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on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Vallstrom, Daniel |
| Abstract: | https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2404.03685 With an evolutionary approach, the basis of morality can be explained as adaptations to problems of cooperation. With ‘evolution’ taken in a broad sense, AIs that satisfy the conditions for evolution to apply will be subject to the same cooperative evolutionary pressure as biological entities. Here the adaptiveness of increased cooperation as material safety and wealth increase is discussed — for humans, for other societies, and for AIs. Diminishing beneficial returns from increased access to material resources also suggests the possibility that, on the whole, there will be no incentive to for instance colonize entire galaxies, thus providing a possible explanation of the Fermi paradox, wondering where everybody is. It is further argued that old societies could engender, give way to, super-AIs, since it is likely that super-AIs are feasible, and fitter. Closing is an aside on effective ways for morals and goals to affect life and society, emphasizing environments, cultures, and laws, and exemplified by how to eat. `Diminishing returns’ is defined, as less than roots, the inverse of infeasibility. It is also noted that there can be no exponential colonization or reproduction, for mathematical reasons, as each entity takes up a certain amount of space. Appended are an algorithm for colonizing for example a galaxy quickly, models of the evolution of cooperation and fairness under diminishing returns, and software for simulating signaling development. |
| Date: | 2025–02–03 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:osfxxx:bq438_v2 |
| By: | Fabio A. C. C. Chalub; Max O. Souza |
| Abstract: | Real populations are seldom found at the Nash equilibrium strategy. The present work focuses on how population size can be a relevant evolutionary force diverting the population from its expected Nash equilibrium. We introduce the concept of insuperable strategy, a strategy that guarantees that no other player can have a larger payoff than the player that adopts it. We show that this concept is different from the rationality assumption frequently used in game theory and that for small populations the insuperable strategy is the most probable evolutionary outcome for any dynamics that equal game payoff and reproductive fitness. We support our ideas with several examples and numerical simulations. We finally discuss how to extend the concept to multiplayer games, introducing, in a limited way, the concept of game reduction. |
| Date: | 2025–02 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2502.07652 |
| By: | Celli, Fabio; Lepri, Bruno |
| Abstract: | In this paper we introduce the use of time-resolved variables to represent the evolution of categorical variables through time. Traditionally, in data science the presence or absence of categorical variables are treated as 1 or 0 with One-Hot Encoding, and then aggregated with compression techniques, such as Principal Components. We annotated time-resolved variables on the Seshat dataset as sequences of categorical features and we compare them to the same categorical features treated with one-hot encoding and Principal Component compression. We find that time-resolved variables are better predictors of the evolution of social scale and social hierarchy, but not of government specialization. We discuss advantages and limitation of the usage of time-resolved variables for the computational analysis of cultural evolution. |
| Date: | 2023–09–14 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:aj8xk_v1 |
| By: | Ruiwu Liu |
| Abstract: | In this working paper, I developed a suite of macroeconomic models that shed light on the intricate relationship between economic development, health, and fertility. These innovative models conceptualize health as an intermediate good, paving the way for new interpretations of dynamic socio-economic phenomena, particularly the non-monotonic effects of health on economic and population growth. The evolving dynamic interactions among economic growth, population, and health during the early stages of human development have been well interpreted in this research. |
| Date: | 2025–03 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2503.00391 |