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on Evolutionary Economics |
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Issue of 2025–09–01
three papers chosen by |
| By: | Joy Das Bairagya; Sagar Chakraborty |
| Abstract: | Humans are bounded rational at best and this, we argue, has worked in their favour in the hunter-gatherer society where emergence of a coordinated action, leading to cooperation, is otherwise the standard stag-hunt dilemma (when individuals are rational). In line with the fact the humans strive for developing self-reputation by having less propensity to cheat than to be cheated, we observe that the payoff structure of the stag-hunt game appropriately modifies to that of coordination-II game. Subsequently, within the paradigm of evolutionary game theory, we establish that a population -- consisting of procedural rational players (a type of bounded rationality) -- is unequivocally evolutionarily stable against emergence of more rational strategies in coordination-II game. The cooperation is, thus, shown to have been established by evolutionary forces picking less rational individuals. |
| Date: | 2025–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2508.08301 |
| By: | Dingyi Wang; Ruqiang Guo; Qian Lu |
| Abstract: | The promotion of Conservation Tillage Technology (CTT) is critical for mitigating global soil degradation, yet their actual adoption rates remain substantially lower than anticipated targets. Existing research predominantly focuses on static factor analyses, failing to adequately capture the dynamic evolutionary mechanisms of farmer strategic interactions and the impacts of information asymmetries in agricultural markets. This study constructs an evolutionary game model integrating heterogeneous time preferences and lemon market effects to reveal the dynamic equilibrium of technology adoption within farmer groups operating under bounded rationality. Key findings indicate that farmers with high time preferences significantly impede CTT adoption due to the excessive discounting of long-term benefits. Furthermore, the lemon market effect dictates the system's equilibrium states: 1) When the lemon market benefit ($P$) exceeds the lemon market loss ($Q$) ($P > Q$), stable tripartite coexistence of adoption strategies emerges; 2) When $P |
| Date: | 2025–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2507.15497 |
| By: | Arunava Patra; Supratim Sengupta; Sagar Chakraborty |
| Abstract: | Learning from experience is a key feature of decision-making in cognitively complex organisms. Strategic interactions involving Bayesian inferential strategies can enable us to better understand how evolving individual choices to be altruistic or selfish can affect collective outcomes in social dilemmas. Bayesian strategies are distinguished, from their reactive opponents, in their ability to modulate their actions in the light of new evidence. We investigate whether such strategies can be resilient against reactive strategies when actions not only determine the immediate payoff but can affect future payoffs by changing the state of the environment. We use stochastic games to mimic the change in environment in a manner that is conditioned on the players' actions. By considering three distinct rules governing transitions between a resource-rich and a resource-poor states, we ascertain the conditions under which Bayesian tit-for-tat strategy can resist being invaded by reactive strategies. We find that the Bayesian strategy is resilient against a large class of reactive strategies and is more effective in fostering cooperation leading to sustenance of the resource-rich state. However, the extent of success of the Bayesian strategies depends on the other strategies in the pool and the rule governing transition between the two different resource states. |
| Date: | 2025–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2508.00363 |