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on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Georg Kirchsteiger; Tom Lenaerts; Remi Suchon |
| Abstract: | Experimental evidence shows that in a repeated dilemma setting cooperation is more likely to become the norm in small matching groups than in large ones. This result holds even if cooperation is an equilibrium outcome for all investigated group sizes. But what happens if small matching groups are merged to become large ones? Our paper is based on the idea that due to norm spillovers, a large group created by a merger of small groups is more likely to cooperate than a large group of similar size that is created directly. We tested this idea experimentally in the context of an infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma game. We compared the cooperation behavior of groups that result from mergers of smaller groups with the cooperation behavior of groups with constant group size. We found that cooperation levels were significantly higher in large groups that resulted from gradual growth than in large groups of the same size that were directly created. Looking at the individual behavior, we see that more subjects develop a norm of unconditional cooperation when the group size increases than when it is already large from the beginning. Hence, our results confirm the idea that cooperation is much more likely to be achieved when groups grow from small to large than when large groups are formed directly. |
| Keywords: | Prisoner’s dilemma, Cooperation in repeated games, Group growth, Norm spillover |
| Date: | 2025–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eca:wpaper:2013/391301 |
| By: | Maurizio Bussolo; Jonah Matthew Rexer; Lynn Hu |
| Abstract: | Legal institutions play an important role in shaping gender equality in economic domains, from inheritance to labor markets. But where do gender equal laws come from? Using cross-country data on social norms and legal equality, this paper investigates the socio- cultural roots of gender inequity in the legal system and its implications for female labor force participation. To identify the impact of social norms, the analysis uses an empirical strategy that exploits pre-modern differences in ancestral patriarchal culture as an instrument for present-day gender norms. The findings show that ancestral patriarchal culture is a strong predictor of contemporary norms, and conservative social norms are associated with more gender inequality in the de jure legal framework, the de facto implementation of laws, and the labor market. The paper presents evidence for a political selection mechanism linking norms to laws: countries with more conservative norms elect political leaders who are more hostile to gender equality, who then pass less progressive legislation. The results highlight the cultural roots and political drivers of legalized gender inequality. |
| Date: | 2025–05–29 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:11135 |
| By: | Ruixue Jia; James Kai-sing Kung |
| Abstract: | This study reviews the culture and institutions of Confucianism and explores their implications for the trajectory of China’s historical development. We trace the origins and evolution of the core elements of Confucianism and synthesize research on its relationship to clan culture, state institutions, and a broad array of societal values. We also highlight promising but underexplored directions for future research. While Confucianism is often invoked to explain China’s absence from the Industrial Revolution and its lack of democratization, we caution against such retrospective determinism. As a multidimensional and abstract tradition, Confucianism likely allows for varied interpretations and institutional adaptations across time and context. |
| JEL: | N15 O43 P51 Z10 Z13 |
| Date: | 2025–05 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:33883 |
| By: | Klaus Desmet; Ignacio Ortuño-Ortín; Romain Wacziarg |
| Abstract: | We discuss a wide range of measures of social heterogeneity, both theoretically and empirically. In our framework, individuals who differ from each other either in terms of their identity traits or of their cultural values experience antagonism toward each other. Depending on the type of interpersonal differences that may give rise to social antagonism, we derive a wide range of microfounded measures of social heterogeneity, many of which have been frequently used in the social sciences to characterize the causes and effects of socially relevant differences between individuals. Using these measures, we explore the worldwide landscape of social heterogeneity. We end our discussion with a consideration of the social, political and economic effects of these various metrics of heterogeneity. |
| JEL: | J1 P0 Z1 |
| Date: | 2025–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:33896 |
| By: | Dickinson, David L. (Appalachian State University); Villeval, Marie Claire (CNRS) |
| Abstract: | We investigate how group identity affects belief updating about moral norms. Using a Belief Updating task, we found that individuals follow a cautious version of Bayesian updating. Group identity itself does not directly affect belief updating. However, when given an information signal about the truthfulness of a normative statement that is dissonant with one’s perceived norm, individuals differ in their resistance to updating beliefs. This difference depends on whether the statement reflects moral norm judgments from people with the same or different political affiliation, and whether the signal supports or opposes honesty. This highlights the importance of understanding how one updates beliefs regarding moral norms, and how the group identity of those making normative judgments can be an important consideration. |
| Keywords: | online experiment, group identity, belief updating, social norms, cheating |
| JEL: | C91 D83 D91 |
| Date: | 2025–05 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp17892 |
| By: | Carlos Alos Ferrer; Johannes Buckenmaier; Michele Garagnani |
| Abstract: | Economic decisions are noisy due to errors and cognitive imprecision. Often, they are also systematically biased by heuristics or behavioral rules of thumb, creating behavioral anomalies which challenge established economic theories. The interaction of noise and bias, however, has been mostly neglected, and recent work suggests that received behavioral anomalies might be just due to regularities in the noise. This contribution formalizes the idea that decision makers might follow a mixture of rules of behavior combining cognitively- imprecise value maximization and computationally simpler shortcuts. The model delivers new testable predictions which we validate in two experiments, focusing on biases in probability judgments and the certainty effect in lottery choice, respectively. Our findings suggest that neither cognitive imprecision nor multiplicity of behavioral rules suffice to explain received patterns in economic decision making. However, jointly modeling (cognitive) noise in value maximization and biases arising from simpler, cognitive shortcuts delivers a unified framework which can parsimoniously explain deviations from normative prescriptions across domains. |
