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on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | D'Errico, Michele; Yasseri, Taha |
| Abstract: | Conspiracy theories are widespread, varied, and socially consequential. While research has identified psychological and social correlates of conspiracy endorsement, debate continues over whether there is a general predisposition toward conspiratorial thinking and whether it should be treated as pathological. We argue that dominant theoretical efforts overlook the cultural dynamics that sustain conspiratorial worldviews. By reviewing empirical and philosophical work, we propose that conspiracy theories are best understood as culturally evolved epistemologies—frameworks that can prescribe what counts as evidence, who is trustworthy, and how to handle disconfirmation. Drawing on cultural evolutionary theory and network psychometrics, we show how this perspective can explain the persistence of conspiracy subcultures, their diversity, and their integration with broader belief systems. Finally, we discuss how artificial intelligence can accelerate the spread of conspiracy narratives, increasingly become the subject of new conspiracy theories, and at the same time offer novel tools for mapping, analyzing, and countering them. |
| Date: | 2025–09–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:4wsjv_v1 |
| By: | David K Levine |
| Date: | 2025–09–03 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levarc:735347000000000013 |
| By: | Ayato Kitadai; Yusuke Fukasawa; Nariaki Nishino |
| Abstract: | Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used to simulate human decision-making, but their intrinsic biases often diverge from real human behavior--limiting their ability to reflect population-level diversity. We address this challenge with a persona-based approach that leverages individual-level behavioral data from behavioral economics to adjust model biases. Applying this method to the ultimatum game--a standard but difficult benchmark for LLMs--we observe improved alignment between simulated and empirical behavior, particularly on the responder side. While further refinement of trait representations is needed, our results demonstrate the promise of persona-conditioned LLMs for simulating human-like decision patterns at scale. |
| Date: | 2025–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2508.18600 |
| By: | Christine Ho (School of Economics, Singapore Management University) |
| Abstract: | This Special Issue brings together nine papers that examine how families allocate time and money across generations. Spanning aging societies in East Asia to informal settlements in the Pacific, the contributions employ diverse methodological approaches, from natural experiments and policy variation to administrative data linkage and cross-generational panel surveys. The findings converge on a central insight: intergenerational transfers of time and money are not merely cultural practices, but systematic responses to changing economic environments and institutional frameworks. Family decisions are critical to the provision of long-term care, investment in children’s human capital, and the transmission of preferences, opportunities, and well-being across generations. Together, these studies highlight the importance of household economics for understanding and addressing the policy challenges of demographic transition, rising care demands, and the complex interplay between family resources and intergenerational outcomes. |
| Keywords: | Intergenerational Transfers; Long-term Care; Fertility; Investment in Children; Intergenerational Tr |
| JEL: | D13 D64 I14 J13 J14 J22 |
| Date: | 2025–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:smuesw:021527 |
| By: | Zhu, Chen; Böckerman, Petri |
| Abstract: | In genetics, heterosis refers to the phenomenon where crossbreeding within a species produces offspring with greater genetic fitness and superior phenotypic characteristics compared to their parents. We propose a novel socioeconomic heterosis hypothesis and examine whether genetic diversity at the individual level benefits economic success. Empirical results from UK Biobank (N=488, 152) indicate that people with higher genome-wide heterozygosity perform better in modern societies. We find consistent, positive links with education, earnings, leadership, height, and ownership of a home and car; a one standard deviation increase in heterozygosity is associated with 0.75% higher income and modest gains in schooling and assets. Results hold with additional controls and Bonferroni correction for multiple hypothesis testing; no effects are found for migration, diabetes, or neuroticism. The relationship rises steadily across the observed range and is stronger for men, suggesting sexual selection in socioeconomic settings. Because heterozygosity is fixed at conception, our evidence points to an underappreciated endowment shaping human capital and wealth accumulation. The contribution is to introduce and document individual-level heterosis effects in economics, offering a new channel for inequality and socioeconomic outcomes. |
| Keywords: | heterosis, genetic heterozygosity, income, education, socioeconomic achievement, sexual selection |
| JEL: | J10 J24 D31 I14 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:glodps:1660 |
| By: | Ponthiere, Gregory |
| Abstract: | This paper analyzes the mechanisms by which Stoic ethics can produce coordination. We study how agents satisfying the Stoic discipline of desires (that is, one should wish for nothing that is out of control, including other players'acts) behave in 2-player simultaneous symmetric coordination games. It is shown that the extent to which the Stoic discipline of desires produces coordination depends on the particular way in which this is translated into the language of microeconomics. Under the I1 account of the Stoic discipline of desires (requiring indifference between outcomes that differ only on other players'acts), it is the case either that coordination is achieved or that coordination is valueless. Hence adopting the I1 account suffices to coordinate agents, without any need for a shared idea of the 'Common Good'. On the contrary, the I2 account of the Stoic discipline of desires (requiring indifference between outcomes that are the best given other players'acts) does not always suffice to coordinate agents. |
| Keywords: | Stoicism, games, coordination, rationality, discipline of desires |
| JEL: | C70 D01 D60 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:glodps:1661 |