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on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Guillaume Blanc; Romain Wacziarg |
| Abstract: | For most of human history, until the fertility transition, technological progress translated into larger populations, preventing sustained improvements in living standards. We argue that migration offered an escape valve from these Malthusian dynamics after the European discovery and colonization of the Americas. We document a strong relationship between fertility and migration across countries, regions, individuals, and periods, in a variety of datasets and specifications, and with different identification strategies. During the Age of Mass Migration, persistently high fertility across much of Europe created a large reservoir of surplus labor that could find better opportunities in the New World. These migrations, by relieving demographic pressures, accelerated the transition to modern growth. |
| JEL: | F22 J13 N33 O11 |
| Date: | 2025–03 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:33542 |
| By: | Gary Charness; Eugen Dimant; Uri Gneezy; Erin Krupka |
| Abstract: | Eliciting social norms is essential for understanding a range of behaviors in economic contexts. This paper reviews key experimental approaches to social-norm measurement, comparing the methods, practical considerations, and specific conditions under which each is most effective. We discuss various social norm elicitation techniques, including coordination-based, opinion-based, and distributional approaches. Our findings suggest that coordination-game approaches are the most widely adopted and tested; they deliver robust results, particularly in contexts with a single dominant norm. Importantly, while early methods focused on eliciting mean or modal normative beliefs, recent work shifts focus to eliciting beliefs about the distribution of normative beliefs. This allows the researcher to draw inferences on the degree of uncertainty that underlies norm assessments. This paper aims to help experimentalists and practitioners choose suitable norm-elicitation methods that are aligned with research objectives and logistical constraints. |
| Keywords: | methodology, norm elicitation, social norms. |
| JEL: | C91 D91 Z13 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11840 |
| By: | Chowdhury Mohammad Sakib Anwar; Konstantinos Georgalos; Sonali SenGupta |
| Abstract: | Gallice and Monzon (2019) present a natural environment that sustains full cooperation in one-shot social dilemmas among a finite number of self-interested agents. They demonstrate that in a sequential public goods game, where agents lack knowledge of their position in the sequence but can observe some predecessors' actions, full contribution emerges in equilibrium due to agents' incentive to induce potential successors to follow suit. Furthermore, they show that this principle extends to a number of social dilemmas, with the prominent example that of the prisoner's dilemma. In this study, we experimentally test the theoretical predictions of this model in a multi- player prisoner's dilemma environment, where subjects are not aware of their position in the sequence and receive only partial information on past cooperating actions. We test the predictions of the model, and through rigorous structural econometric analysis, we test the descriptive capacity of the model against alternative behavioural strategies, such as conditional cooperation, altruistic play and free-riding behaviour. We find that the majority resorts to free-riding behaviour, around 30% is classified as Gallice and Monzon (2019) types, followed by those with social preference considerations and the unconditional altruists. |
| Date: | 2025–04 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2504.10441 |
| By: | Takashi Izumo |
| Abstract: | In everyday life, we frequently make coarse-grained judgments. When we say that Olivia and Noah excel in mathematics, we disregard the specific differences in their mathematical abilities. Similarly, when we claim that a particular automobile manufacturer produces high-quality cars, we overlook the minor variations among individual vehicles. These coarse-grained assessments are distinct from erroneous or deceptive judgments, such as those resulting from student cheating or false advertising by corporations. Despite the prevalence of such judgments, little attention has been given to their underlying mathematical structure. In this paper, we introduce the concept of coarse-graining into game theory, analyzing games where players may perceive different payoffs as identical while preserving the underlying