| Abstract: |
Asymmetric evolutionary games, such as the Ultimatum Game, provide keys to
understanding the emergence of fairness in social species. Building on this
framework, we explore the evolution of social value systems and the
operational role that social status plays in hierarchically organised
societies. Within the asymmetric Ultimatum Game paradigm, where "proposers"
suggest terms for resource distribution, and "responders" accept or reject
these terms, we examine the assignment of roles between players under a
subjective social order. This order is grounded in an emergent status
hierarchy based on observable player attributes (such as age and wealth). The
underlying rules for constructing such a hierarchy stabilise over time by
inheritance and family ties. Despite their subjective nature these (often
sub-conscious) value systems have operative meaning in controlling access of
individuals to resources and decision making. We demonstrate these effects
using a simple but sufficiently complex model with dynamical population size
and network structure, where division of resources (prey) is carried out
according to the principles of the Ultimatum Game. We focus on the emerging
proposer and responder thresholds under distinct social hierarchies and
interaction networks and discuss them in relation to the extensive body of
Ultimatum Game experiments conducted across a wide range of cultural contexts.
We observe the emergence of diverse sharing norms, ranging from unfair to
highly generous, alongside the development of various social norms. |