| Keywords: | Cognitive Imprecision, Strength of Preference, Noise, Decision Biases, Belief Updating, Certainty Heuristic |
| JEL: | D01 D81 D87 D91 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lan:wpaper:423483206 |
| By: | Guo, Qilin |
| Abstract: | This paper introduces the Principle of Economic Entropy Increase to elucidate the fundamental mechanism of economic growth: through the expansion of scale and diversification of structure, economic systems overcome both quantitative and structural forms of scarcity. Building on the concept of economic entropy, the study develops a dual-dimensional model—scale entropy and structural entropy—to enable the quantitative assessment of entropy dynamics within economic systems. Economic entropy increase originates from the system’s intrinsic structural demands and determines the macro trajectory of institutional evolution. Accordingly, this paper is the first to propose and systematically demonstrate the core proposition that the market economy constitutes the fundamental trajectory of economic evolution. Market economies, with their superior self-organizing and adaptive capacities, embody high-entropy structures; in contrast, planned economies, constrained by “long-chain interventions” that crowd out market mechanisms, exhibit low-entropy structures and are ultimately to be superseded. This framework offers a new lens for understanding economic growth, institutional selection, and the evolution of complex systems, with significant implications for policy design and economic governance. |
| Date: | 2025–05–30 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:ut72d_v1 |
| By: | Aldarbi, Saad |
| Abstract: | Organic Mathematics (OM) introduces a novel semantic framework designed to model the complexity of living and emergent systems. Traditional mathematical tools excel at describing linear, closed, and deterministic processes, but they struggle to capture the cyclical, recursive, and adaptive nature of organic phenomena. OM redefines variables as interdependent cycles, employs operators for influx and emergence, and uses context-driven notation to formalize the flux of biological, ecological, and social systems. Applications of OM are demonstrated through abiogenesis modeling, competitive exclusion dynamics, and the construction of sociological feedback loops. By bridging the gap between classical formalisms and the fluidity of life, Organic Mathematics offers a unifying language for systems that evolve through emergence rather than equilibrium. |
| Date: | 2025–04–25 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:osfxxx:256fw_v1 |
| By: | Lambert, Thomas |
| Abstract: | This research note/paper examines several factors that have been mentioned and debated as determinants of how Britain moves from feudalism to mercantilism and then to capitalism by way of agricultural and industrial innovations and also how it arrives at the cusp of the industrial revolution. Of special interest are somewhat recent conjectures of macroeconomic data, investment estimates, and data on horses, serfs, and slaves of previous centuries that perhaps can better contribute to and add some clarification to the debates over the transition from feudalism to capitalism and the transition from an early form a capitalism or mercantilism to the industrial revolution. The estimates, empirical notes, and exploratory analyses in this paper partially support the Brenner thesis or concept of the transition from feudalism to capitalism and also support the notion that the proceeds of slave sales and slave production provide a substantive portion of British investment amounts leading up to the industrial revolution of the 18th Century. The mainstream economic notions of property rights, thrift, free markets, and free trade are only part of the picture of how Britain achieves economic prominence in the 19th Century. Exploitation of people and animals play a very significant role that has been ignored or minimized in many history and economic history accounts. |
| Keywords: | Baran ratio, economic surplus, investment, slave trade, slavery, serfs, horses, Great Britain |
| JEL: | B51 B52 N13 N33 N44 |
| Date: | 2024–11–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:124978 |
| By: | Guo, Qilin |
| Abstract: | Drawing on the broad historical trend of power decentralization, this paper proposes the Principle of Power Entropy Increase, introducing the concept of power entropy and its mathematical formulation to systematically illuminate the evolutionary shift of power structures from concentration to dispersion. Power entropy increase is framed as a natural response of social systems to the challenges of power scarcity, structural complexity, and governance pressure—serving as the underlying logic that drives the evolution of public governance toward democratic institutions. On this basis, the paper is the first to advance and rigorously substantiate the theoretical proposition that democracy is the inevitable trajectory of institutional evolution. It contends that democracy is not born of ideological design, but arises as a structurally optimal outcome driven by systemic dynamics—a Nash equilibrium in the context of generalized social games. This principle offers not only a new perspective on political modernization and institutional transition, but also a theoretical foundation and analytical tool for assessing and forecasting transformations in power structures. |
| Date: | 2025–05–30 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:5h4j2_v1 |
| By: | Menefee, Trey |
| Abstract: | This paper reconceptualizes the domestication of Oryza sativa through the lens of recursive enclosure and network-critical evolution, where feedback loops between fire management, human cognition, and plant adaptation crossed critical thresholds to establish novel evolutionary dynamics. Challenging hydraulic-state orthodoxy, I argue that domestication emerged not through discrete human control but via phase transitions within fire-maintained ecotones operating on 3-7 year cycles. Through archaeobotanical and genomic evidence, I demonstrate that upland swidden systems created recursive attractors - ecological and cognitive feedback loops in which rice and humans co-adapted through repeated burning (t), systematic return (t+1), and selective harvesting (t+2). Fire functioned simultaneously as ecological reset mechanism and prosthetic memory system, compressing successional cycles while entraining selection pressures across multiple plant generations. These early disturbance regimes structured not only rice biology but the cognitive infrastructure enabling subsequent agricultural intensification. I propose that domestication represents a distributed phase shift in socio-ecological networks - a recursive enclosure operating at the ashline where repetitive human-fire interactions established the conditions for coevolutionary change without requiring conscious breeding programs. |
| Date: | 2025–05–30 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:3jy4h_v1 |