order structure. We call it a Coarse-Grained Game (CGG). This framework allows us to examine the rational inference processes that arise when players equate distinct micro-level payoffs at a macro level, and to explore how Nash equilibria are preserved or altered as a result. Our key findings suggest that CGGs possess several desirable properties that make them suitable for modeling phenomena in the social sciences. This paper demonstrates two such applications: first, in cases of overly minor product updates, consumers may encounter an equilibrium selection problem, resulting in market behavior that is not driven by objective quality differences; second, the lemon market can be analyzed not only through objective information asymmetry but also through asymmetries in perceptual resolution or recognition ability. |
| Date: | 2025–03 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2503.17598 |
| By: | Dror, David Mark |
| Abstract: | This paper develops a rigorous mathematical framework for analyzing trust dynamics and statistical properties in small-scale risk-sharing communities. We establish that small pools with interdependent risks exhibit fundamentally different mathematical properties than large insurance systems, with volatility exceeding stability thresholds by a factor of √(N/Nc) and correlation structures reducing effective pool size by up to 89%. We formalize trust as a mathematically tractable variable with threshold stability properties, proving the existence of critical values TRcritical ∈ [0.65, 0.75] that create bifurcation points in system behavior. Our mathematical analysis demonstrates that network density directly determines trust propagation speed according to precise mathematical relationships. We prove that trust response exhibits asymmetric properties, with negative experiences having 1.5-2.5 times stronger impact than positive experiences of equal magnitude, creating hysteresis effects in system stability. By developing differential equations governing trust evolution and applying network diffusion models, we establish exact conditions for system stability and characterize phase transitions under parameter variation. The mathematical framework enables precise quantification of correlation penalties, network effects, and trust thresholds with applications to community-based risk-sharing systems where conventional statistical approaches fail. Our results transform qualitative concepts of trust and social capital into quantifiable mathematical variables with specific dynamics and stability properties. |
| Abstract: | Diese Arbeit entwickelt ein rigoroses mathematisches Rahmenwerk zur Analyse von Vertrauensdynamiken und statistischen Eigenschaften in kleinskaligen Risikoausgleichsgemeinschaften. Wir zeigen, dass kleine Risikopools mit interdependenten Risiken grundlegend andere mathematische Eigenschaften aufweisen als groß angelegte Versicherungssysteme: Die Volatilität überschreitet die Stabilitätsschwellen um den Faktor √(N/Nc), und Korrelationsstrukturen reduzieren die effektive Poolgröße um bis zu 89 %. Wir formalisieren Vertrauen als mathematisch behandelbare Variable mit stabilitätstheoretischen Schwellenwerten und weisen die Existenz kritischer Werte TR_critical ∈ [0, 65; 0, 75] nach, die als Bifurkationspunkte im Systemverhalten fungieren. Unsere mathematische Analyse zeigt, dass die Netzwerkkonnektivität die Geschwindigkeit der Vertrauensausbreitung direkt bestimmt, gemäß exakt ableitbaren mathematischen Beziehungen. Es wird nachgewiesen, dass die Vertrauensreaktion asymmetrisch verläuft: Negative Erfahrungen wirken sich 1, 5- bis 2, 5-mal stärker aus als gleichwertige positive Erlebnisse, was Hystereseeffekte in der Systemstabilität verursacht. Durch die Entwicklung von Differentialgleichungen zur Beschreibung der Vertrauensentwicklung sowie die Anwendung von Netzwerkdiffusionsmodellen definieren wir exakte Stabilitätsbedingungen und charakterisieren Phasenübergänge bei Parameterveränderungen. Das mathematische Rahmenwerk ermöglicht eine präzise Quantifizierung von Korrelationsverlusten, Netzwerkeffekten und Vertrauensschwellen – insbesondere in gemeinschaftsbasierten Risikoausgleichssystemen, in denen konventionelle statistische Verfahren versagen. Unsere Ergebnisse überführen qualitative Konzepte wie Vertrauen und Sozialkapital in quantifizierbare mathematische Variablen mit spezifischen Dynamiken und Stabilitätseigenschaften. |
| Keywords: | trust dynamics, small risk pools, network diffusion, copula theory, correlation structures, threshold stability |
| JEL: | Z13 G22 D85 C46 C58 C22 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:esprep:316140 |