|
on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Abdellaoui, Abdel; Martin, Hilary C.; Rutherford, Adam; Kolk, Martin; Muthukrishna, Michael; Tropf, Felix; Mills, Melinda C.; Zietsch, Brendan; Verweij, Karin J.H.; Visscher, Peter M. |
| Abstract: | In civilizations, individuals are born or sorted into different levels of socio-economic status (SES) through social stratification. SES clusters both in families and geographically, and has been associated with detectable genetic effects. Here, we first review the history of scientific research on the relationship between social stratification and heredity. We then discuss recent findings in genomics research in light of the hypothesis that SES is a dynamic social construct that reflects genetically influenced traits that help in achieving or retaining a certain socio-economic position, and can exert selection pressures on genes associated with such traits. Social stratification results in people with varying talents being placed into strata with different environmental exposures, which could result in evolutionary selection pressures through differences in mortality, reproduction, and non-random mating. Recent cultural developments may have influenced these selection pressures in ways that increase social inequality. Novel tools in genomics research are revealing previously concealed genetic consequences of the way society is organized, yielding insights that should be approached with caution in search for a fair and functional society. |
| JEL: | J1 |
| Date: | 2025–03–26 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:127662 |
| By: | Columbus, Simon; Feld, Lars P.; Kasper, Matthias; Rablen, Matthew D. |
| Abstract: | This study investigates how institutional rules and fairness in enforcement affect cooperation and compliance in heterogenous groups. In a preregistered online experiment (n = 1, 254), we vary both the existence of a rule governing contributions to a public good as well as whether enforcement of the rule is biased against some players. We find that merely stating a rule has a stronger effect on behaviour than rule enforcement. Specifically, institutional rules promote cooperation by strengthening personal and social norms, which in turn sustains contributions over time. In contrast, in the absence of a rule, norms are weaker and contributions decline. Fair rule enforcement reduces free-riding and increases compliance, but it also crowds out full cooperation. Finally, we find no evidence that biased rule enforcement erodes norms, reduces cooperation, or diminishes rule compliance. Our findings highlight the crucial role of institutional rules in strengthening norms and sustaining cooperation in heterogeneous groups, even in the absence of enforcement or when rule enforcement is biased. |
| Keywords: | public goods, rule compliance, rule enforcement, social norms |
| JEL: | H41 C72 C91 C92 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:aluord:315749 |
| By: | Lorenzo Corno (Université Côte d'Azur, CNRS, GREDEG, France); Giovanni Dosi (Istituto di Economia, Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna, Italy); Luigi Marengo (Dipartimento di Impresa e Management, LUISS, Italy) |
| Abstract: | This paper provides an overview of behaviors and learning of heterogeneous economic agents - whether individuals or firms—within complex evolving economies. It aims to explore the microfoundation of agency and learning, two fundamental aspects that constitutively contribute to the emergence of micro, meso, and macro stylized facts of modern capitalist economies, conceived as complex evolving systems. The investigation begins at the individual level, drawing on insights from cognitive and social sciences and identifying relevant micro-evidence concerning the cognitive, psychological, behavioral, and social dimensions of human agency in complex and uncertain environments. It then shifts to the epistemological level organization, where individual behaviors and learning are interwoven with those of other members and embedded within the genuinely collective dimensions and emergent properties of the firm—such as organizational capabilities, heuristics, and power configurations—on which the analysis will focus. This perspective interprets the firm as a sort of primitive problem-solving entity and acknowledges that organizational behaviors and learning are "more" than what can be grasped by attending solely to insulated parts. The primary objective of this work is to contribute to a positive theory of behaviors and learning in complex evolving economies, while also offering a fertile ground for theoretical and modeling developments in search of realistic building blocks. |
| Keywords: | Complex Evolving Economies, Firm Behaviour, Human Cognition and Agency, Heuristics, Microfoundations |
| JEL: | B41 B52 D01 D21 D83 D91 |
| Date: | 2025–04 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gre:wpaper:2025-14 |
| By: | Yuval Salant; Jörg L. Spenkuch; David Almog |
| Abstract: | We explore the role of memory for choice behavior in unfamiliar environments. Using a unique data set, we document that decision makers exhibit a “memory premium.” They tend to choose in-memory alternatives over out-of-memory ones, even when the latter are objectively better. Consistent with well-established regularities regarding the inner workings of human memory, the memory premium is associative, subject to interference and repetition effects, and decays over time. Even as decision makers gain familiarity with the environment, the memory premium remains economically large. Our results imply that the ease with which past experiences come to mind plays an important role in shaping choice behavior. |
| Keywords: | memory, choice behaviour, decision-making, chess960 |
| JEL: | D01 D87 D91 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11787 |
| By: | Anwar, Chowdhury Mohammad Sakib; Georgalos, Konstantinos; SenGupta, Sonali |
| Abstract: | Gallice and Monzón (2019) present a natural environment that sustains full cooperation in one-shot social dilemmas among a finite number of self-interested agents. They demonstrate that in a sequential public goods game, where agents lack knowledge of their position in the sequence but can observe some predecessors' actions, full contribution emerges in equilibrium due to agents' incentive to induce potential successors to follow suit. Furthermore, they show that this principle extends to a number of social dilemmas, with the prominent example that of the prisoner's dilemma. In this study, we experimentally test the theoretical predictions of this model in a multi-player prisoner's dilemma environment, where subjects are not aware of their position in the sequence and receive only partial information on past cooperating actions. We test the predictions of the model, and through rigorous structural econometric analysis, we test the descriptive capacity of the model against alternative behavioural strategies, such as conditional cooperation, altruistic play and free-riding behaviour. We find that the majority resorts to free-riding behaviour, around 30% is classified as Gallice and Monzón (2019) types, followed by those with social preference considerations and the unconditional altruists. |
| Keywords: | Position uncertainty, Conditional cooperation, Social dilemma, Social preferences, Experiment, Finite mixture models |
| JEL: | C91 D64 H41 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:qmsrps:202504 |
| By: | Hu, Sijie |
| Abstract: | In unified growth models, the evolving nexus between population dynamics and technological change is key to achieving sustained economic growth. This paper uses genealogical records of 23, 449 males and their spouses to investigate this interplay-the intergenerational transmission of reproduction and human capital-within six Chinese lineages from 1300 to 1920. Examining the relationship between reproduction and long-run reproductive success, the empirical results reveal an optimal level of reproduction, demonstrating a strong Darwinian trade-off: high reproduction in each generation did not consistently lead to long-term reproductive success. Further analysis of the mechanisms is consistent with a Beckerian trade-off, highlighting the potential costs of excessive reproduction through contrasting outcomes in sons' quality: having more brothers exhibited little apparent impact on marriageability but may have been associated with lower human capital. Together, these findings contribute to a deeper understanding of micro-demographic dynamics in pre-modern China and the persistence of Malthusian constraints. |
| Keywords: | Reproduction, Long-run reproductive success, Child quantity-quality trade-off, Ming-Qing China |
| JEL: | I25 J13 N35 O15 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:glodps:1572 |