recent years, increasing skepticism regarding oxytocin’s (OT) influence on social behavior arose. Low power, HARKing (hypothesizing after the results are known), and replication failures have clouded the field. Here, we directly address these concerns with a high-powered, preregistered study that offers robust evidence for a causal effect of OT on trust among individuals with a low disposition to trust. We recruited 359 low-trusting individuals who participated in a trust game under strict anonymity conditions. Results show that OT administration significantly increased trusting behavior by roughly 15%, with consistent effects across regression models with and without controls for personality traits. A pooled data analysis incorporating a previous sample (n=219) of low-trusting individuals further strengthens this conclusion, yielding a statistically significant 16.9% increase in trust. Crucially, no interaction effect was found between OT and the degree of dispositional trust, suggesting OT’s effect is uniform across the low-trusting spectrum. These findings present a strong case for OT’s selective trust-enhancing role. By isolating OT’s impact within a well-defined subpopulation and experimental context, this study provides a critical pivot in the debate over neurobiological mechanisms of trust. |
| Date: | 2025–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zur:econwp:481 |
| By: | Baranski, Andrzej (New York University, Abu Dhabi); Reuben, Ernesto (New York University, Abu Dhabi); Riedl, Arno (Maastricht University) |
| Abstract: | In a laboratory experiment, we study the role of fairness ideals as focal points in coordination problems in homogeneous and heterogeneous groups. We elicit the normatively preferred behavior about how a subsequent coordination game should be played. In homogeneous groups, people share a unique fairness ideal how to solve the coordination problem, whereas in heterogeneous groups, multiple conflicting fairness ideals prevail. In the coordination game, homogeneous groups are significantly more likely than their heterogeneous counterparts to sustain efficient coordination. The reason is that homogeneous groups coordinate on the unique fairness ideal, whereas heterogeneous groups disagree on the fairness ideal to be played. In both types of groups, equilibria consistent with fairness ideals are most stable. Hence, the difference in coordination success between homogeneous and heterogeneous groups occurs because of the normative disagreement in the latter types of group, making it much harder to reach an equilibrium at a fairness ideal. |
| Keywords: | cooperation, coordination, focal points, fairness ideals, experiment |
| JEL: | H41 C92 D63 |
| Date: | 2025–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp18200 |
| By: | Claude Diebolt; Michael Haupert |
| Abstract: | This article celebrates the thirtieth anniversary of Région et Développement by revisiting the dialogue it has nurtured between development economics and spatial economics. We situate our contribution within this tradition by engaging with selected chapters from the Handbook of Cliometrics, highlighting how long-run historical perspectives can illuminate contemporary spatial and territorial dynamics. Building on the contribution of Diebolt and Hippe in Région et Développement, we extend their cliometric approach to examine the persistence of disparities, the role of institutions, and the impact of policy interventions. Our analysis emphasizes that territorial development must be understood within long-term trajectories shaped by demographic forces, shocks, and innovations. We argue that historically grounded and spatially sensitive perspectives are essential for designing effective policies aimed at reducing regional inequalities. By weaving together insights from cliometrics and regional development, our study illustrates the value of connecting historical causality with spatial analysis. In doing so, we reaffirm the journal’s mission of combining analytical rigor with societal relevance. |
| Keywords: | Forest Regional development, Cliometrics, Territorial disparities, Institutions and public policy, Long-term historical dynamics. |
| JEL: | N10 N90 O18 R11 R58 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ulp:sbbeta:2025-43 |
| By: | Jan Stuhler |
| Abstract: | A growing literature provides evidence on multigenerational inequality -- the extent to which socio-economic advantages persist across three or more generations. This chapter reviews its main findings and implications. Most studies find that inequality is more persistent than a naive iteration of conventional parent-child correlations would suggest. We discuss potential interpretations of this new ``fact'' related to (i) latent, (ii) non-Markovian or (iii) non-linear transmission processes, empirical strategies to discriminate between them, and the link between multigenerational and assortative associations. |
| Date: | 2025–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2509.16734 |