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on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Lucia Corno (Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore; Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore); Eliana La Ferrara; Alessandra Voena |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates the historical origins of female genital cutting (FGC). We test the historical hypothesis that FGC is associated with the Red Sea route of the African slave trade, where women were typically sold as concubines in the Middle East and infibulation was used as a means to preserve virginity. Using individual-level data from 28 African countries combined with historical records of Red Sea slave shipments from 1400 to 1900, we find that women from ethnic groups whose ancestors experienced greater exposure to the Red Sea slave trade are more likely to undergo infibulation or circumcision today. They are also more inclined to support the continuation of this practice. Our findings are robust to instrumenting Red Sea slave exports with the distance to the nearest port used for this route. We also leverage a dataset on oral traditions (Folklore) to show that greater exposure to the Red Sea slave trade correlates with a stronger association between infibulation and the cultural values of chastity and purity, which may have facilitated the diffusion of infibulation among local populations. |
| Keywords: | FGC, FGM, social norms, slave trade, Africa. |
| JEL: | O10 I11 |
| Date: | 2025–05 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ctc:serie1:def138 |
| By: | Ron Boschma |
| Abstract: | The paper reviews how the concept of institutional complementarities has been approached in the Varieties of Capitalism and Policy Mix literatures. Based on a critical review, we propose instead an evolutionary framework to analyze institutional complementarities that is inspired by the principle of relatedness. We discuss promising future applications in economic geography, such as how complementarities across institutions may promote regional diversification in regions, how this institutional complementarity framework may shed light on the question what is feasible when implementing institutional change in specific territorial contexts, and how it may contribute to understand better how regional innovation policy may become effective in particular institutional contexts. |
| Keywords: | institutions, institutional complementarities, institutional relatedness, institutional change, institutional space, varieties of capitalism, policy mix, policy space, regional diversification, Evolutionary Economic Geography |
| JEL: | B15 B52 P51 R11 R58 |
| Date: | 2025–05 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:egu:wpaper:2514 |
| By: | Sébastien Fontenay; Paula Eugenia Gobbi; Marc Goñi |
| Abstract: | Fertility in sub-Saharan Africa is the highest in the world. We showcase a driver of this exceptionally high fertility which has been largely overlooked by demographers and economists: inheritance customs. We develop a theory of inheritance under subsistence agriculture, where households face economic incentives to limit fertility to avoid dividing land into inefficiently small parcels. Consequently, fertility is higher where inheritance is transmitted to a single heir (impartible) than where it is divided equally among all children (partible). We test this prediction by linking deep-rooted inheritance customs for more than 800 ethnic groups with modern demographic surveys covering 24 countries. Exploiting ancestral borders in a spatial Regression Discontinuity Design, we show that belonging to an ethnic group with impartible inheritance increases fertility by around one child per woman and that fertility differences are larger in lands subject to indivisibilities than in lands suited for cultivating labor-intensive crops. |
| Keywords: | Fertility, Inheritance, Sub-Saharan Africa |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eca:wpaper:2013/390703 |
| By: | Heng-fu Zou |
| Abstract: | This paper develops a dynamic, neuroscience-based theory of utility and disutility, replacing the static scalar utility functions of classical economics with a biologically grounded, mathematically rigorous framework. Drawing from molecular, cellular, systems, and computational neuroscience, we model subjective wellbeing as a neurodynamic process governed by differential equations, oscillatory systems, stochastic fluctuations, and quantum probability. The brain—containing roughly 100 billion neurons and 100 trillion synapses—emerges as the fundamental organ of economic valuation, with synaptic plasticity and circuit feedback shaping how pleasure, fatigue, and effort evolve over time. We present nine core equations that capture the temporal, spatial, and probabilistic structure of hedonic experience, integrating economic constraints such as PC=wL. These models reveal utility as a lived, adaptive, and embodied process, sensitive to consumption, labor, attention, and expectation. The framework offers a unified theory of welfare rooted in neurobiological complexity, enabling a redefinition of human flourishing through the combined lenses of economics and brain science. |
| Date: | 2025–05–16 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cuf:wpaper:753 |
| By: | Selim Gulesci; Sam Jindani; Eliana La Ferrara; David Smerdon; Munshi Sulaiman; H. Peyton Young |
| Abstract: | We propose a model to study when an intermediate action can serve as a “stepping stone” that enables the elimination of a harmful norm. While the intermediate action may facilitate the first “step”, it may also become a new norm. We derive intuitive conditions for stepping stones, which depend on the relative size of social penalties and intrinsic utility benefits. We propose an econometric approach to testing whether an intermediate action is a stepping stone, and apply it to original data on female genital cutting in Somalia. The analysis shows that the intermediate action may become the new norm. |
| JEL: | C73 D91 O12 |
| Date: | 2025–05 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:33734 |
| By: | Heng-fu Zou |
| Abstract: | This paper develops a dynamic model of power accumulation and inequality using the framework of mean field games. Agents optimize intertemporally over consumption while accumulating power as a capital stock, subject to idiosyncratic productivity shocks. Power yields direct utility and enhances future accumulation. In equilibrium, the joint distribution of power and productivity evolves endogenously via a coupled Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman and Fokker-Planck system. We prove that - even absent initial heterogeneity-persistent inequality and elite dominance emerge as stable outcomes. The stationary distribution exhibits fat tails and high Gini coefficients, consistent with empirical observations of power concentration in historical empires and modern regimes. The model offers a structural explanation for the recurrent emergence of dominant elites under decentralized, rational decision-making. |
| Keywords: | power accumulation, inequality, mean field games, elite dominance, stochastic dynamics |
| Date: | 2025–05–15 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cuf:wpaper:759 |